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Bioculturalism, simulation and satire: the case of S1mOne 
 
SUMMARY: 
This study offers a close look at Andrew Niccol’s (b 1964) satirical film S1mOne 
from a biocultural perspective emphasising the technological simulation of a 
Hollywood celebrity and the farce ensuing from her creation.  The film is based 
on Niccol’s assumption that the hypertrophied culture into which he places his 
cultural object will be one in which human traits of sociality will be well 
advanced and the highly demanding genre of satire will be entertaining, 
persuasive, and on occasion punitive in its ridicule of Hollywood. 
The study makes a contribution to the idea that a cultural object/text operates as a 
rapid mechanism for propagating cognition — it shows how Niccol has adapted to 
less than optimal conditions in his world of Hollywood — in this case he parodies 
the role of the director of Hollywood films in the figure of Taransky.  Cognition is 
understood as that series of mental processes which include attention, memory, 
learning (from mimicry as well as other forms), problem solving, ratiocination, 
and making decisions.  Niccol relies on his audience's embodied capacities and 
skills of recognition, thinking, feeling, remembering, and accounting for his 
message to be understood.  Niccol’s technical skill in editing his narrative to 
emphasise the satire of the narrative of Taransky and Simone is a critical part of 
the film’s success.  Interpersonal and social propagation of cognition is achieved 
through reference to other cultural artefacts recalling a variety of similar ideas 
used in film and other visual creations.  The cultural significance of the 
simulacrum, Simone, is that she is a vehicle for and a form of socially propagated 
cognition. 
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The powerful imagistic impression of film helps to structure internalised cognitive 
artefacts in the viewers who are expected to reflect on their habits of viewing and 
thinking.  When a film, artwork, poem or novel is analysed, then such a cultural 
object becomes a vehicle of and for propagating cognition. 
KEYWORDS: 
Biocultural perspective, coupled systems, evolution of culture, framed narrative,  
narratives, propagated cognition, satire, simulacra, simulation. 
xvi 
 
PREFACE 
The issue of simulation, paraphrasing the old Shakespearian chestnut, “to 
simulate or not to simulate”, is contentious in many circles of visual artists.  
Most of the discussions held privately or publicly about the value of figurative 
artmaking reach back to the condemnation of imitation by Plato and it is most 
puzzling that Aristotle, the famous proponent of imitation, is not often appealed 
to as the justifier of the imitation in those disputes.  Aristotle, if he could have 
had a glimpse at the current scientific views on imitation would — one dares to 
presume — be very pleased to see the strong circle of scientists who support his 
ideas formed in the 4th century BC.  Meltzoff (1995) with his conclusions about 
the inborn propensity of humans to imitate, or Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004), 
Gazzaniga (2005) and Ramachandran (2001) with their research into mirror 
neurons, all confirm the value of imitation for learning, empathy, transmission of 
information and knowledge, and mostly for enabling culture and cultural 
behaviour. 
As a visual artist I engage with art objects and often question the validity of 
financial resources spent on cultural productions in the face of great social 
poverty.  Millions of dollars are spent daily on films and other art projects while 
millions of humans suffer extreme poverty.  In searching for some deeper 
understanding or even some reconciliation of these phenomena the observations 
made from the biocultural perspective expose a different view of “resources” and 
“costs”.  Artmaking, play or narratives examined from this perspective are not 
about financial costs and benefits, as Brian Boyd (2009) reminds his readers, but 
about evolutionary profits.  Antonio Damasio’s explanation (2012:296) that the 
“arts prevailed in evolution because they had survival value and contributed to 
the development of the notion of well-being” is useful to understand the human 
drive to make cultural products.  Those products can be understood to nourish 
our emotional biological base.  They have a power to elevate “humans to the 
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greater heights of thought and feeling” and “become a way into the homeostatic 
refinement that humans eventually idealized and longed to achieve, the 
biological counterpart of a spiritual dimension in human affairs”. 
The study is situated in an interdisciplinary field and works across the 
boundaries between disciplines traditionally divided into humanities and 
sciences. It presupposes that knowledge is propagated across various human 
activities that have been compartmentalised under such labels as ‘visual 
communication’, ‘behavioural psychology’ or ‘artificial intelligence systems’.  
Mindful of the arguments laid out by Sokal and Bricmont in the late 1990s about 
the incompetent use of scientific language by many humanistic scholars, I 
abandon the practice of paraphrasing in the places where more precise scientific 
explanations are required and use complete quotations to provide undistorted 
views of scientific accounts concerning the discussion of issues at hand. 
The examination of the roles framed narratives and human simulacra play in 
socially propagated cognition serves to emphasise the homogeneity of culture 
and knowledge and is set against the “great divide in human consciousness” 
which Latour criticises in his essay Visualisation and cognition: drawing things 
together (1999b).  The aim of this investigation is reflected in the second part of 
Latour’s title: “drawing things together”, where the “things” in this study are 
narrowed to narratives and simulation while the activity of “drawing together” 
denotes drawing them through the analytical lens provided by the cognitive 
sciences and evolutionary biology.  Doing this I hope will show that cultural 
artefacts, human minds and science do not operate separately but together they 
form a complex system of knowledge that continuously feeds, informs and 
extends one another or as Andy Clark (2010:xxviii) puts it, they form 
“inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward and feed-around loops […] loops 
that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world”.
xviii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Chapter 1 
1.1. Capuchin monkeys use stones to crack open nuts. Source: a still from 
National Geographic documentary: On assignment. Available on 
YouTube.com. 
1.2. Development of cognitive/biocultural emphasis in film studies (Buckland 
2003:3) 
Chapter 2 
2.1. William Blake, Nebuchadnezzar, 1795-1805. Watercolour on paper. Tate 
Gallery London. 
2.2. A symbolical illustration of relationships between biology and culture — a 
coupled system. Source: the cover of Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society – The Biological Sciences Journal, 363(1499). 
2.3. An example of a mind map for investigating the relationships between 
biology and culture targeting particular biological ground for pointing and 
problem solving. 
2.4. Mandler’s example of successful categorization of plane and bird models by 
9-month old children (Source: Margolis & Laurence 2007:194). 
2.5. Dan Sperber’s diagram illustrating simplified fragment of cultural cognitive 
causal chain representing a folktale that can be told and retold in many 
versions, forms and hybrids on both public and individual platforms 
(Source: Enfield & Levinson 2006:438). 
Chapter 3 
3.1. A simplified chart of cognition. 
 
xix 
 
Chapter 4 
4.1. A still from S1mOne — The press conference given by Taransky echoes a 
visual and conceptual structure of a religious assembly. 
4.2. Stills from S1mOne; (a) The elevated preacher-like position Taransky 
assumes as a self-appointed ‘high-priest’ spokesman for Simone; (b) The 
visually diminished figure of Taransky makes a sudden retreat after fierce 
grilling from information-hungry paparazzi. 
4.3. Stills from S1mOne; (a) The opening close-up shots which come to focus to 
reveal jellybeans are initially out of focus and enigmatic; (b) the image is 
brought into focus and becomes recognisable; (c) sorting out of jellybeans – 
the ‘mysterious’ purpose of this activity attended with such reverence is 
revealed three minutes later during the conversation Taransky has with his 
wife – the explanation is provided; (d) an altar-like setup for the sorting of 
jellybeans. 
4.4. Stills from S1mOne; (a-b) The repetition of close-up shots which 
thematically and structurally link the different stages of launching the 
synthespian into the public scene; (c) Taransky’s daughter retrieves the 
computer programme ‘containing’ Simone. 
4.5. Stills from S1mOne; (a) The shot from the televised interview alludes to the 
theme Madonna and Child; (b) The green screen technique that was 
supposedly used in filming the interview is revealed. 
4.6. A still from S1mOne; “I know this place!” (a) Bellini, Madonna and Child 
Enthroned with Saints of San Zaccaria in Venice, 1505; (b) Piero della 
Francesca, The Montefeltro Altarpiece, Pinacoteca di Brera in Milan, 1474. 
4.7. Stills from S1mOne: (a) Shadow projection – the outside view. (b) Shadow 
projection – the inside view; (c) A still from the film Home Alone (1990); 
(d) Indonesian shadow theatre – visual storytelling for the purpose of 
passing on morals, myths and knowledge; (e) Joseph Benoit Suvee, 
Invention of Art of Drawing, 1793, oil on canvas; (f) A still from Lotte 
Reiniger’s 1925 “shadow film” The adventures of Prince Achmed; (g) Jan 
Saenredam, Plato's Allegory of the Cave, 1604, engraving. 
xx 
 
4.8. (a) A still from S1mOne: Taransky produces a 3D holographic 
representation of his synthespian for a worldwide concert performance; (b) 
A still from Lang’s Metropolis where the robotic replica of Maria is brought 
to life; Rotwang, the inventor-magician creates Maschinenmensch; (c) 
Alphonse Marie de Neuville, Nautilus (1869), illustration from Jules 
Verne’s Twenty thousand leagues under the sea; (d) A still from the Star 
Trek series (1987), teleportation; (e) An example of motion capture 
processes; (f) Alesso Baldovinetti, Annunciation (1447) Tempera on wood, 
167 x 137 cm, Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence.  
4.9. A still from S1mOne; the Internet page from the research Taransky’s 
daughter, Lainey Christian, conducts at the same time as her father 
constructs a digital actress (like Pygmalion who according to Ovid “carved 
a statue out of snow-white ivory”). 
4.10.   Stills from S1mOne; (a-b) the soft emotional gaze of Simone evokes the 
emotional response in the audience. 
4.11.   Stills from S1mOne; (a) running into fiction; (b) the image of Simone as a 
dominant stage set. 
4.12.   Stills from S1mOne; (a) & (b) the billboard with the image of an eye is 
being transported across the end of a passage between the studio buildings. 
4.13.   Stills from S1mOne; (a) the visual distortions of the environment; (b) “we 
gave you a complementary carwash”; (c) illusionistic environment where 
nothing is what it seems to be. 
4.14.   Stills from S1mOne – spotting the differences; (a) still from the televised 
interview with Simone; (b) comparison of the views of the location; (c) the 
actual ‘current’ location which has changed since the time the internet 
photo was taken (and used by Taransky) – a building in the background has 
been erected; (d) the paparazzo ‘faces’ the discrepancies between the 
physical and photographic evidence. 
4.15.   (a) Michelangelo Buonarroti, The creation of Adam on the Sistine Chapel 
ceiling in the Church of S. Pietro in Vincoli in Rome, 1511; (b) Hercules at 
the crossroads, Annibale Carracci (1596), oil on canvas, collection: Naples, 
xxi 
 
Museo e Gallerie Nazionali di Capodimonte; (c) Hercules at the crossroads, 
Pompeo Batoni (1748), oil on canvas, collection: Liechtenstein Museum; 
(d) The Continence of Scipio, Niccolo dell'Abbate (1555), oil on canvas, 
location: Louvre Museum; (e) Christ Pantocrator, mosaic (1174-82) in 
Albanian Catholic Church from Cefalù Cathedral, Sicily; (f) Neo-Assyrian 
cylinder seal c.85BC, location: British Museum; (g) Warren Neidich, 
Conversation map (I worked on my film today. Are you dating someone 
now?) (2002), digital composite image of conversations conducted in sign 
language with lights attached to participants hands; (h) Warren Neidich, 
Conversation map (I am in love with him, Kevin Spacey) (2002). 
4.16.   Stills from S1mOne (a-c) Taransky stages the presence of body-less actress 
in the hotel suite; (d-e) the paparazzo reconstructs the presence of Simone 
and worships all objects supposedly touched by her; (f-i) the hotel scenes – 
the shots satirically reveal before and after situations.  
4.17.   Stills from S1mOne; (a) Taransky’s imprisonment; (b) the creator of the 
most influential celebrity in the world is powerless. 
4.18.   Stills from S1mOne; (a-d) “stills” from Simone’s film “I am Pig”; (e) the 
attempted subversion of Simone’ status backfires and the dispirited 
Taransky faces the film poster for Simone’s cinematic effort. 
4.19.   Stills from S1mOne; (a) “Simone wishes to thank the following for their 
contribution to the making of Simone”; (b-d) the epilogue scenes Taransky 
is shown to continue creating illusions. 
4.20.   Stills from S1mOne; (a) social fitness asserted by “gift bearing”; (b) Lainey 
rescues her father by restoring Simone to existence; (c) Taransky’s family 
restoration. 
4.21.   Stills from S1mOne; (a) selection of the facial features and visual 
appearance of the synthespian – the newly established alliance’s facial 
features must appeal to both Taransky’s and social visual preferences; (b-c) 
Taransky searches through the visual bank of facial features of the 
renowned film stars who had already “proved” their social fitness and 
desirability for forming alliances with them; (d-e) “putting it together” – 
Taransky makes a comparative analysis of selected facial features resulting 
in a composite portrait of an ultimate star. 
xxii 
 
4.22.   Stills from S1mOne; (a-b) the mirror actions by the synthespian are shown 
in the film to anticipate the inductive actions by Taransky as his cognitive 
entanglement with Simone progresses; (c) A graph illustrating the close 
‘geographical’ proximity within the brain of regions responsible for 
“monitoring own mental states” and for “attributing mental states to others” 
activities.  “Location of peak activations in medial frontal regions during 
task in which subjects think about their own or other people’s mental states 
or have to interpret actions of freely moving agents” (source: Frith & Frith, 
2001:153). 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
Human cognition, interaction, and culture are thoroughly intertwined.  
Without cognition and interaction there would be no culture.  Without 
culture, cognition and interaction would be very different affairs, as they 
are among other social species. 
Dan Sperber (in Enfield & Levinson 2006:431) 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
In this study the focus is on a cultural object, a film.  This cultural object, while it 
showcases some prime examples of human ingenuity in technological 
development, at the same time relies on our biology to disseminate the cognition 
of moral values which the director, Andrew Niccol (b 1964), wants to offer 
viewers.  There are many well studied mechanisms to explain how we as humans 
perceive, appropriate, and understand information about our world. However, as 
an artist, I use biology to amplify my understanding of the cultural artefact, 
S1mOne — not as a biologist would, but as a visual artist.  So, I have used this 
biocultural study, ranging over culture in a broad sense to narrative, and on to one 
of the specific genres of humour, namely, satire and the historical treasury of 
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visual art, to express my understanding of a biocultural approach.  The biology, as 
far as an artist has understood it, or the science behind cognition, as it pertains to 
perception, appropriation and comprehension of a narrative, is detailed to provide 
evidence for the bio-aspect of the biocultural analysis (Boyd, Carroll & Gottschall 
2010).  The biocultural approach to date has not been exploited in film to the same 
degree as it has been in literary studies and that is the particular contribution 
which this study claims to offer. 
Although narrative is one of our basic human methods of creating meaningful 
interpretations of the world, the biological background and basis for the success of 
narrative as a way of distributing cognition could not be understood as well as it is 
now without technological advancements in neuro-imaging made during the 
1990s. In particular, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allowed 
scientists to map the brain’s structures by measuring fluctuating levels of blood 
flow while these structures were activated and working.  Furthermore fMRI gives 
scientists a three dimensional map of the inside and outside of the brain (Larson 
2009; Mlodinow 2012).  These advances and others in evolutionary biology have 
assisted in making the concept of a mind-body unity important in science and, 
subsequently, the humanities.  Such new understanding has gradually filtered into 
cultural criticism (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby 1992; Carroll 1995; Storey 1996; 
Pinker 2007) and enabled those engaged in critiques of literature, the fine arts and 
other humanities disciplines to view theoretical and philosophical responses to 
culture through a new lens, that of biology. 
An example of the mode through which a specific cultural object is considered as 
an opportunity to transmit cognition is a dramatic, satirical narrative, a romantic 
farce, about simulation. Andrew Niccol’s film S1mOne (Simone henceforth refers 
to the synthespian character in the film) simulates and satirises the real world of 
Hollywood.  The film relates a story which, through parody, satire and an 
effortless exploitation of the conventions of film production, points a finger at the 
film director/producer, Taransky, and the whole industry of film creation.  
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Taransky becomes entangled with his creation, a digital actress, Simone, to the 
extent that he becomes a fabulator and confabulator whose lies cause increasingly 
severe consequences for him as he faces the public and the paparazzi.  The film 
satirises many components, including auteurs, conventions of Hollywood 
narratives, screen goddess worship, the lack of insight into the meretricious 
business practices of the film industry, and the extent to which paparazzi are 
willing to humiliate themselves in the service of an illusion.  But the main target 
of the satire is Taransky, living and working in a highly artificial world of 
consumerist illusion, who loses his identity to a simulation, almost commits an 
illusory murder, only to have his daughter resolve the complexities of the plot in 
the epilogue to give the story a happy ending. 
The claim is made in this study that meta-cognition (thinking about thinking), 
when manipulated through satire, imposes a burden on the satirist to mark the 
objects of his satire sharply and accurately to encourage reflection on what he is 
satirising.  In film, this requires a comprehension of the conventions of 
Hollywood scripts, techniques of filming, editing, and editing for continuity on 
the part of the film makers.  The editing is a critical way of involving the spectator 
in what is happening in the film and to its characters, especially if the intention is 
to satirise some spectators and the industry itself.  Satire is a difficult genre, 
because it is based on the assumption that readers, spectators or viewers will be 
moved by reflecting on the satirised behaviour to reflect on their own foibles and 
faults.  In the world of primates it is humans only who appear to have the capacity 
to reflect on and enjoy satire. 
Niccol raises questions about what it is to be human compared to the simulacra of 
persons who are represented as screen goddesses.  Simone, the synthespian, like 
Galatea in the Pygmalion myth, represents all those creations of the divine and 
magical woman of the imagination.  A predominant question in the film is that of 
sexual selection in terms of beauty and which man is to have access to the 
beautiful Simone.  Socially constructed cultural objects such as film, artworks and 
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literature provide an opportunity for the creators of the objects to spread ideas 
influencing the behaviour and understanding of the recipients of these objects, 
provided each of those engaged in the “conversation” has shared mental models 
(Givón 2005).  In the world of satire as an expression of humour three theories 
about how it functions have been dominant until recently, namely, incongruity, 
relief, and superiority (Kuipers 2008).  Those approaches all have validity and the 
biocultural approach offered in this study is believed to enhance understanding of 
satirical ruses to spread comprehension. 
The fact that culture is embedded in social structures and spread through society 
arises in part from the tendency of humans to aggregate in large groups which can 
facilitate group intentionality.  As Tuomela (2007:9) states, “[a]s the disposition 
to ‘we-mode’ thinking and acting arguably is a stable feature based on culture-
gene coevolution (an adaptation), this theory connects to our ancestral history and 
has a naturalistic basis.”  Working with this fact that as cultural actors our ‘we-
mode’ of thinking can be influenced, satire as a tool for doing so seems to be very 
valuable. Of course, whether satire has any lasting effects, or changes the way we 
think, is part of another discussion. 
A cultural problem which has engaged authors, auteurs, playwrights, artists and 
philosophers has been the imitative nature of humans' interaction with each other, 
the world around them and their production of simulations of humans in that 
world.  The connotative field concerning the idea of simulation — dissimulation, 
dissembling, deception, faking, and so on, suggests something is not real and so is 
morally bad, but this study is not an answer to the moral question of whether 
simulation is ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  It is related to a series of other questions.  Those 
questions can be summed up as, ‘What is the use to which the simulation has been 
put from a biocultural perspective?’ 
A clarification of some of the terms used in this study is provided here. 
“Simulation” (DeLanda 2011) is the technical term for an imitation such as 
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Taransky is supposed to perform.  To simulate Simone he has source information 
about women, the characteristics which are essential to their being women as well 
as their key behaviours.1  With that information he can make a simulation. 
Simulation is based on approximations and simplifying to replicate some process, 
real or non-existent.  The fidelity and the validity of the outcome of the simulation 
depend on the model which is initially developed for the simulation. S1mOne is 
about a successful simulation.  ‘Mimesis’ is a carry-all term used in this study as 
in imitation, representation of the real world.  Its philosophical implications from 
the Greeks and Romans of antiquity as ‘imitatio’ to the feminist Luce Irigaray's 
(b. 1930) stereotypes are acknowledged as important but are not germane to this 
biocultural analysis.2 
The study focuses on the two kinds of simulation that pertain to the analysed film.  
The first is the cognitive aspect where the speculative, imaginative and 
hypothetical scenarios of possible outcomes to the encountered problems are 
played out in the human brain.  Such speculative play can result in imagery 
produced in the visual cortex.  The second meaning of simulation, an act of 
creating a representation or a model of something, is the technological, imitative 
sense.  The view of simulation taken in this study is that it is a premeditated, 
“outcome-based” behaviour in which both the imaginary (speculative) and 
imitative (technological) solutions are intimately connected and gradually 
conflated as portrayed through the increasingly confused behaviour of the 
character Taransky in the film. 
Because this study analyses S1mOne from a biocultural perspective, different 
                                                 
1 The use of the plural ‘behaviours’ comes from biological discourse to underscore the fact that 
Simone is not a human, but a simulation. Human behaviour refers to the whole range of 
behaviours, voluntary or involuntary, conscious or subconscious, exhibited by humans who are 
influenced by biology, culture, values, authority, emotions, and ethics.   
2 μίμησις in Greek and ‘imitatio’ in Latin. 
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definitions of culture are offered.  Culture in an anthropological sense is 
understood as the “non-genetic transmission of behaviour, including local customs 
and even fashions” (Tomasello 1999a:4—5).  Or, as Sperber (1996:1) says, 
Culture is made up, first and foremost, of … contagious ideas. It is 
made up also of all productions (writings, artworks, tools, etc.), the 
presence of which in the shared environment of a human group 
permits the propagation of ideas. 
Culture has been characterised as a rapid method for humans to adapt to their 
environment (relatively speaking over a vast timeline).  Culture in this sense, as 
adaptation, contrasts with genetic adaptation which is infinitely slower (Orr 
2005).3
   
Culture as an evolutionary adaptation is well established, although the 
analogy between culture and genes cannot be taken too far (Boyd & Richerson 
2005).  There is widespread consensus amongst evolutionary biologists on certain 
assumptions about the value of culture for human beings, as Boyd and Richerson 
(2005:44) explain, “[c]ulture increases average fitness if it makes the learning 
processes that generate new knowledge less costly or more accurate”. 
Imitation in this study is examined from the perspective of its being one of a set of 
animal behaviours used for numerous purposes – survival, problem solving, 
learning and teaching, acquiring resources, and access to mate selection. It also 
has a significant impact on the development of pro-social adaptations which lead 
to sociality (Tuomela 2007).  The understanding of biological bases for cultural 
activities and cognition enables cultural criticism to exist in the widest possible 
context and allows for new insights into the understanding of culture (Andrews & 
Andrews 2012).  The cognitive sciences include studies of other species and work 
                                                 
3 “Adaptation and selection are not the same – adaptation is a process in evolution and through 
adaptation an organism helps itself to fit into its habitat more successfully.  Selection is also an 
evolutionary term and it refers to genetic development which suggests that successful adaptation 
might be the reason for selection and the consequences of that will be that adaptive traits which 
have been selected and are inherited enable more offspring to be produced” (Orr 2005). 
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across anthropocentric boundaries – looking at culture from such a broad 
perspective enables fresh insights (Cochran & Harpending 2009). 
The transmission of cognition is one of the causes and one of the outcomes of 
sociality in the sense of cooperation to solve problems, joint intention, joint social 
action, social institutions, evolution of cooperative social activities and group 
responsibility (Tuomela 2007).  Even if such behaviours are technologically 
assisted and therefore enhanced, they remain of the same type.  Nevertheless, we 
share many basic behaviour traits with other mammals (Figure 1.1).  The 
Capuchin monkeys use nut-crushing rocks as tools.  Culture is conceptualised as 
having three components — socially learned information, and although this 
particular component is reported among some primates, the other two 
components, morality of the social group and communication as rituals are not 
easily proved to exist in non-human species.  As Hill (2007:353) says, “It is 
unclear (and doubtful) whether any nonhuman species exhibit the second and third 
components of culture. Until this is established, I believe that it is inappropriate to 
talk about animal culture”. 
 
Figure 1.1 Capuchin monkeys use stones to crack open nuts.  
Not all social animal groups use rocks as tools although they might live in the 
same territory, similar environments and have access to the same rocks.  It is only 
under certain conditions that imitation of tool use happens.  Boyd and Richerson 
(2005:44) say, 
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[I]mitation occurs when younger animals observe the behavior of 
older animals and learn how to perform the behavior by watching 
them.  In this case, the tradition is preserved because young 
chimpanzees actually imitate [my emphasis] the behavior of older 
chimpanzees. 
This act of imitation is significant compared to the ‘social enhancement’ of 
animals learning on their own but not experiencing selective social or 
“observational learning” which leads to cumulative cultural change (Boyd & 
Richerson 2005:56). The reason for distinguishing between imitation and 
cultural enhancement is based on psychobiological findings.  As soon as the 
animal (or organism) does not have to rely on its own reinvention of the 
enhanced behaviour and can use observation/imitation as a means of learning 
there is cumulative cultural change.  The biological bases for this behaviour are 
described more fully in the second chapter. 
1.1.1  Biocultural approach defined as the “cognitive turn” in film theory 
An increased interest in the findings of science in relation to cognition can be seen 
in the particular way the film industry has interpreted the last thirty years' 
scientific findings about the brain, biology and the technology which enabled the 
profound shift in thinking about the body-mind. 
Bordwell (1985) had begun to take into account cognitivism in relation to film 
theory in the early 1980s.  The publication of Lakoff and Turner's (1989) book on 
the embodiment of metaphor, made scholars of social sciences and film theory 
more aware of the need for a cognitive framework for their disciplines.  The impact 
of cognitive science on film theory has been rather fragmented, according to 
Buckland (2003), and there exists a split between North American critics and their 
European counterparts.  Generally, the split can be described as follows (Buckland 
2003:1-2): 
Despite their similarities, the two groups evidence a marked contrast 
in their work: Whereas the North American cognitivists decisively 
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reject the basic doctrines of modern film theory (a.k.a. 'contemporary' 
film theory, based upon structural linguistics, semiotics, Marxism, and 
psychoanalysis), the European cognitivists inaugurate a revolution in 
modern film theory by returning to and transforming its early stage – 
that is, the semiotic stage.  Both groups therefore reject psychoanalysis 
and replace it with cognitive science.  However, the European 
cognitivists assimilate cognitive science into a semiotic framework, 
whereas the North American cognitivists work within a pure cognitive 
framework (one untainted by semiotics). 
In Figure 1.2 the development of a cognitive emphasis on film theory is 
exemplified by how theorists have moved from classical film theory to cognitive 
film semiotics. 
1. CLASSICAL FILM THEORY 
(a) Montagists (Rudolf Arnheim, Sergei Eisenstein, etc.) 
(b) Realists (André Bazin, Siegfried Kracauer, etc.) 
2. MODERN FILM THEORY (a.k.a. 'contemporary' film theory) 
(a) Film semiotics (Christian Metz of Film Language, Language and Cinema) 
(b) Post-structural film theory (a.k.a. second semiotics, psychosemiotics): Marxist and 
psychoanalytic film theory of Stephen Heath, Colin MacCabe, Metz of The Imaginary 
Signifier, Jean-Louis Comolli, Jean-Louis Baudry, Raymond Bellour, etc. 
(The transition from 2a to 2b was effected by theories of enunciation based on the linguistics 
of Benveniste). 
3. COGNITIVE FILM THEORY 
David Bordwell, Noël Carroll, Edward Branigan, Joseph Anderson, Torben Grodal, Ed Tan, 
Murray Smith 
4. COGNITIVE FILM SEMIOTICS 
(development from 2a) 
(a) New theories of enunciation (Francesco Casetti, Metz of The Impersonal Enunciation) 
(b) Semio-pragmatics of film (Roger Odin) 
(c) Transformational generative grammar and cognitive semantics of film (Michel Colin, 
Dominique Chateau). 
Figure 1.2 Development of cognitive/biocultural emphasis in film studies (Buckland 
2003:3) 
It is Buckland’s intention to show the value of the semiotic approach to film 
theory in arguing for bridging the gap between cognitive film theory and cognitive 
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film semiotics.  He arrives at the following conclusions (2003:5): 
Film semiotics is a project that does not consider 'film' to be an 
unproblematic, pregiven entity, but reflects on the very nature of film's 
existence, together with the consequences it has on culture and 
society. Semioticians challenge the commonsense ideological 
understanding of film as a mere form of harmless entertainment, 
maintaining that it is a system of signification that articulates 
experience. 
It is not the intention in this study to take up Buckland's challenge and enter the 
semiotic discussion.  That film is a “system of signification that articulates 
experience” seems to be Niccol’s intention in S1mOne.  Approaching the film 
through a biocultural critique enables research in the disciplines of the fine arts to 
be included beyond the peripheries of cognitivism.  Thus it becomes possible to 
include some discussion on aspects of sociality and evolution, not excluding any 
semiotic understandings. 
1.1.2  Niccol’s reception in the academic literature 
The lack of attention to Niccol’s S1mOne is exemplified by the coverage his other 
films have had but to date there has been no biocultural examination of the film. 
Niccol’s S1mOne has not received much academic attention apart, perhaps, from 
Michael Foley’s “Plato, Christianity, and the cinematic craft of Andrew Niccol” 
(2006:43-67) in which the emphasis is primarily on Niccol’s two other films, 
Gattaca (1997) and The Truman Show (1998).  Gattaca has attracted most of the 
scholarly attention and has been analysed from a variety of perspectives.  The 
urgent issues concerning genetic and sociobiological determinism are taken up in 
“Genetic coming of age: genomics, enhancement and identity in film” by Kirby 
and Gaither (2005), while Banner’s (2011) essay, “The postracial imagination: 
Gattaca’s imperfect world”, examines the film’s representation of the world.  
Kirby’s (2004) focus is on the ethical values and discriminatory practices 
addressed through the film in his essay, “Extrapolating race in GATTACA: 
genetic passing, identity and the science of race”.  Other noteworthy essays 
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addressing Gattaca are Briggs and Kelber-Kaye’s (2000) “There is no 
unauthorized breeding in Jurassic Park: gender and the uses of genetics”, in which 
the body politics and the cultural anxiety about biological technologies in Gattaca 
are examined.  There is Wood’s (2003) “Genes and human potential: Bergsonian 
readings of Gattaca and the human genome”, in which he demonstrates the 
possible alternative interpretation of the film compared to the prevailing analysis 
through the dystopian lens which targets deterministic trends in contemporary 
societies by Kirby or Banner. 
These articles are, however, focused on Gattaca and The Truman Show and do not 
address the concerns presented in S1mOne.  The issue of manipulation of reality 
in S1mOne is seemingly of lesser urgency than that of gene manipulation in 
Gattaca and apparently carries much less emotional weight. 
1.2  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There has been no serious critique from directors, actresses, pressmen to 
financiers which Niccol presents that has been given any coverage from a 
biocultural perspective.  It is Simpson (2003:1) who enunciates the value of 
humour in human interactions in a nutshell, “Skill in the delivery of humour, in 
whatever its precise style or genre, is a prized asset in human societies and 
cultures”.  Although Branigan (2006) explicitly uses cognitive science 
terminology and speaks about the cognitive turn in film theory, works such as 
S1mOne are not mentioned in his publication.  Satire is a type of humour reserved 
perhaps for TV and cartoon rather than a full length film, Goldmark and Keil 
(2011) suggest.  Comedies abound in the Hollywood annals, but satire about 
Hollywood is less easy to discover (Horton 1991, 2003; Goldmark 2005).  
However, in his review of the life of Henry Bumstead, Hollywood director, 
Horton, suggests that Slaughterhouse Five (1974) consisted of a 
challenge ... to create a satirical look to contemporary American 
culture, to come up with an exaggerated 'futuristic' world on another 
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planet (Tralfamadore) and, most difficult of all, to recreate the city of 
Dresden before, during and after the Allied firebombing attack. 
This was not about Hollywood, though.  Although the satirical view of American 
politics and the politics of war under President Bush in Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004) is 
another look at American society it is not a cameo of Hollywood.  Satire and 
comedy are easily confused in the lay public's vocabulary.  Horton (1991:4) says 
of the genre of satire as compared with that of comedy, 
[i]f the comic can represent the purest form of laughter, then satire ... 
is by general consensus a form of purposeful laughter.  Voltaire ends 
his satiric novel Zadig with the words “Yes, but. ...”.  In a real sense, 
any satirist … works within such a double awareness of the need to 
suggest a ‘but’, an alternative vision/perspective/reality.  But ... satire 
is perhaps the slipperiest of genres, the one most misunderstood, 
abused, and in danger of falling into something else, be it pathos, 
bathos, self-pity, farce, or pure propaganda. 
But scarce interest in the biological bases of humour has kept discussion of the 
genre of satire in film firmly in the camp of the humanities despite the revolution 
wrought by findings in biology in terms of culture and humour.  At the risk of 
repetition, findings in biology have only lately begun to filter down into the 
humanities (Boyd & Richerson, 2005) and these illuminating insights of biology’s 
impact on culture are only gradually being taken up from various perspectives into 
the discourse of the humanities (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby 1995; Carroll 1995; 
Storey 1996; Damasio 2003; Eakin 2004; Boyd & Richerson 2005; Pinker 2007; 
Boyd 2009, 2012; Dancygier 2011). 
This study, then, is a close look at the satirical film S1mOne from a biocultural 
perspective.  It makes a small contribution to the idea that a cultural object/text 
operates as a rapid working mechanism for propagating cognition, especially 
when it exploits narrative, embedded narrative, social criticism in the form of 
satire, parody and irony, perception, and appropriation and comprehension as fine-
tuned to our biological make-up.  The interpersonal and social transmission (or 
scaffolding) of cognition is also achieved through reference to other cultural 
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artefacts recalling a variety of similar ideas used in the film world and other visual 
creations.  The producer of the film relies on his audience's embodied capacities 
and skills of recognition, thinking, feeling, remembering and accounting for his 
message to be understood.  The powerful imagistic impact of film helps to 
structure internalised cognitive artefacts for the viewers about to reflect on their 
habits of viewing and thinking.  When a film, artwork, poem or novel is put 
through the process of close criticism and analysis then such cultural object/text or 
film becomes a vehicle of and for transmitting cognition. 
Although the nature of simulation and mimesis has been scientifically examined in 
fields such as neuroscience, cognitive sciences and the new philosophy of mind in 
the last three decades, there has been an on-going “simulation practice” or 
repetitive acts of representation/mimesis ever since the Middle/Upper Palaeolithic 
transition (Mithen 1996:152).  Cultural objects are understood as outward 
representations of internalising processes in relation to environment and ideas. 
Mimesis and simulation do not only underpin certain productions of cultural objects 
but also serve to frame episodic, individual and collective memory into propagated 
cognition (Donald 1991; Mithen 1996; Dennett 2000; Stafford 2007). This study 
examines how cultural objects pull mimesis and simulation out of episodic memory 
and push them into the field of transmitted cognition. 
The study argues that simulation, vital for production of narratives and the creation 
of forms of human simulacra, is rooted in biology, and its cultural existence is not 
only the reflection of that biological wiring, but also a vehicle for and a form of 
socially transmitted cognition.  The claim that the brain can seemingly experience 
sensations where there are no sense receptors (Békésy 1974; Goldstein 2001), as 
well as ideas about the extended mind (Menary 2010), poses questions about the 
role and function of simulations, such as: Can simulation act as an extension of 
human perception, how it is processed by the brain and what emerges out of human 
interactions with simulations?  However, these questions are not pursued in this 
study.  Clark (2010:xxvii), convincingly, in any case, presents an objection, when 
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he sees the “separation between the mind, the body and the environment as an 
unprincipled distinction".  Because external objects play a significant role in aiding 
cognitive processes, the mind and the environment act as a “coupled system”. 
1.2.1  Aims 
The aims of this study are as follows: 
 To show the links between biology and culture from an artistic 
understanding of evolutionary biology; 
 To analyse Niccol’s film from the perspective of biology and as a cultural 
object; 
 To show that the genre of satire is a successful mechanism for providing 
an opportunity for propagating cognition;  
 To make a contribution to the body of knowledge in the humanities 
through biocultural analysis of a specific film. 
1.2.2  Objectives 
The study is undertaken to achieve the following objectives: 
 To review the literature on the topic of how human sociality has a 
biological background for the propagation of culture and ideas; 
 To show that the old divide between the humanities and sciences can be 
fruitfully reviewed to enable fresh perspectives on cultural objects; 
 To show how, through the analysis of certain cultural products, the 
biocultural approach to film criticism might be useful. 
 
1.2.3  Domain of the study 
The domain of the study is the field of narrative, film, satire and biology as it 
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pertains to human deception and the consequences for violators of the norm of 
fairness, especially in the use of human simulacra.  Satire is understood as a 
particular vehicle for the transmission and spreading of cognition. 
1.2.4  Limitations of the study 
The study is conducted from the perspective of the humanities and no claims are 
made as to a deep understanding of evolutionary biology or the functions of 
cognition from a scientific viewpoint.  Studies of cognitive processes are complex 
and are informed by research made in a variety of fields and perspectives.  In 
Chapter 4 the biocultural analysis of a cultural object, the film S1mOne, is carried 
out according to the general and current understanding of how human evolution, 
culture and cognition operate. 
I do not suggest that the interpretation presented here has a value over and above 
other critical approaches, nor does it necessarily provide a scientific, reliable or 
accurate account of interactions with cultural objects.  The value of the biocultural 
approach is that it bridges the humanities and sciences divide and because it is 
biocultural, it does not take issue with many contemporary “-isms” (such as 
masculinity in some areas of feminism, or authorship in Barthes’ postmodern 
notions of originality).  The biocultural approach is inclusive in bringing together 
biology and culture and enables cultural critics’ focus to move more freely 
between cultural universalities and cultural differences. 
 
1.3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section expands on 1.1.1 Biocultural approach defined as the “cognitive 
turn” in film theory, in terms of the worldview which underlies that 
interpretation and the theoretical considerations which have informed that view. 
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1.3.1  Worldview/paradigm 
The methodology of this study is qualitative in nature because it is undertaken as 
an interpretation of a cultural object.   
This study has been undertaken from the viewpoint that Darwin's (1809-1882) 
conclusions about natural selection as an evolutionary drive are fundamentally 
significant methods of understanding the world and natural life.  In addition, the 
idea that the body and mind are not separate but are intimately connected (Varela 
1992; Damasio 2010) is a tacit premise.  The third assumption in the paradigm 
which has driven this research is that culture and the gene pool co-evolve (Boyd 
& Richerson 2005), however differently the two systems might operate at the 
micro level. 
1.3.2  Theoretical background 
The critical approach to the cultural objects under discussion is from a biocultural 
perspective.  That perspective has been called the “cognitive turn” in film theory 
(Buckland, 2003).  This section contains a general overview of what the 
“cognitive turn” has come to mean to the social sciences in general and what the 
significance of that turn might be.  One of the characteristics of culture among 
humans is the manufacture of cultural objects, art objects, serving as one of the 
key indicators of sociality (Tuomela 2007).  With the blossoming of cognitive 
studies over the last three decades (Longuet-Haggins 1973; Churchland 1986; 
Dennett 1988; Minsky 1988; Turner 1991; Fireman, McVay & Flanagan 2003; 
Gazzaniga 2005; Keysers 2011; Ramachandran 2011) a biocultural approach to 
the study of works of art which differs from previous approaches has been enabled 
through the work of such scholars as Lopreato (1990), Tooby and Cosmides 
(1992), Mithen (1996), Carroll (1995), Sperber (1996), Tomasello (1999a), 
Sterelny (2003), Dutton (2009) and Boyd (2009, 2012). To some degree in film 
studies there are Branigan (1992), Currie (1995), Buckland (2002, 2003), 
Bordwell (2006) and Andrews and Andrews (2012).  
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Each discipline has to incorporate cognitive science findings according to its own 
theoretical base.  Different design layouts for biocultural analysis target different 
domains of such analysis and are outcomes of the relationships between the 
interests and intentions of the maker of an object or creator of a text and those of 
the cognisant.  The biocultural analysis of cultural objects involves both complex 
volitional actions and, simultaneously, quite simple volitional actions.  For 
instance, to make a film which correlates with our visual, perceptual, cognitive 
apparatus as human beings, the film maker has to take account of the way the 
human brain processes visual information through the analysis of certain cultural 
products.  As a consequence, film relies on a running rate of twenty-four frames 
per second, an obvious example of how film makers have matched our biology to 
our own benefit in understanding the cultural object.  Another of the strategies 
film makers exploit is the use of narrative as a way of making sense of the world. 
A biocultural analysis of cultural texts and objects relies on a combination of 
actions that simultaneously deal with cultural and biological phenomena which 
enable and facilitate human understanding of the particular object under such 
analysis. To define relationships between biological and cultural agents in a 
cultural object in terms of its form and content, actions like perception, 
appropriation, pattern recognition and interpretation play important roles.  The 
forms of cultural objects are a direct outcome of human cognitive functions.  The 
content of cultural objects is typically thought of as open for interpretative actions, 
but those actions in turn also rely on cognitive processes like anticipation, mind-
reading and pattern recognition. 
Traditional humanistic critiques of cultural objects have not taken into account the 
biological bases for the development of those objects, nor for the reception of 
those objects.  This is true of film scholarship (Andrews & Andrews 2012). 
Indeed, the vertical, in-depth magnifications used in science to examine biological 
and non-living agents and environments when annexed for use in humanistic 
critiques, amplify the intimate connectedness between human culture and human 
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biology and account for cultural actions as being biologically emergent.  As Gay 
(2009:33) explains, the vast majority of humanistic study is horizontal.  An 
inspection of “Michelangelo’s genius by examining his marbles with a 
microscope” would seem questionable.  But a biocultural approach to the 
discussion of cultural objects which takes into account scientific findings over the 
last half century about human nature and behaviour and the homeostatic 
necessities underlying the very existence of a self — relating to culture (Damasio 
2010), enriches cultural and literary theories and prevents them from being a 
deadly malaise which might stultify and nullify collaboration, cognition and 
creativity.   
The popular view that the adoption of the biological approach towards culture and 
human characteristics leads to biological determinism is misleading. This 
misconception has been dealt with by many scientists and thinkers such as 
Chomsky (1980), Mithen (2000, 2005) and Smail (2008).  Midgley (1980: xviii), 
as early as the 1980s, argued that human biological nature is paramount even for 
such an ideal as human freedom in saying, 
The notion that we have a nature, far from threatening the concept of 
freedom, is absolutely essential to it.  If we were genuinely plastic and 
indeterminate at birth, there could be no reason why society should not 
stamp us into any shape that might suit it.  The reason people view 
suggestions about inborn tendencies with such indiscriminate horror 
seems to be that they think exclusively of one particular way in which 
the idea of such tendencies has been misused, namely, that where 
conservative theorists invoke them uncritically to resist reform.  But 
liberal theorists who combat such resistance need them as much, and 
indeed usually more. 
Boyd (2009:339-340) draws critics’ attention to the benefits of biocultural 
approaches to the analysis of cultural objects, texts and beliefs.  He juxtaposes the 
tenets of postmodernism (which he terms “Cultural Critique”) with corresponding 
biological findings which can be shown to enable the evolution of culture.  For 
example, the famous postmodern stress on the “difference” is counterbalanced in 
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bioculturalism by the inclusion of human commonalities and Boyd (2009:338-9) 
also says that it is owing to those commonalities that human culture is 
transferable.  Otherwise it “could not pass from one person to another or from one 
tradition to another”. 
The range of approaches to a biocultural interpretation of humans and their culture 
is qualified by the specific field from which they originate.  Ramachandran 
(2011:117-35), for example, focuses on mirror neurons in the brain and explains 
how, by equipping us with the ability to imitate, they are responsible for the 
shaping of human civilisation.  He sees mirror neurons as biological agents 
performing cultural actions.  Damasio (2003) and Linden (2007), by contrast, 
stress the importance of the narrative—constructing function of the left frontal 
cortex in the manufacture of fiction, narratives and the self.  Adjacent to these two 
major views that come from hard neuroscience, an anthropological perspective on 
culture and biology is represented by Mithen (2000) who argues that biology and 
language alone cannot be credited for the dissemination of human intelligence and 
that material culture and social structures play a crucial role in cognition.  A 
similar view, namely that cognition originates in culture, is advocated by the 
cognitive linguist, Tomasello (1999; 2010). 
Ramachandran’s (2011:117-135) perspective on bio-culture seems to encompass 
all the other views in that mirror neurons enable a variety of cultural and 
behavioural acts that range from “mind reading”, empathy and the belief in other 
mental agents to the making of assumptions and formation of beliefs about other 
mental agents.  In Ramachandran’s view mirror neurons are directly related to 
simulation/imitation.  He explains that mirror neurons are the main enablers for 
extending ideas from one mind to another.  However, the views of Mithen and 
Tomasello are important for this study as they validate cultural objects as tools 
for transmitting cognition.  Damasio’s “movie-in-the-brain” (2003:198) concept 
supports the continuity of the construction of the self and emphasises the role 
narratives play in the assembling of identity. 
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The origins of cultural artefacts and the meaning of those artefacts in terms of 
the society in which and for which they are produced can be clarified with 
reference to biology. Such an approach ratifies the significance of the individual 
author and provides an opportunity for sharing cognition throughout society.  It 
is in these instances, in which the analysis of cultural and biological patterns is 
revealed as overlapping and validating one another, that the depth of co-
dependence can be grasped. Culture in this dissertation is understood as all that 
constitutes human knowledge — the sciences, technologies and humanities, 
values, belief systems, and norms.  Biology is understood as the physical, 
organic structure of living things which can be explored through science. 
Although the biocultural approach is used, in which critics (Carroll 1995; 
Sterelny 2003; Stafford 2007; Boyd 2009; Dutton 2009) acknowledge biology in 
the formation of culture, it remains a relatively new method of analysing art 
objects and artefacts.  But as Lehrer (2011:xii), in praise of art and artists, says, 
[i]t is ironic but true: the one reality science cannot reduce is the only 
reality we will ever know. This is why we need art.  By expressing 
our actual experience, the artist reminds us that our science is 
incomplete, that no map of matter will ever explain the immateriality 
of our consciousness. 
In terms of artificial intelligence Herman (2003:11) reports that stories and 
cultural objects can be construed as the “pairing or blending of (certain kinds of) 
semiotic structures [or certain kinds of systems of signs] with (certain kinds of) 
cognitive resources”.  Because the pairing or coupling of biological and cultural 
agents can be understood from the perspectives of so many different disciplines, 
according to the extended mind theory, there is no received formula for 
embarking on criticism using a biocultural approach. 
1.4  OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS 
Chapter 1 acts as an introduction to the entire study, besides making the problem 
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statement, identifying the scope and domain of the study, and briefly referring to 
the qualitative nature of the study.  As a background and contextualisation of the 
particular style of criticism, the biocultural one, the chapter includes a discussion 
of this approach and its value to the humanities.  The entwined nature of biology 
and culture is discussed as giving rise to and promoting ever further the evolution 
of culture. 
Chapter 2 is a review of the crucial literature for the study, although Chapter 1 
also contains many citations of significant figures in the fields of culture, 
evolution, cognition, satire and the biocultural approach to the critique of the film 
S1mOne.  As this study is qualitative and based largely on literary sources, 
amplified by experience in teaching multimedia studies over ten years, it is not 
always possible to cite precisely the origin of the ideas which have crystallised 
into this study. 
Chapter 3 encapsulates a brief discussion of satire over its very long history from 
the earliest Aristophanic comedies/satires, Roman satire to the Commedia 
dell’Arte, Rabelais, Cervantes, English dramatic satirists and some artworks.  The 
chapter also includes a short history of the film industry as the “what” of the satire 
in the film S1mOne to contextualise the discussion in the next chapter. 
Chapter 4 is a lengthy and detailed analysis of the film S1mOne from a biocultural 
point of view.  The technicalities of film making are described so as to emphasise 
Niccol’s satirical points.  The farcical characters, turns in the plot and Niccol’s 
skilful deployment of the “Hollywood arc” for narrative are referred to. 
Chapter 5 constitutes the conclusion of the study and makes some 
recommendations as to the further application, in an academic learning and 
teaching environment, of the biocultural basis and approach in multimedia studies.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The human brain is nature’s great mental chameleon. Pumped and 
primed by native plasticity, it is poised for profound mergers with the 
surrounding web of symbols, culture, and technology. Human thought 
and reason emerges from a nest in which biological brains and 
bodies, acting in concert with nonbiological props and tools, build, 
benefit from, and then rebuild an endless succession of designer 
environments.     
Andy Clark (2003:197) 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to ground the discussion which follows by reviewing 
literature pertinent to the related topics of simulation, mimicry, mimesis and 
human simulacra as cultural objects which in social situations can propagate 
cognition and can deceive.  The discussion of the satirical film, S1mOne, Niccol’s 
cultural object, is approached from the social sciences' perspective as worthy of 
serious criticism.  If, as Sperber (1996:1) says, “[c]ulture is made up, first and 
foremost, of ... contagious ideas” then Niccol’s “contagious” idea in his film can 
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be described as a satire on unmasking the ‘make-believe’ strategies among 
humans and the consequences of those strategies for all involved through the 
invention of a technically new Galatea and a more foolish Pygmalion.  Since 
deception is as old as sociality in evolutionary terms (or perhaps older in organism 
terms), Niccol must rely on his narrative to capture the attention of his spectators.  
He does this through the use of technology to cause wonder, the arousal of 
curiosity about the plot, the elicitation of humour at the stupidity of grown-up 
people, and the astonishing capacity that he hints at for an endless development of 
an avatar (even of the opposite gender) which are the trappings of his story about 
deception.  
How humans as primates use forms of deception to conceal the truth —
dissimulation — as a strategy for survival, control of/ access to resources and 
reproduction is a biological fact well researched and documented (Higley 2003; 
Maestripieri 2003; Wallen, Zehr, Herman & Graves 2003). Niccol’s meditation on 
a particular version of dissimulation — a simulated heroine in a celluloid story — 
enables him to draw the attention of his viewers to the parody of solving those 
primary biological problems in a late twentieth century social system in which the 
values of the portrayed characters can be satirised with as sharp a wit as 
Alexander Pope’s (1688-1744) or Charlie Chaplin’s (1889-1977).   
To discuss the strategy of dissimulation as a biologically based behaviour, 
because the critical standpoint adopted in this study is a biocultural one, it has 
been necessary to examine literature in the biological sciences based on primate 
and human studies.  That Niccol’s purpose in making a satire about dissimulation, 
as it has been carried to extremes by current technology, has a reflexive quality 
about it when the medium he himself uses for the spread of his ideas — film is 
itself a species of dissimulation — is another of his subtle jokes. 
This chapter outlines the biocultural approach to extend the discussion already 
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presented in sections 1.1.1 and 1.3.2 on the findings in science and the ensuing 
appropriation of these findings by humanities scholars who use this approach.  
This discussion contextualises the analyses of cultural objects in Chapter 4 and 
distinguishes the particular form of criticism used in the study to analyse cultural 
objects.  The next section of this chapter is about simulation and dissimulation, in 
terms of its biological basis as well as its significance in human behaviour.  The 
section that follows this is a review of literature pertaining to cognition in relation 
to its propagation through culture.  The final section is about narratives and the 
devices at play in satirical narratives. 
2.2  BRIEF OUTLINE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
HUMANITIES AND SCIENCES 
Historically the sciences-humanities relation was perceived as severed during the 
mid-twentieth century.  Snow (1963:20) is the main proponent of the view that 
humanities and sciences have no common ground — in his work, The two cultures 
and a second look, he points to the disparity between these fields.  Sokal and 
Bricmont (1988) support Snow’s line of thought in their article ‘Transgressing the 
boundaries: an afterword’ and they invite the readers of the humanities to sit 
through lectures of Physics I to illustrate the vast abyss between these two 
different disciplines.   
Philosophers such as Derrida (1976; 1982; 1994), Latour (1993; 1999) and 
Newman (1997), among others, were drawn into the debates about the relationship 
between the sciences and humanities adding their views on the issues — 
especially after the publication of Sokal and Bricmont’s ‘Fashionable nonsense: 
postmodern intellectuals' abuse of science’ (1999), the focus of which is the 
incorrect use of scientific metaphors as scientific concepts by humanists.  Mindful 
that the differences and likenesses between science and philosophy have a long 
tradition in epistemology, Derrida’s response to and Sokal and Bricmont’s claim 
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was that postmodern intellectuals were abusing science.  Although Latour’s 
(1993) evaluation of the scientific method and the work of scientists brought 
about a realisation that the distinctions between various disciplines and fields are 
fuzzy, it is Edward O. Wilson’s idea of consilience that asserts that “the loom is 
the same for both enterprises, for science and for the arts and [that] there is  a 
general explanation of its origin and nature thence of the human condition, 
proceeding from the deep history of genetic evolution to modern culture” 
(1999:13). Wilson goes on to suggest that “consilience of causal explanation is 
the means by which the single mind can most swiftly and surely from one part of 
the communal mind to the other” (ibid).  
Newman (1997) in his defence of postmodernism points out that critiquing 
science in general is not the goal of postmodernism, but it is important to expose, 
in his view, the inappropriateness of applying the scientific paradigm to 
psychology and as his conclusion he proposes that science and postmodernism 
should not work against each other but combine their forces and unify.  The calls 
for unification of the sciences and humanities (Newman 1997), pointing to the 
blurred boundaries across different fields (Latour 2005), or exposing the 
similarities between the epistemological methods in science and philosophy 
(Derrida 2005) are useful for fuelling and dissecting the debates within different 
disciplines on this topic and for practising cognitive prowess. 
However it is the biological approach to culture which unveils the intimate 
interconnections between nurture and nature and its value lies in providing 
scientific insights into the phenomenon of human culture itself by bringing into 
our mental landscape the very factor, the leading ‘actor’ that enables the very 
existence of mental processes — our biology.  But, as Boyd and Richerson 
caution, (2005:376-377), biology cannot be successful when understood in terms 
of “universals” as Dawkins’s (1976) famous “memes” proclaim as if the analogy 
between genes and culture were a very deep one: 
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... [t]he two are similar in that important information is transmitted 
between individuals.  Both systems create patterns of heritable 
variation, which in turn implies that the population-level properties of 
both systems are important.  Population-level properties require 
broadly Darwinian methods for analysis.  But this just about exhausts 
the similarities.  The list of differences is much larger.  Culture is not 
based on direct replication but upon teaching and imitation.  The 
transmission of culture is temporally extended.  It is not necessarily 
particulate.  Psychological processes have a direct impact on what is 
transmitted and remembered.  These psychological effects can produce 
complex adaptations in the absence of natural selection (Boyd & 
Richerson 2005:376-377). 
The portrayal of the relationships between the humanities and sciences during the 
last three decades of the last century provided above is necessarily brief and 
sketchy.  It purposefully does not focus on the nuances and detailed contributions 
brought to the debates by, for example, Sokal and Bricmont’s opponents, among 
others, Gabriel Stolzenberg, Stephen Hilgartner or Bruce Fink, or their supporters 
like Richard Dawkins, Barbara Epstein, Thomas Nagel or Rob Willer.  Willer4
 
in 
1997, through the sociological follow-up laboratory study, had confirmed one of 
Sokal’s premises about the different natures of the humanities and sciences, 
targeting particularly their methods — in which the humanities are exposed as 
being vulnerable to intellectual bias that directly corresponds to the status of the 
academic individual and is opposed to the scientific practice of rationally 
weighing up data. 
The reason for including this brief outline of sciences versus humanities ‘wars’ is 
not so much to provide a historical background to views of cultural and scientific 
frameworks but mainly to enunciate the differences between the concerns these 
debates and the biocultural approaches to culture are focused on.  While Snow’s 
                                                 
4 See Willer’s ‘The effects of author's status on the evaluation of unintelligible texts’ (1997) for 
detailed discussion on this issue. 
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and Sokal and Bricmont’s debates operate within the paradigm that is focused on 
clarification of scientific and cultural methods, the biocultural approach targets the 
essence of life management as an adaptive organisation of a variety of behaviours.  
These behaviours include such strategies as problem solving, provision of access 
to resources, reproduction and status seeking, and are fundamental in biology and 
therefore in culture too.  The debates about the compatibility of the humanities 
and sciences are rendered marginal when culture is revealed as having a biological 
centre. 
In current discussions on the relationship between the humanities and the sciences, 
the question of their mutual support for each other is a convenient start to many 
cognitive literary critics’ writings.  For example, Richardson (2010:ix), before 
launching his arguments about the neural sublime, uses such an opening to 
provide the backdrop of science/humanities interactions and to ground the ‘new 
interdisciplinarity’, also referred to as a ‘biocultural criticism’ or the ‘cognitive 
turn’, as a bridge between “the notorious but increasingly narrow ‘gap’ between 
the humanities and the sciences”.  Despite Sokal’s 1996 article, ‘The science 
wars’, used to introduce the field of debate on the topic by Labinger and Collins 
(2001), the editors of the collection of discourse and essays, there is a growing 
confidence in the circles of the ‘cognitive turn’. 
Lehrer (2007:xi) in the introduction to Proust was a neuroscientist, while he 
briefly contrasts Snow’s laments over the separation of two cultures with works of 
art that stemmed directly from the involvement of their makers with scientific 
fields, does not feel compelled to make lengthy historical elaborations on the topic 
of bridging the gap between the humanities and the sciences.  Varela (1992) 
observes that the so-called ‘problem’ between the sciences and humanities has 
more to do with the binary approaches to subjectivity and objectivity.  
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2.2.1  Intuitions in previous centuries about cognition and culture 
Sperber (1996:1) in expanding on culture as “contagious ideas” says, 
... an idea, born in the brain of one individual, may have, in the brains 
of other individuals, descendants that resemble it.  Ideas can be 
transmitted, and, by being transmitted from one person to another, 
they may even propagate.  Some ideas — religious beliefs, cooking 
recipes, or scientific hypotheses, for instance — propagate so 
effectively that, in different versions, they may end up durably 
invading whole populations. 
That earlier intuitions about nature and culture have led to the findings of many 
current theories about the relationship of cognition and culture is without question 
— we are dwarves standing on the shoulders of the giants of the past5.  The 
“contagious ideas” intuited earlier will be the basis for many modern 
developments.  But it is technology, which illuminates biology at the 
microbiological level, that has been the vehicle and tool for new understanding in 
biology. 
Earlier voices in philosophy, art and literature intuited the close connection 
between biology and culture, the evolution of culture through biological processes 
and the idea that the biological basis for personality is deeply related to the 
malleability of the neurology of the brain.  For Aristotle (384-322 BCE), 
concerned with the vexing topic of mimesis in relation to drama, mimesis was an 
“inborn gift” manifesting itself in every human (Aristotle 2000:7).  Intuitions 
similar to those of Aristotle, before the advent of the discipline of the cognitive 
sciences, by numerous poets, philosophers and authors about the role of biology in 
the formation of culture are common.   
                                                 
5 The phrase is attributed to Bernard of Chartres in John of Salisbury’s 1159 Metalogicon. 
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Lehrer (2007:25-52) speaking about George Eliot (1819-1880), for instance, who 
while writing Middlemarch in an age in which predetermined character traits were 
believed to determine the outcome of behaviour, anticipated that human minds are 
malleable. Eliot’s main character Dorothea is allowed to evolve and recover from 
the mistakes she has committed earlier and is shown to adapt to the new insights 
she has formed in the light of her experiences.  Thomas Hardy’s (1840-1928) Tess 
of the D'Urbervilles shows much less capacity to escape the pessimistic 
determinism of Hardy’s outlook on human nature. 
Damasio’s (1994) publication of his findings about the unity of body, brain and 
mind were intuited in Walt Whitman’s 19th century publication Leaves of grass, 
in which he draws readers’ attention to body and mind as one entity.  Damasio’s 
claim (2006:226) that the body “contributes more than life support and 
modulatory effects to the brain ... [it] contributes a content that is part and parcel 
of the workings of the normal brain” has already been expressed in 1855 in 
Whitman’s words as “Your very flesh shall be a great poem” (2004:77) and 
“Seeing, hearing and feeling are miracles, and each part and tag of me is a 
miracle… the scent of these arm-pits aroma finer than a prayer” (2004:124). 
Nebuchadnezzar (Figure 2.1), a 1795 watercolour by William Blake (1757-1827) 
can be interpreted from a biocultural perspective as an inkling of ideas about the 
biological emergence of the human mind.  It corresponds to the observations 
made by Mithen (in Carruthers & Chamberlain 2000:208) about the “most striking 
pattern in the archaeological record is that modern human brain sizes are reached 
long before there is any trace of modern human thought and behaviour”.  It is this 
event before the formation of the extended mind, before the emergence of the 
“mental exoskeleton” that Blake represents in his watercolour. 
Nebuchadnezzar is alone in his surroundings where there are no cultural objects, 
no tools and the only a hint at some kind of communication is the facially 
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expressed angst as if in an attempt to form the first guttural sounds or a sign of 
surprise, or unease at the awakening of self-awareness.  Blake acknowledges the 
biology of the emerging human by portraying a complex vascular system of the 
lower limbs of the being and it is echoed in the execution of the patterns forming 
the cave environment as if hinting at the development of biological solutions 
throughout strata of different species.  The animal qualities of Nebuchadnezzar 
are emphasised by his claws, his mane and mostly by his crawling position that is 
earth-bound and insecure, and further accentuated by the choice of the horizontal 
format.  The gaze directed toward the viewer seems to carry the self- 
contemplative, introspective weight exerted by an attempt at performing cognitive 
actions. 
Figure 2.1  William Blake, Nebuchadnezzar, 1795—1805. Watercolour on paper. Tate 
Gallery, London. 
Another example of an early intuitive insight into human cognition is provided by 
Lehrer (2007:97) who observes that Cezanne “believed that light was only the 
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beginning of seeing. ‘The eye is not enough’, he declared. […] Cezanne’s 
epiphany was that our impressions require interpretation”.  Cezanne’s statement is 
congruent with the biological view of visual perception which is enabled through 
sensory responses that occur in different areas of the brain ranging from the visual 
cortex to the medial temporal lobe where interpretation of the received images 
takes place. A new theory has emerged from the biological ruminations about 
biology and mind since the 1990s and that is described as the “extended mind”, an 
idea from scientists working on artificial intelligence. 
2.2.2  Extended mind theory 
Human brains use a variety of external cultural tools, symbol systems and 
artefacts to enable, share and spread knowledge.  Clark’s hypothesis of the 
extended mind (Clark 1997; Clark & Chalmers 1998; Wilson 2004) is one of the 
contributory bases of the understanding of transmission of cognition, namely, that 
humans are “essentially incomplete creatures [who] naturally use […] neural 
resources in part to parasite, lean on, and incorporate those external cultural—
technological resources which have become apt for incorporating” (Dror & 
Harnad 2007:47). Clark (2003) and Wilson (2004) describe shared cognition in 
terms of the “extended mind” hypothesis.   
Chambers (in Clark 2010) suggests that hints of the idea of the extended mind are 
already found in Dewey, Heidegger and Wittgenstein.  The view that biology and 
culture (and technology as part of human cultural development) are intertwined is 
not new but it is only in recent decades that it has been so extensively 
acknowledged (Tuomela 2007).  Although this is an interesting study in itself it is 
not the main focus of this study and belongs more to research on cyborgs and 
robot hybrids.   
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2.2.3  Relationship between biology and culture 
Boyd and Richerson (2005:44) describe how culture and biology are entwined in 
evolutionary terms as a result of imitation: 
Culture increases average fitness if it makes the learning processes 
that generate new knowledge less costly or more accurate. Culture 
may do this in at least two ways: first, social learning allows 
individual learning to be selective.  Individuals can learn 
opportunistically when it is likely to be more accurate or less costly 
and imitate when conditions are less favorable.  Second, social 
learning allows learned improvements to accumulate from one 
generation to the next.  When learning in small steps is less costly per 
unit improvement in fitness than learning in large steps, the 
cumulative learning over many generations can increase average 
fitness. ... These results help us understand the importance of the 
evolution of true imitation. 
Imitation is then one of the mechanisms of our biology intimately connected to the 
evolution of culture.  It is from such mechanisms of our biological make—up as 
described as “cooperation, commensality, morality […] capacity for intention 
attribution, planned deception, and the highly structured nature of social 
interaction” that we form interdependent networks (Enfield & Levinson 2006). 
To understand the interconnectedness of biology and culture there are several 
ideas which have developed over the last century which, although observed by 
scholars and thinkers before, have not necessarily been discussed from a scientific 
point of view (Boyd & Richerson 2005).  The model for cultural evolution which 
Boyd and Richerson (2005:289) favour is a Darwinian one which they define as, 
... [t]he idea that unifies the Darwinian approach is that culture 
constitutes a system of inheritance.  People acquire skills, beliefs, 
attitudes, and values from others by imitation and enculturation (social 
learning), and these ‘cultural variants’ together with their genotypes 
and environments, determine their behaviour.  Since determinants of 
behaviour are communicated from one person to another, individuals 
sample from and contribute to a collective pool of ideas that changes 
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over time.  In other words, cultures have similar population-level 
properties as gene pools, as different as the two systems of inheritance 
are in the details of how they work. 
That human evolution is an important factor in a discussion of culture is what is 
assumed in this study.  Trying to find out what happened to make humans capable 
of culture and prosociality in their evolutionary trajectory is the business of 
scientists from a wide range of scientific disciplines.  What is significant to 
understand, is what Nesse (2010:137) explains as follows, 
... [s]omething extraordinary happened on the evolutionary path that 
gave rise to creatures capable of culture.  The changes are so profound 
it is as if we humans were somehow domesticated.  Levels of violence 
are drastically lower than for the other great apes.  We are born 
helpless, we require extended care, and we actively teach each other.  
We pay exquisite attention to each other's wishes and emotional states. 
We not only cooperate in ways other great apes cannot, we also form 
deep attachments to nonrelatives and groups that result in altruistic 
behaviors obviously harmful to fitness.  Even our bones are different 
from our ancestors in ways typical of a domesticated species.  
So, from a biologist's point of view, although the basics are generally agreed on, 
the selection pressures are innumerable in their details and we are “domesticated”. 
Nesse (2010:137) explains that 
... [s]election has shaped many traits closely related to culture, 
including bipedality, hunting, language, tool making, manual 
dexterity, agriculture, cooperation, emotions, facial expressions, 
foresight, inhibition, guilt, conformity, imitation, social learning, norm 
enforcement, morality, empathy, and theory of mind, among others ... . 
Many selection forces have been proposed to shape these traits, 
including kin selection, group selection, sexual selection, cultural 
group selection, and the benefits of exchange relationships.... 
Without drawing up a hierarchy of the traits which might have been selected for 
and thus given rise to culture, cooperation seems a useful place to start.  
Cooperation is a most vital trait for social interactions and for culture. However, 
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Nesse (2010:138-139) sums up one of the problems as, “[p]rior to 1966, capacities 
for cooperation were explained as obviously beneficial for groups, but everything 
changed when Williams (1966) pointed out and Dawkins (1976) emphasized that 
selection would tend to eliminate genes that resulted in greater fitness benefits to 
others than the self”.  As a consequence of these insights, current discussions 
centre on reciprocity, mutual benefits and, importantly, kin selection.  So, even if 
the genes selected are not necessarily the best, amongst kin, cooperation is 
beneficial.  Amongst strangers it is a matter of exchange — who benefits from the 
cooperation?  What happens if one party defects on the cooperative endeavour 
then the other contributor is left without benefits?  
Fairness violations are not easily handled amongst humans, ranging from stinging 
words to violent revenge (the Norse and Icelandic sagas are excellent examples). 
Non-relatives also work on the idea of mutually beneficial exchanges.  But a point 
of the greatest importance for the proposition that culture and cooperation are 
intimately entwined is that, “Human patterns of exchange, and the associated 
fitness benefits, are not found in other animals.  They may be crucial steps on the 
road to culture” (Nesse 2010:139).  To sum up, Nesse (2010:142) argues that 
“competition within groups, rituals and displays, divisions of labour, and social 
integration — this list could hardly be more germane to the origins of human 
capacities for culture”. 
Nesse’s next major point about traits that might be essential for culture to develop 
opens with the question, “What kinds of traits should we expect social selection to 
shape?”  In answer to the question he brings together areas of research which have 
provided some answers to that question of social selection: 
It should shape traits that make an individual preferred as a social 
partner, including (a) high levels of resources (health, vigor, personal 
skills, powerful allies, status, territory, and other resources), (b) 
tendencies to share those resources reliably and selectively with 
relationship partners, (c) accurate intuitions about what others are 
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seeking in a partner, and (d) strong motivations to please partners and 
other in-group members (2010:143). 
Although all of these traits are not reducible to culture itself they begin to make a 
sufficient basis for the development of culture.  Culture must surely have emerged 
from human cognitive capacities and evolved and is acted upon by motivational 
and cognitive factors, new selection forces and so on.   
One such factor of social selection is “status displays” whether it enables 
increasing fitness to attract or keep social partners.  On the other side of this 
tendency is our need to preserve social norms and that violators deserve some 
punishment or exclusion from the group.  However, because deception is 
ubiquitous and our desire to please others is in direct opposition to this trait, there 
is great vigilance in society to detect deception. Naturally different cultures use 
very different strategies to keep cooperation going amongst members of groups 
and respond to norm or unfair violators (Nesse 2010:143-144).  
For Nesse (2010:144) the products of selection and their utility are not the most 
significant part of the argument for prosociality given that “one process ... shapes 
a whole suite of traits ... toward the process that influences the fitness for 
individuals who vary on certain behavioral traits”.  That process is all about what 
happens inside the minds of others in the group who will judge fitness of the 
individual and reject or accept, leave or provide help.  In fact, according to Nesse 
(2010:145), “A variety of other mental traits give advantages when social 
selection influences fitness” — abilities in facial recognition to remember 
violators of norms, predict what might happen in complex social situations, 
conformity to norms, exclusion of outsiders and language.  With language it 
becomes possible to promise and to threaten.   
Social selection leads to human “domestication” (of sorts) as social choices 
enabled our ancestors who were not so aggressive but more generous and intuitive 
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of what was in others' minds to have selective advantages.  Then prosociality as a 
process “ran away”.  Nesse (2010:146) suggests, “[e]ach lifetime recapitulates the 
process; tiny social cues act on mechanisms shaped by selection to detect and 
respond to them, steadily but firmly rewarding increasingly prosocial behaviour”.  
Naturally, there are innumerable failures, but social selection affords a convincing 
underpinning to prosociality.  Once complex culture is launched it becomes a 
selection force of its own and becomes “a system of inheritance” (Boyd & 
Richerson 2005:4). 
Over the last three decades Boyd and Richerson (2005:3-5) have worked on the 
problem of the evolution of culture in humans in terms of how culture works, and 
what the interaction is between cultural evolution and genetic evolution.  Their 
key findings can be summarised as follows, 
1. Culture is information that people acquire from others by teaching, 
imitation, and other forms of social learning… 2. Culture change 
should be modelled as a Darwinian evolutionary process ...  3. Culture 
is part of human biology ...  4. Culture makes human evolution very 
different from the evolution of other organisms...  5. Genes and culture 
co—evolve. 
In the graphic (Figure 2.2) the relationship between culture and biology as a 
feedback loop between the “sophistication of the stone tools and brain 
development” as an accepted scientific theory (Nicholson 2013, Kindle, loc.271) 
is presented.  Tools and cultural objects (or manufactured objects) extend the 
reach and capacity of our mind-body’s limitations. 
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Figure 2.2   Symbolic illustration of relationships between biology and culture – a 
coupled system. (Source: the cover of Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society – The Biological Sciences Journal, vol. 363, no. 1499). 
 
This point encapsulates a very significant question which the social sciences 
have not taken up in a way that is illuminating for themselves.  From a 
biologist’s point of view it is not the old nature (biology)-nurture (culture) 
argument which suggests that first we developed brains big enough to 
accommodate culture, then we ‘got’ culture (Boyd & Richerson 2005:9), but 
something else.  That crucial deduction about the relationship between culture 
38 
 
and genetic evolution is that culture and genes co-evolve, so our genetic 
evolution happens in a constructed environment. The argument which is not 
clearly understood about culture is that it is an adaptation by natural selection 
which gives rise to certain traits.  Boyd and Richerson (2005:8) make it clear 
where to place the emphasis because 
... every bit of the behavior (or physiology or morphology, for that 
matter) of every single organism living on the face of the earth results 
from the interaction of genetic information stored in the developing 
organism and the properties of its environment, and if we want to 
know why the organism develops one way in one environment and a 
different way in a different environment, we have to find out how 
natural selection has shaped the developmental process of the 
organism.  This logic applies to any trait, learned or not.  Moreover, 
biologists have been quite successful in applying adaptationist 
reasoning to explain learned behaviour. 
 
2.2.4  Cognition and culture: a summary of scholarship 
The next illustration (Figure 2.3) provides a mind map of the key issues in 
biological terms that are significant for cognition, the other part of the discussion 
in this study.  These are gesturing, pointing, problem solving through competitive 
or cooperative approaches and sociality.  They work in a feedback loop impacting 
our cognition and transmitting and spreading it in a multiplicity of ways.  The 
biologically significant activities are indicated with some of the names of the 
significant scholars working on the issues from a very wide variety of cognitive 
disciplines — the network of scientists.  
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Figure 2.3 An example of a mind map for investigating the relationships between 
biology and culture targeting particular biological ground for pointing and 
problem solving. 
 
 
2.3  HUMAN SOCIALITY AND BIOLOGY 
Human sociality is the necessary ground for all areas of human social 
interactions (Enfield & Levinson 2006:2).  But the range and variety of human 
societies with habits, norms, ecologies, institutions and so on is dizzyingly 
diverse.  Altruistic behaviour in social groups continues to be a much debated 
question and is set against the selfishness axiom.  But research has shown that 
prosocial behaviour is rewarded in society, even at great cost as is its opposite, 
anti—social behaviour which is punished.  The question currently being asked 
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has to do with motives and cost.  Henrich, Boyd, Bowels, Camerer, Fehr and 
Gintis (2004:9) remark that, 
... [a] vast amount of ethnographic and historical research suggests that 
social preferences are likely to be influenced by the economic, social, 
and cultural environment.  Humans live in societies with different 
forms of social organization and institutions, different kinship 
systems, and diverse ecological circumstances; varying degrees of 
market integration demonstrate quite different kinds of social 
behavior.  Many of these behavioral patterns do seem to reflect local 
context, circumstances, and culture.  However, while ethnographic and 
historical methods provide rich contextualized details about the lives 
of individuals and the practices of groups, they can only yield 
circumstantial evidence about human motives. As the longstanding, 
fundamental disagreements within the cultural and historical 
disciplines attest, many different models of human action are 
consistent with the ethnographic and historical record. 
An investigation into human sociality as it currently operates is often, in 
academic contexts, focused on Westerners.  In the experiments conducted by 
Henrich et al. (2004:16-18) they do not.  They distinguish between different 
societies all of which exhibit characteristics of sociality, but have different 
environments, access resources in various ways, speak totally different 
languages, have different economic bases, style of residence, size and 
arrangement of cooperation in terms of social institutions and settlement sizes.  
These range from horticulturalists, horticulturalists/foragers, agro-pastoralists, 
nomadic groups, sedentary nomadic groups, to semi-nomadic groups.  The 
complexity of their societies also differs widely.  Henrich et al. (2004:18) use 
well established anthropological classifications to explicate the variety of 
possible ways to live together; they explain how decision-making happens in the 
various groups currently from family to multiclan chiefdoms, 
... [f]amily-level societies consist of economically independent 
families that lack any stable governing institutions or organizational 
decision— making structures beyond the family.  Societies classified 
as Family plus extended ties are similar to family-level societies, 
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except that such groups also consistently exploit extended kin ties or 
non-kin alliances for specific purposes such as warfare.  In these 
circumstances decision-making power is ad hoc, ephemeral, and 
diffuse, but high status males often dominate the process. 
In terms of bands, the next stratum, Henrich et al. (2004:16) say, 
Bands consist of both related and unrelated families that routinely 
cooperate in economic endeavors.  Decision-making relies heavily on 
group consensus, although the opinions of high status males often 
carry substantial weight. 
The next grouping which Henrich et al. (2004:17-18) examine in terms of 
sociality are clans and villages: 
Clans and villages are both corporate groups of the same level of 
complexity, and both are usually larger than bands.  Clans are based on 
kinship, tracked by lineal descent from a common ancestor.  Decision- 
making power is often assigned based on lineage position, but prestige 
or achieved status may play a role .... Villages operate on the same scale 
of social and political organization as clans, but consist of several 
unrelated extended families.  Decision-making is usually vested in a 
small cadre of older, high-status men who may compete fiercely for 
prestige. 
Clans can be grouped into multiclan corporations (ibid): 
At a larger scale of organization, multiclan corporate groups are 
composed of several linked clans, and are governed by a council of 
older high-status men – assignment to such councils is often jointly 
determined by lineal descent and achieved prestige.  Multiclan 
corporations sometimes act only to organize large groups in times of 
war or conflict, and may or may not play an important economic role.  
The largest non-Western groupings which Henrich et al. (2004:18) investigated, 
on the assumption they would exhibit sociality traits were chiefdoms, described 
thus, 
Often larger than multiclan corporations, Chiefdoms [sic] are ruled by a 
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single individual or family and contain several ranked clans or villages.  
Rank of individuals, clans, and villages usually depends on real or 
customary blood relations to the chief.  Economic organization and 
integration in chiefdoms are more intense than in multiclan corporate 
groups, and chiefs usually require subjects to pay taxes or tribute.  Such 
payments allow for the large-scale construction of irrigation works, 
monuments, and public buildings, as well as the maintenance of 
standing armies. 
We cannot presume that this reflects the earliest way human sociality developed 
or that we can make assumptions about the dimmest biological beginnings. 
Certainly Niccol’s satire is not about groups smaller than chiefdoms.  But from a 
biological view, the collective intentionality, the capacity to categorise and 
process information and joint problem solving related to pattern recognition 
underpin all these societies.  The unique human characteristics of sociality — 
“cooperation, commensality, morality […] capacity for intention attribution, 
planned deception, and the highly structured nature of social interaction” to form 
interdependent networks (Enfield & Levinson 2006:2) is evident in any human 
society. 
In biological terms human sociality is characterised by the tendency of 
individuals to form communities, to engage in interactions, to share problems, 
solutions and decisions and to collectively focus on securing a goal.  These 
complex processes in sociality are enabled by extensive biological underpinning. 
2.3.1  Collective intentionality 
Tuomela (2007:217), citing Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, and Moll (2005) 
as well as Tomasello and Rakoczy’s (2003) findings about collective 
intentionality says, 
[t]hey ... discuss and, to an extent, defend the phylogenetic hypothesis, 
according to which, based on group selection, humans evolved skills 
and motivations not only for competing but also for collaborating with 
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each other in activities involving shared goals and joint intention and 
attention. ... [T]hey also argue, in part on the basis of their experimental 
work, that selection for good collaborators requires capacity for 
intention reading and motivation for sharing psychological states with 
others. 
Competing as opposed to collaborating suggests little collective intentionality.  
As soon as cooperation becomes important many things can happen.  
Significantly there seems to be a consensus on the development of language 
beginning to appear, as Tuomela (2007:217) notes, “They have recently argued 
... that the capacity for collective intentionality is required to account for 
language capacity and cooperativeness in humans”.  Bickerton (2007:167-168) 
places the development of language within the field of collective intentionality, 
arguing that over hundreds of thousands of years our early ancestors needed to 
cooperate with a collective intentionality to work on “recruitment for carcass-
exploitation”.  His argument for how humans made language and language made 
humans fits neatly into the idea of co-evolving culture and genes. 
A further spin off of adaptations like cooperation in terms of cultural evolution is 
that there are benefits (this especially so in the Pleistocene era — 2,588,000 to 
11,700 years ago — when climatic conditions favoured cooperation for 
survival). There is also room for enormous variation between groups so, as Boyd 
and Richerson (2005:143) say, “... group selection is a much more important 
force in human cultural evolution than it is in genetic evolution.  We think the 
best evidence from archaeology suggests that humans first began to rely on 
cumulative cultural adaptations roughly a half million years ago”.  That is a long 
time to contemplate. 
Other traits in social behaviour are also important.  One such is pattern 
recognition. 
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2.3.2  Pattern recognition and episodic or autobiographical memory 
Pattern recognition is another of the biological prerequisites that facilitates 
sociality.  The primary function of pattern recognition for humans involves 
identification of faces among mammals (Meltzoff 1995).  The ability to 
recognise faces is expanded with further brain development in children allowing 
them to identify objects, differentiate between objects and symbols, so making 
use of their capacity for abstract thinking (Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4 Mandler’s example of successful categorization of plane and bird models by 
9-month old children (Margolis & Laurence 2007:194). 
Episodic memory or autobiographical memory (Tulving 1984) plays a part in our 
ability to analyse and plan events and is another way in which the resource of 
pattern recognition is developed in humans.  We remember things which we 
have experienced personally, like our mother's face.  Episodic memory is usually 
distinguished from procedural or implicit memory (Squire & Schacter 2002). 
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2.3.3  Information and categorising 
The capacity to categorise is an extremely significant and biologically based 
phenomenon in human cognition for successful sociality.  As Givón (2005:39) 
states, “Categorization — the mental representation of individual tokens of 
experience as members of recognizable recurrent types — is one of the most 
profound adaptive moves in the annals of biological evolution”.  He goes on to 
say, “Sorting tokens of experience into separate categories is the foundation 
upon which biological organisms structure their adaptive behavior. One's mental 
categories determine how one responds — with decision and action — to one's 
physical, biological, mental and social environment”.  Unless there is the 
capacity to categorise, from amoeba to theoretical physicist, the chances of 
successful survival are diminished (Givón 2005:39-41). What counts 
biologically in the act of categorisation is that the bulkiest information should be 
categorised fairly rapidly and with a low incidence of error.  For that sort of 
biologically grounded information processing system the information will be 
“repetitive, frequent and highly predictable; and/or of great adaptive urgency or 
relevance” (Givón 2005:47-48), as in our use of our motor skills in which 
repetition enables skill to develop. 
Categorisation can be broadly described within cognitive sciences as a process in 
which objects and ideas are recognised, differentiated, and understood (Cohen & 
Lefebvre 2005) for the purpose of illuminating relationships and links between 
those objects and ideas.  Before making connections between, and linking objects 
and ideas, information of the automated processing type from numerous sources 
relies on “discrete, hierarchic, categorial structures” (Givón 2005:48).   
This is also how stories are made out of a welter of information which is 
processed through recognition, differentiation and comprehension, but there is a 
conflicting type of information processing need that has to do with fine 
contextual discrimination of “small but relevant minorities” (2005:48).  So the 
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categorisation of information is a hybrid type of action.  In this fine contextual 
discrimination we are more likely to make errors, the processing is slower and as 
Givón states (2005:48-49) it 
... must allow fine-grained discrimination of shades and gradations, 
contextual scanning, and pragmatic judgements of relevance.  Irrelevant 
information is ignored.  Relevant information is sifted more finely 
before filing and action decisions are made.  Understandably, the 
processing of 'outlier' information remains un-automated and heavily 
dependent on the more powerful, energy consuming but slower 
'attentional system'. 
From these cognitive processes the ultimate human activities of seeking — and 
making — meaning are also derived.  But there is another elemental trait we 
share with primates and that is play.  Play and humour are inextricably bound 
together. 
2.3.4  Laughter and sociality 
A unique trait of humans is their capacity to laugh and enjoy humour.  Gervais 
and Wilson (2005:402-3) suggests that laughter as “a function of humor” works 
towards helping groups to be cooperative and cohesive; and he suggests “the 
contagious nature of laughter can function to couple the emotions and coordinate 
behaviors of the individuals within a group”.  Laughter spreads positive affect 
through a group which is goal-orientated.  The construal of other minds which is 
basic for survival is built on communication and cooperation (Givón 2005).  The 
possibility of reading other people's possible feelings as well as their intentions or 
of empathising with them is one of the highly developed human features of 
fictional narratives. 
2.3.5  Narrative as part of sociality 
Narrative or story is one of the ways that humans make sense of events which 
happen to them which they then have the option to impart to others.  Narratives 
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use cause and effect as a strong impulse to organise the events and affect plays a 
large part in relaying a narrative.  The emotions most commonly agreed on as 
basic to human experience are fear, disgust, anger and love.  However Hogan 
(2003:252) expresses the sense which many scholars have been identifying in the 
studies of emotion from psychology, neuroscience, history, medicine, even 
sociology: 
... [s]pecifically, I do not believe that our emotions are structured in so 
discrete a manner as to allow strict division into emotion categories, 
followed by some sort of hierarchization in which some of these well-
defined emotions form the basis of other emotions.  It is, I believe, a 
mistake to understand emotion on the model of, say, atomic physics or 
molecular chemistry.  Unlike atoms, emotions do not begin with well-
defined boundaries and fully specified constituents.  On the other 
hand, it is clear that there are clusters of feeling, behaviour, and idea, 
that are in effect biological givens of emotion — “proto-emotions,” as 
we might call them.  A subset of these acquire [sic] prototype status 
because they are biologically salient — through, for example, 
spontaneous facial expressions — presumably for functional (thus 
evolutionary) reasons. 
Collaboration, which is underpinned by collective intention and enables culture 
to be passed down through imitation or language, is significant for the 
production of narratives, fictions, stories, beliefs, values, norms and ethics 
(Biesele 1993).  But genes and culture co-evolve so forms of collaboration from 
hominids to modern humans evolve significantly and innovatively too (Larson 
2009). 
There is, however, one element of emotion related to evolution which seems to 
have little to do with adaptation (and more to do with human hypertrophied 
mental development-cognition) which Hogan calls “wonder” and part of our 
delight in narrative has to do with the sheer pleasure of recognising patterns in 
the stories.  Aesthetic pleasure is bound up with boredom versus curiosity and 
sensitivity to those two feelings — what is the creator of the cultural object “up 
to”. Hogan (2003:261-2) reminds us that 
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... [f]rom a very early age, children delight in patterned sounds and 
images. For example, as to the former, from about seven months, 
babies begin to engage in spontaneous rhythmic babbling... . This 
undoubtedly has a function in aiding language acquisition, as Locke 
and others have argued. However, from the baby’s point of view, that 
is irrelevant, at least initially. Infants engage in rhythmic babbling at 
least in part out of simple enjoyment.  In short, they are not entirely 
hard-headed pragmatists setting out to practice their language skills.  
They are also playful children having fun. Propensities to enjoy verbal 
and visual symmetries, rhythms, and so on, develop as we grow, 
yielding an emotive relation to objects that involves attraction, but is 
not a matter of affection or lust.  This is a sort of proto-aesthetic sense.  
Its eliciting conditions are what we call ‘beauty’.  Its associated feeling 
is a proto-form or ancestor of what we awkwardly refer to as 
aesthetical pleasure, but is perhaps more aptly characterized 
(following the Sanskrit theorists) as wonder or wonder/delight.  Its 
associated actional outcome is contemplation — just looking or just 
listening.  When successful, its result is not precisely happiness, but 
rather what Abhinavagupta said is the ultimate goal of all art — peace. 
The sensation of wonder at what technology or science or fiction offer is readily 
available to us in the film S1mOne. 
Sperber comments on the role of narratives and stories together with imitation 
and emulation in human sociality (in Enfield & Levinson 2006:433).  The ability 
to tell stories is the foundation for communication chain processes with their 
multifarious nature.  It is illustrated as a process in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5            Dan Sperber’s diagram illustrating simplified fragment of cultural causal chain 
representing a folktale that can be told and retold in many versions, forms and 
hybrids on both public and individual platforms (Source: Enfield & Levinson 
2006:438). 
 
Sperber’s diagram illustrates a simplified fragment of a cultural cognitive causal 
chain representing a folktale that can be told and retold in many versions, forms 
and hybrids on both public and individual platforms (Enfield & Levinson 
2006:438) as is the case in the foraging hunter-gatherer family groups described 
by Biesele (1993) to pass down beliefs, values, norms and ethics and to enjoy the 
sense of wonder at the stories. 
Mar and Oatley (2008) argue that fiction is an abstraction and simulation of 
social experience, as such an important way of transmitting culture (2008).  In 
approaching the value of stories Hutto (2007) distinguishes between those who 
have new propositions to make about them: “(a) enabling us to exercise our 
imaginations in unique ways; (b) developing our everyday understanding of 
actions performed for reasons; and (c) external reflection, evaluation and 
orientation in our understanding of the situations of ourselves and others” 
(2007:2).  Branigan (1992:xi-xii) in discussing influences on cinema studies in 
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relation to narrative reminds us that in the development of the discipline of 
narratology currently, 
... narrative is increasingly viewed as a distinctive strategy for 
organizing data about the world, for making sense and significance.  
As the features of narrative came to be specified more precisely, it was 
detected in a bewildering number of places: not just in artworks, but in 
our ordinary life and in the work of historians, psychologists, 
educators, journalists, attorneys, and others. It became clear that 
narrative was nothing less than one of the fundamental ways used by 
human beings to think about the world. 
Narratives use enframed stories extensively and S1mOne is no exception.  When 
a story is framed within another story, a gap, a certain distance to the narrated 
events is created which allows us to see those events in the extended 
environment of the framing story.  The device of a framing story is a 
commonplace in human narrations whether literary or visual and enables the 
teller to achieve numerous goals.  From a cultural point of view the teller can 
enliven and give immediacy to events which her listener was not party to.  
Thematic and dramatic links between the two stories are invited. The reading 
and the understanding of a contained story are influenced by the containing story 
and vice versa, by which means a feedback loop between the understanding of 
the stories is created.  The gap in which the listener/viewer/reader experiences 
the enframed narrative is provided by the framing narrative in such a way that 
there is seldom confusion as to which narrative is the framing one and which is 
enframed.  To make sense of the two narratives language provides a range of 
rhetorical, syntactic, grammatical devices which act as clues to our 
understanding.  In other cultural expressions as in sculpture, for instance, where 
there is no language the sculptor has to rely on the cultural knowledge and 
recognition capacity of the viewer’s memory. 
In film, editing techniques provide clues to how the viewers are expected to 
understand the film.  By the parataxis of clips with many intervening parts edited 
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out, the syntax of the film story acts in a similar way to language: we understand 
what is framed and what is framing.  Herman (2006:356) in his interrogation of 
framed poetic narratives comes to the conclusion that a framed narrative is “an 
image of intelligence as … a ‘society of mind’.   For Herman the ‘society of 
mind’ is based on Minsky’s famous eponymous work (1988). 
By a ‘society of mind’ Minsky suggests that human intelligence consists of 
innumerable ‘agents’ which have differing kinds of processes, each with their 
own purposes; the agents have innumerable ways of representing knowledge, as 
well as methods for producing results (Minsky 1988).  However as Herman 
(2006:356) explains there is “a socially coordinated effort” among those 
differing agents “to negotiate and make sense of a complex, ever-changing, and 
sometimes threatening environment”.  Framing and enframed narratives in visual 
and literary objects are a metonymy for the processes of cognition, however 
schematically represented. The cultural historian Stafford in her book Echo 
objects (2007:206-7) draws an analogy between the processes of cinematic 
artmaking and the workings of cognition.  She emphasises the resemblance 
between different agents with different kinds of processes that are participating 
in both, the mind and the artworks.  The cognitive agents are disseminated 
through the internal intelligence of the maker to expressively externalise an 
understanding of concepts.  It is anticipated that a similar transfer of information 
will happen between the object and the viewer.  
2.4  BIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR MIMICRY IN HUMANS 
An idea as yet only touched on which is important for the biocultural critique of 
Niccol’s film satire is that of the synthespian, a simulacrum of a human based on 
the simulation of innumerable previous screen stars in terms of her outward 
appearance.  Mimicry is closely linked to the idea of deception from a biological 
perspective.  Indeed the mimicry used in the film in the contained narrative is a 
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deception.  Mimicry as in many organisms on earth is a well-developed strategy 
for survival.  To account for the propensity of mimicry amongst humans Darwin 
speculated on natural selection. The idea of mimicry has played a fundamental 
role in the evolutionary view of life (Mayr 1982; Goodson 2003).  But first to 
clarify what is meant by ‘natural selection’ — the term means something more 
precise currently than it does in folk psychology.  By natural selection two 
different things are understood today.  Ayala (2005:15) states, 
[t]he phrase ‘natural selection’ was used by Darwin to refer to any 
reproductive bias favoring some hereditary variants over others.  He 
proposed that natural selection promotes the adaptation of organisms 
to the environments in which they live because the organisms carrying 
such useful variants would leave more descendants than those lacking 
them. 
But, as Ayala observes, the idea has changed in current biology with the advent 
of computers to do so much of the mathematics and translate complicated 
statistics rapidly.  He (2005:15) defines natural selection as currently understood, 
[t]he modern concept of natural selection derives directly from 
Darwin’s but is defined precisely in mathematical terms as a statistical 
bias favoring some genetic variants over their alternates (the measure 
to quantify natural selection is called fitness).  Hereditary variants, 
favorable or not to the organisms, arise by mutation.  Unfavorable 
ones are eventually eliminated by natural selection; their carriers leave 
no descendants or leave fewer than those carrying alternative variants.  
Favorable mutations accumulate over the generations.  The process 
continues indefinitely because the environments that organisms live in 
are forever changing.  Environments change physically — in their 
climate, physical configuration, and so on — but also biologically, 
because the predators, parasites, and competitors with which an 
organism interacts are themselves evolving. 
The relationship between the related neurological processes of cooperation and 
mimicry, imitation and copying among humans probably evolved 
conterminously in the primate line.  In terms of prosociality social selection as a 
basis for a suite of traits which led to the development of culture would include 
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the capacity of children to mimic parents.  Findings from developmental 
behavioural psychology about the role of mimicry in human infants support the 
significance of imitation in the development of abstract ideas (Meltzoff 1995; 
Frith & Frith 2001).  Toddlers easily pick up from parents the code of values for 
which they are rewarded. Mimicry has advantages.  But if mimicry is related to 
deception and cheating the social norms all groups of humans have different 
ways of punishing the offender. 
2.4.1   Imitation and mirror neurons 
However, at a deep biological level in recent years the presence of mirror 
neurons in monkeys and humans has given even more significance to the idea of 
mimicry. Larson (2009:74) explains, “Recent work with mirror neurons in 
monkeys suggests there is a neurological basis for recognizing what actions 
might be taken by another individual — the concept of mind reading”.  The 
neuroscientist Rizzolatti and his colleagues discovered the existence of mirror 
neurons in the human brain which are thought to be the very medium for transfer 
of culture (Iacoboni, Woods, Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta & Rizzolatti 1999; 
Gallese 2003, 2004; Ramachandran 2011) and have been commented on by a 
number of researchers from different specializations (Bradshaw & Sampolsky 
2006; Cook, Johnson & Heyers 2011; Sparenberg, Springer & Prinz 2012). 
Mimicry was the underlying key concept of Darwin’s speculation on natural 
selection and plays a fundamental role in the evolutionary view of life (Mayr 
1982:522; Goodson 2003:15).  Another important milestone in scientific ideas 
about the concept of imitation came in the late 1990s when the neuroscientist 
Rizzolatti and his team announced the discovery of the existence of mirror 
neurons in the human brain.  These are loosely described as the very medium for 
transfer of culture (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004; Fogassi, Ferrari, Gesierich, 
Rozzi, Chersi & Rizzolatti 2005; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro 2008; 
Ramachandran, 2011). 
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Findings from developmental behavioural psychology about the role of mimicry 
in human infants support the significance of imitation in the development of 
abstract ideas (Meltzoff 1995; Frith & Frith 2001).  In relation to mirror neurons, 
a number of different considerations of simulation have arisen from this 
research. One such debate is focused on developing the so called “Simulation 
Theory” and its possible connections and disconnections with the Theory of 
Mind.  The participants (such as Gallese, Ramachandran, Varela and Keysers) in 
these debates and their attitudes to simulation within or outside of the Theory of 
Mind (ToM) are complex and beyond the scope of this study.  Other debates 
concerning simulation focus less on theoretical constructions and mostly address 
the ways simulation enables motor, spatial, emotional and perceptual exchanges 
between humans. Larson (2009:74) notes that, “The neurosciences have 
produced evidence that human propensities for conformist and replicative 
behaviors are reinforced by both cultural and neurological–biochemical reward”. 
Gallese (2003:517) suggests that mirror neurons are a basic organisational 
feature of the human brain.  These mirror neurons are thought to be linked to 
understanding intentions and goals of others according to researchers (Gallese & 
Goldman 1998; Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta & Lenzi 2003; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero 2004; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti 2004; Fogassi, et al. 2005; 
Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh & Keysers 2006; Keysers & Gazzola 2007; Ramachandran 
2011) while other scholars claim mirror neurons play a fundamental role in 
human interaction, especially in the exercise of empathy (Gallese & Goldman 
1998; Gallese 2001; Decety 2002; Decety & Jackson 2004; Keysers 2010).  
Ramachandran (2011:117) calls the mirror cells in the brain the “neurons that 
shaped civilisation”.  Social neuroscience stresses that through the biologically 
wired system for simulation and mimesis, empathy and the transfer of culture 
have been enabled (Emery, Clayton & Frith 2007; Harmon-Jones & Winkielman 
2007; Decety & Ickes 2009). 
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2.4.2  Attitudes to imitation and mimicry 
Simulation and mimicry have sometimes been undervalued in the past.  The 
rapid overview of the concept of simulation and imitation prior to the findings of 
science in the 1990s could perhaps include Plato’s discussion in the Republic 
(Πολιτεία, 380 BCE) of mimesis as an imitation of reality.  As Russel (2007) and 
Forrest and Kaufman (2008) observe, Plato famously disapproves of imitation as 
a distortion of reality.  The “good” name of the practice of mimesis was 
revitalized by the reworking of classical Greek ideas (Aristotle’s ‘mimesis of 
nature’ [4th century BCE] and Dionysius’s ‘imitation of authors’ [1st century 
BCE]) and by eighteenth century thinkers such as Kant and Burke, and 
nineteenth century such as poets Keats and Byron.  Longinus’s On the sublime 
(1st or 3rd century CE) equated truth with beauty and was later reversed by Kant 
in his Critique of Judgment (1790) as beauty equalling truth where the mere 
mimetic representation was rejected in favour of genius, aesthetics and 
idealisation. The long tradition of dramatic representations as imitation was 
preserved from earliest drama until the eighteenth century.  In terms of theatre 
and the imitation of another human being by actors Naremore (2012:34) says, 
[f]rom the eighteenth until the early twentieth century the Aristotelian 
concept of mimesis governed most aesthetic theory, and stage acting 
was often described as an ‘imitative art’. Denis Diderot’s ‘Paradox 
sur le comédien’ (1758), for example, argued that the best theater 
actors played not from strongly felt emotion or ‘sensibility’, but from 
‘imitation’. 
Nowadays the approach to playing a role as an actor or simulating another 
human has been radically changed by the ideas of Stanislavski (1863-1938) who 
used a method to train actors so that they would focus on their understanding of 
the emotions of the characters whom they were playing from an interior 
recollection of their own emotion.  Further development came with the 
introduction of Method acting in the theatre in the 1930s and 1940s in New 
York.  As Naremore (2012:34) observes, “By the late 1930s, when 
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Stanislavsky’s ideas were fully absorbed into the U.S. theater and Hollywood 
achieved hegemony over the world’s talking pictures, dramatic acting was nearly 
always evaluated in terms of naturalness, sincerity, and emotional truth of 
expression”.  Naremore (2012:35) goes on to say, 
... the metaphor of art as a mirror held up to the world was replaced 
by the metaphor of art as a lamp projecting individual emotions into 
the world. Where acting was concerned, ‘imitation’ became 
associated with such words as ‘copy’, ‘substitute’, ‘fake’, and even 
‘counterfeit’.  The new forms of psychological realism, on the other 
hand, were associated with such words as ‘genuine’, ‘truthful’, 
‘organic’, ‘authentic’, and ‘real’. 
In postmodernist narratives and fiction, simulation has predominantly been 
viewed through a dystopian lens (Blade Runner [1982], Terminator II [1991], 
The Matrix [1999]) and as Tofts observes (2002: 264-266) it served to raise 
questions ranging from forecasting the future of life and technology to blurring 
of boundaries between real and unreal, between life and its synthetic copies like 
artificial creatures, robots and replicants.  Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Lewis 
Mumford (1895-1990), Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), Rachel Carson (1907-
1964) and Theodore Roszak (1933-2011) are the main participants in the 
dystopian debates.  The explanations of dichotomies was the underlying 
principle in many postmodern debates such as those by Huyssen (b 1942) or 
Klinkowitz (b 1943) and is the reflection of Cartesian dualistic ideas about the 
body and mind which were inherited from an earlier age and had coalesced into 
the publication in 1637 as Discourse on Method by René Descartes (1596-1650). 
Telotte (1995:86) speculates that films depicting the duality of knowledge’s 
outcomes are connected to the Cartesian mind-body split, especially in the cases 
where they “depict violent efforts to redefine the human body as some sort of 
raw material, waiting to be reshaped, reformed by a scientific capacity for 
artifice”. Such science fiction narratives belong to the middle of the twentieth 
century and earlier decades.  The violence towards the body implied by such 
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attitudes is at variance with what constitutes current understanding of what the 
connection is between mind and body (where mind is conceived as “our mental 
representation of the experienced world”) (Roberson 2010:167). 
The understanding of a mechanistic idea about the workings of the human brain, 
body and mind is obviously reflected in stereotypical cyborgian narratives.  The 
unsympathetic Cartesian attitudes towards the body prevailing since the 
seventeenth century have been undermined by findings about the unity of body 
and mind by, among others, Varela (1992), Damasio (2006), Blakeslee (2007) 
and Ramachandran (2011).  It is in this context of the body re-unified with the 
mind- brain, that simulation and socially transmitted cognition is considered in 
this study. 
On the one hand, making things, machines, visual and other cultural objects in 
our own image is, according to Nelson (2001:251), “resonating with our secret 
divinizing needs” — a tool for mediating the internal to the external reality and 
vice versa.  Telotte, (1995:87) on the other hand, says of this drive that it 
operates within the “Pygmalion mould”, serving to question “what it means to 
fashion or refashion the human”.  These two distinct attitudes to human 
simulacra, one neo-Platonist and the other postmodernist, offer insight into the 
phenomenon of imitation and the satire of the film under discussion.  However, 
the human simulacrum, and the processes of imitation as a whole, can also be 
viewed through the lens of cognitive sciences in which, in the last two decades 
of the twentieth century onwards, the close examination of neural mechanisms 
making imitation possible and understanding imitation processes have become a 
priority (Meltzoff 1995; Gallese & Goldman 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004; 
Gallese, Keysers & Rizzolatti 2004; Fogassi, et al. 2005; Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh & 
Keysers 2006; Ramachandran, 2011). 
In postmodernism simulation and its different forms have been well scrutinised 
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from philosophical angles focused mainly on the cultural and technological 
production of simulacra (Benjamin 1939; Baudrillard 2003). 
2.5  BIOCULTURAL APPROACH 
To distinguish the critical approach used to analyse the cultural objects in this 
study from other approaches, the term “biocultural” is used after Boyd (2009:2) 
who says that, 
... [in] literary studies, and in the humanities in general, a biological 
approach to the human has been anathematized for the last four 
decades by the recently dominant paradigm that calls itself ‘Theory’ 
or ‘Critique’. But after announcing decades ago first the death of the 
author and then the death of the “subject” (the individual), Theory has 
recently raised the question of its own death, and there has been a 
widespread cry in literary studies for a return to texts. [...]  A 
biocultural approach to literature invites a return to the richness of 
texts and the many-sidedness of the human nature that texts evoke. 
Although Boyd applies the term specifically to literary texts, it has been applied 
to a variety of cultural objects as Stafford (2007:1) does in interpreting 
“everything from autopoeisis to mental imagery” in her discussion of artworks.  
Prominent in the use of scientific understanding from biology, particularly in 
relation to narratives, cognition and emotion are scholars like Hobbs (1990), 
Schwarz (1996), Hogan (2003, 2004, 2008), Hampe and Grady (2005), Kövecses 
(2005), Oatley (2011). 
An understanding by this researcher of the biology involved in cognition and 
culture cannot be as deep as that of scientists or biologists, but the contagious 
ideas from those disciplines are flooding into the humanities.  Turner (2002:9) 
sees the ‘cognitive turn’ in the humanities as an “aspect of a more general 
cognitive turn taking place in the contemporary study of human beings” and 
stresses that this ‘turn’, while continuing to draw its central questions and 
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methodologies from the “humanities as old as classical rhetoric”, aims at 
“combining old and new, the humanities and the sciences, poetics and cognitive 
neurobiology”.  Its purpose, Turner (2002:14), claims is “not to create an 
academic hybrid but instead to invent a practical, sustainable, intelligible, 
intellectually coherent paradigm for answering basic and recurring questions 
about the cognitive instruments of art, language, and literature”. 
Richardson (2010), by contrast, observes that the ‘cognitive turn in humanities’ 
enables the posing of new questions and the reopening of old ones. These 
questions pertain to the embodiment of cognition (Lakoff & Turner 1989; Lakoff 
& Johnson 1999), the materiality and malleability of the brain, cognition and 
metacognition.  In eras previous to the ‘cognitive turn’ and neuroscientific 
knowledge these matters were approached intuitively, for instance by such 
writers as Jane Austen (1775-1817) or George Eliot (1819-1880) or Nabokov 
(1899-1977).  Boyd (2009:2) insists that the implication of the ‘cognitive turn’ is 
that “we cannot simply go back to literary texts without assimilating what 
science has discovered about human nature, minds, and behavior over the last 
half-century,  and considering what these discoveries can offer for a first truly 
comprehensive literary theory”. 
Many different terms are applied to the idea that culture is intimately connected 
to biology.  Sperber’s (1996) term ‘naturalistic explanation of culture’, Boyd’s 
(2009) term ‘biocultural approach’ to cultural texts and objects, Richardson’s 
(2010) term ‘cognitive turn in humanities’, and Zunshine’s (2006, 2010) 
‘cognitive cultural interplay’ all denote an acknowledgement of the biological 
underpinnings of culture.  The main stress in these approaches to analysis of 
cultural texts and objects is on the key insight that culture arises out of the 
particular capacity of human cognition to innovate technologically, to think 
symbolically, record and reflect, impacting on how humanities approach culture 
and biology. 
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According to Zunshine (2010: Kindle, loc 435), that is what drives the 
understanding that “the contemporary sciences of the mind destabilize the old 
division between ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ and open new venues for investigating 
the role of universally shared features of human cognition in historically specific 
forms of cultural production”.  Besides spreading knowledge about cognitive 
make-up and processes, these approaches enable new interpretations and 
perspectives on cultural representations (Boyd 2009; Zunshine 2010). 
While for some (Tsur 1992; Richardson 2004; Miall 2006) seeking the common 
ground for the context and methodologies of the cognitive 
interpretations/biocultural approaches with the existing literary-theoretical 
paradigms as the focus, it is the “inclusiveness toward a full array of 
contemporary literary approaches” that is valuable and productive for cognitive 
literary studies, as Hart claims (2009:329).  Zunshine (2010:1) observes “today 
this position has become one of the key features of the field”.  Richardson (2010: 
xii), however, warns against a shallow bricolage of cultural studies with 
neuroscience, although he also admits that he finds the “dizzying variety of 
approaches that continue to proliferate […] a sign of its early strength rather than 
amateurishness or professional disarray”.  Varela (1992) explains that one of the 
reasons for such diversity of approaches within the ‘cognitive revolution’, or 
‘cognitive turn’ has been brought about by the specific research and funding 
allocation policies in the United States.  His explanation stresses that the access 
to resources, one of the biological underpinnings of cultural evolution, weighs on 
the direction in which culture evolves. 
2.5.1  Self as a vehicle for cognition 
However, before any discussion of the cognition-culture nexus is engaged as a 
cultural criticism, the argument of Damasio (2010) must be acknowledged about 
the significance of the self as a vehicle for cognition and specifically meta- 
cognition.  It is the privilege of humans to have a heightened sense of the self. 
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This sense of self Damasio (2010) argues has its deep roots in the homeostatic 
mechanisms which are evident at every level of biological organisms.  Klemm 
(2011:16) raises the question of, “how a conscious sense of self is represented in 
the brain”; his answer from a neuroscientific point of view is that, 
[l]ike all senses, the sense of self must be contained in patterns of 
nerve impulses.  Unlike the traditional senses that are registered by 
impulse flow in relatively simple, pauci-synaptic projection pathways, 
the sense of self is a system-level phenomenon that may be generated 
by impulse patterns in widely distributed complex and interacting 
circuits. 
How different parts of the brain are involved in the emergence of consciousness, 
the self and the mind, has been for the last few decades, the subject of utmost 
interest and intense research undertaken within cognitive sciences that stretch 
across related disciplines like neuroscience, linguistics, artificial intelligence, 
psychology, anthropology and philosophy of mind (Varela et al. 1992:4). The 
Self is typically and popularly defined as the essential being, both conscious and 
unconscious, of a person that enables it to distinguish itself from others and is an 
object of reflexive and contemplative actions. Psychological and philosophical 
views of the Self have been constructed by a number of psychologists, scholars 
and researchers who arrived at, or ascribed various attributes, ‘components’, or 
divisions of the Self. They range, to mention a few, from Jungian (Jung 1968) 
opponent forces, the Ego and the Self, Winnicott’s (1965) true and false Selves 
to Lewis’ (1990) coupling of the categorical Self with the existentialist Self.  
The ‘splits’ and divisions of the Self prominent in the above theories are 
reconciled in Damasio’s (2010) theory of consciousness and the Self in which he 
argues for them as biologically emergent products of homeostasis.  He proposes 
that it is the brain stem, often considered by many psychologists as the triune 
brain’s reptilian core of human conflict (Kral & MacLean 1973, MacLean 1985, 
1990) and the ‘primitive’, ‘un-updated’ and inelegant piece of brain hardware 
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(Linden 2007:3), which enables the rise of consciousness on the primordial level 
where the “primordial feelings and their emotional variations generate an 
observant chorus that accompanies all other images going on in the mind” 
(Damasio 2010:193).  It is its very rootedness in biology and neuroscience, on 
the cytological, behavioural and meta-levels, which makes this theory a 
particularly attractive and suitable base for conducting a biocultural analysis of 
an art object. 
Damasio argues that consciousness is a result of the evolutionary development 
stemming from the cytological level upwards to form behavioural patterns and 
the cognitive level from which the success of those patterns can be assessed.  It 
is the accumulation of the perceptions of the gratifying and painful events and 
encounters filtered within the stem brain that gives rise to the awareness of 
otherness, explains Damasio.  The mysterious nature of consciousness, therefore, 
ascends out of the even more mysterious chemical actions and reactions adhering 
to and driven by the principles of homeostasis. 
Without a sense of self it might be impossible to enjoy the pleasure of the 
contemplation of cultural objects.  Klemm (2011:19) explains the biological 
basis for the sense of self as consciousness: “Consciousness is intrinsically 
experiential and first-person subjective”.  To expand on this sense of self he 
(2011:20) explains in biological terms that, 
... the operational level of brain organization resides in internal 
physical brain architecture (i.e., canonical cortical column circuits), 
and is the basis for conscious sense of self.  Thus the operational level 
ties neurophysiological and subjective domains together. The 
operational level constitutes consciousness, rather than “emits” it in 
some mysterious way. Consciousness is selfpresenting at the level of 
operational architectonics of the brain, but is emerging in relation to 
the neurophysiological level of brain organization. 
The implications of a self which is conscious of itself are important for producers 
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of cultural objects.  This has led Damasio (2010:295-296) to hypothesise about 
the value of art: 
... [a]rt became a privileged means to transact factual and emotional 
information deemed to be important for individuals and society, 
something established in early epic poems, theater and sculpture.  Art 
also became the means to induce nourishing emotions and feelings, 
something at which music has excelled through the ages.  No less 
important, art became a way to explore one's own mind and the minds 
of others, a means to rehearse specific aspects of life, and a means to 
exercise moral judgement and moral action. 
The evolutionary success of the arts was in the variety of values assigned to them 
by humans as a compensation for all the imbalances of human suffering, but 
their compensatory value is biologically prompted by the need for the organism 
to maintain an optimal homeostatic range in their interiors.  This optimal range is 
recognised by our consciousness as Damasio (2010:55) explains, “optimal 
ranges express themselves in the conscious mind as pleasurable feelings; 
dangerous ranges, as not-so-pleasant or even painful feelings”. 
Although not necessarily opposed to Damasio’s theory, Mithen (2000) constructs 
a different scenario of the evolution of cognition.  His is a modular theory of the 
brain that relies on the speculation that the separate areas (modules) of 
specialisation for language, tool making and symbolic thinking started first to 
emerge and continued to gradually overlap and merge with each other.  This 
anthropological theory attempts to explain the rise of human cognition but it 
does so through the analysis of the symptoms of cognition rather than its 
biological causes; and an individual being with her personal autobiography does 
not play as significant a role as in Damasio’s illuminations on the issue of the 
Self. 
Damasio’s theory is useful for the interpretation of a film about disembodiment, 
a simulation with no sense of self, exactly because of his claims that the 
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consciousness arises directly out of the body.  Mithen’s ideas and methods can 
contribute to the analysis of the film through evaluation of the trail evidence that   
results from the interactions between the ‘embodied’ film director with his 
disembodied synthespian. 
2.5.2  The importance of biology 
There is a tendency in the descriptions of the relationship of the humanities and 
sciences to suggest that over time there is a continuous migration of the so-called 
soft sciences toward the hard science arena because of the enormous expansion 
of scientific knowledge.  Frith (2007:4) gives the example of biology being 
“rather softer science than physics and chemistry, but this changed dramatically 
with the discovery that genes consist of precise sequences of base pairs in DNA 
molecules”. However, Boyd and Richerson (2005:375) state that, “Biology is an 
immense enterprise whose purview ranges from the physics of enzyme catalysis 
to the role of gene expression in cell differentiation to the evolutionary origins of 
flight to the global carbon cycle”. With a discipline as far-reaching as that it 
would be unusual if it did not have an impact on the humanities. Biology is very 
coherent as a discipline but its range is wide and is not organised in the same 
way as the humanities with its differing disciplines. Again the argument of Boyd 
and Richerson (2005:375) is illuminating: 
One reason why biology remains a unified discipline is that the 
science has a small set of unifying problems at its core.  Physics and 
chemistry underpin everything.  Genetics, cell metabolism, ecology, 
and evolution are relevant to all organisms, and physiology is common 
to all multicellular life. 
One of the “transforming ideas of the 20th century” say Huss-Ashmore (2005:6) 
has been the emergence of the “synthetic theory of evolution”. To understand 
this, Ayala’s (2006:4) description of the concerns of modern biology can be 
presented: 
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Three different, though related, issues have been the main subjects of 
evolutionary investigations: (1) the fact of evolution; that is, that 
organisms are related by common descent with modification; (2) 
evolutionary history; that is, the details of when lineages split from 
one another and of the changes that occurred in each lineage; and (3) 
the mechanisms or processes by which evolutionary change occurs. 
Darwin must get the credit for the new idea of ‘population thinking’ to biology, 
as before that the general belief was that people in terms of being a species were 
“essential, unchanging types, like geometric figures and chemical elements” 
(Richerson & Boyd 2006:5).  The climate that enabled the emergence of the 
biocultural approach is complex and includes, on the one hand, among others, 
contributions by Dawkins (1976), Hofstadter (1981, 2000, 2007), Latour (1993, 
1999a, 1999b, 2005), Gell-Mann (1994), Dennett (1997, 2000) and Wilson 
(1999), while on the other hand developments in cognitive science have also 
been the trigger for the spread of ‘contagious ideas’ about the biologically 
grounded nature of culture. This distinction is made only for the purpose of 
reviewing the literature on the subject of the biocultural approach and is as 
arbitrary as the rise of the climate that enables it.  The important fact is that 
biology and culture are intertwined and the process of re-evaluating ideas about 
culture and biology and the research on cognition must overlap.  Dennett, 
working from the perspectives of philosophy and cognitive science (1997) places 
the cultural idea of ethics as originating in evolution while Latour (2005), by 
developing a concept of science as a social actor which participates in forming 
cultural representations and perceptions, highlights the groundlessness of the 
divide between humanities and sciences. 
2.5.3  Ideas at the intersection of science and the humanities 
Knowledge of human and primate biology has begun to impact on the 
humanities (Carroll 1995; Hogan 2003, 2010; Eakin 2004; Spolsky 2010; Palmer 
2010; Starr 2010).  Some researchers take it on board in a way that expands the 
discourse; good examples are Stafford (1999, 2007), Herman (2003), Zunshine 
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(2006, 2010), Boyd (2009, 2011) and Lehrer (2011).  The dual inheritance theory 
— namely, that culture and genetic evolution are entwined — received a major 
scientific boost from Boyd and Richerson (1985) among many others who as 
early as the 1970s and early 1980s spoke (Lumsden & Wilson 1981) of 
biocultural evolution.  There is a movement amongst scientists such as Sperber 
(1996) and Mithen (1996, 2005) who, in their differing disciplines of 
anthropology, archaeology in examining cultural objects, have expanded on the 
way in which culture and cognition are inextricably interlinked.  Sperber (1996) 
adopts a social- scientific view of culture and its spread by suggesting that 
culture spreads like an epidemic.  On his view mental representations move from 
private individuals into the public sphere and remain over centuries, as 
traditions, or are short lived, as fashions, or to return to the disease metaphor as 
infections lasting for different time spans.  Culture explained in this way from 
such a broad perspective, as instantiations of mental representations, enables the 
biocultural critic to approach objects not as discrete manifestations of human 
agency, but as naturally developed mechanisms which transmit cognition. 
Sperber gives both interpretative and causal explanations of the social and his 
idea for developing “science of the social” or “naturalistic approach to culture” 
as the realisation that such biocultural approaches cannot rely on a single Grand 
Theory but need to be built upon “a complex of interlocking, middle range 
models” (1996:6).  By asking questions why certain cultural representations are 
more successful than others, Sperber targets the nature of representations as both 
private and public, which when circulated contribute to the dissemination of 
ideas and propagate cognition.   
Niccol’s S1mOne is an example of such an exchange between public and private 
representations that address viewers’ understanding of simulation.  Functionalist, 
structuralist and interpretative models, Sperber argues, do not serve 
anthropology as successfully as epidemiological ones.  Sperber’s model of the 
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“epidemiology of representations” (1996:50) aims to explain how two types of 
macro-mechanisms (individual and public) drive “transformation of mental 
representations” and “alterations of the environment” which results in “the 
transmission of representations”. 
These observations, from the anthropological perspective, add weight to the 
biocultural approach by providing a causal explanation of how cognition is 
propagated through cultural objects by personal and interpersonal means where 
both mental and public processes of representation and their spread are 
acknowledged.  The value of this perspective is that it challenges traditional 
views of culture as residing in cultural objects.  
Although Mithen from his paleontological and archaeological perspective also 
supports the idea that material culture and social structures played a crucial role 
in cognition along with biology and language, his reasoning towards this 
conclusion differs from Sperber’s.  Mithen (1996) argues for the modular mind 
that contains special modules for specific domains that govern intelligence in 
different areas such as language, sociality, technical ability, as well as social and 
individual memory.  It is the exchange between these modules and gradual 
formation of feedback loops between them, Mithen claims, which led to the 
fluidity of the modern mind in which culture and biology craft each other. 
2.6  SIMULATION 
Darwin (1889-1882), in his major work, The descent of man and selection in 
relation to sex (1871) acknowledged Wallace’s (1823-1913) view6 that “much of 
                                                 
6 1863 paper by Alfred Russell Wallace entitled “Remarks on the Rev. S. Haughton's paper on 
the bee's cell, and on the origin of species.” 
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the intelligent work done by man is due to imitation and not to reason” (Darwin 
2008:59).  The connection between the ability to imitate and the capacity to 
sympathise and feel empathy that has been recently illuminated by 
neuroscientific research on mirror neurons (Rizzolatti 2004, 2005, 2008; 
Gazzaniga 2005; Ramachandran 2011) had already been hinted at by Darwin and 
some of his contemporaries. Darwin already observed in 1871 (2008:88) that 
... [s]pecies which are not social, such as lions and tigers, no doubt feel 
sympathy for the suffering of their own young, but not for that of any 
other animal.  With mankind, selfishness, experience, and imitation, 
probably add, as Mr. Bain has shewn, to the power of sympathy; for 
we are led by the hope of receiving good in return to perform acts of 
sympathetic kindness to others; and sympathy is much strengthened 
by habit. 
While imitation is mainly considered as more basic and less premeditated 
behaviour than the more complex simulation, it is at the very core of the actions 
of mirror neurons (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004; Gazzaniga 2005). Simulation 
happens on a cytological level, through a behavioural one to the meta-level of 
human cognition.  Markman, Klein, and Suhr (2009:vi) report that, since the 
early 1980s, the research targeting the mental nature of simulation has increased 
considerably and branched out to include scientific areas of interest such as the 
act of imagination and the generation of alternate realities. Some researchers 
have focused on what happens in the brain when an individual is mentally 
simulating an action or forming a mental image, whereas others have focused on 
the consequences of mental simulation processes for affect, motivation, and 
behaviour. 
In this study simulation is acknowledged as a phenomenon that acts on many 
levels of biological scaffolding ranging from the cytological level of mirror 
neurons, behavioural, psychological level, to cognitive and metacognitive levels 
in which simulation is manifold (such as stories and art objects).  This goes back 
to ‘simulation’ for survival purposes in a huge variety of organisms on earth 
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(butterflies, spiders, fish, for example). 
Moravec (1998:2) claims that the increasing computing scope to create 
simulations gives ground to 
the premises and techniques of physical science, [which] has the 
unexpected consequence of demoting physical existence to a 
derivative role. A possible world is real, and only as real, as conscious 
observers, especially inside the world, think it is! 
He speaks of the future post-human possibility of expanding our powers of 
simulation to such a degree as to enable a simulation of ancestral history.  And 
that our reality might be exactly one of such simulations produced by our 
progeny — the present controlled by its future.  The very complex nature of 
simulation that relies on invented events, artificial environments or deceptive 
actions is often the aggravating, non-mitigating element in human negotiations 
about understanding human nature and the nature of reality.  Such speculation, 
however, is beyond the scope of this study. 
Within the humanities the idea of the simulacrum was largely popularised by the 
French philosopher Jean Baudrillard7
 
who in his works (1996, 2003) and in his 
short essay (1991:1) observed that the efforts put into creating simulacra are of a 
utopian thrust in which “the separation from the real world is maximal — it is 
the utopian island in contrast to the continent of the real”.  Furthermore, 
according to Baudrillard, these efforts are underpinned by concerns of how 
humans produce their world — the act and the media of production. 
In accordance with his emphasis on media and production he devises three 
                                                 
7 1929-2007. 
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“orders” of simulacra which unfold with an increasing complexity as the 
progression of science and technology prompts more and more evolved acts of 
replication.  The basic idea is that the more complex and advanced means of 
reproduction, the more porous the boundaries between reality and the 
simulacrum, culminating in the collapse of originality.  Eco (1986:45) declares 
that we proudly judge simulations as more satisfying and desirable than reality: 
“we not only enjoy a perfect imitation, we also enjoy the conviction that 
imitation has reached its apex and afterwards reality will always be inferior to 
it”.  That simulation has expanded itself into a global continent with its 
simulated environments, virtual beings, avatars, synthespians, and CAVE 
(Computer Assisted Virtual Environment8) situations is true of course. 
These cultural outcomes of simulation are engaging, educational, entertaining and 
are testimony to a preoccupation with simulacra especially in technological and 
artificial intelligence spheres.  What is, however, important for the biocultural 
approach to cultural objects in terms of simulation, is the investigation of the 
biological base that enables it in humans.  Humans are constantly trying to 
understand themselves.  The value of these meditations is at the core of the effort 
to understand human cognitive processes and actions.  Such meditations and 
debates are undertaken by a number of scientists and philosophers who aim to 
acquire knowledge about the role of simulation in, for example, the formation of 
mental concepts, representations of reality, attribution of the internal 
characteristics of mental states to others, or how simulation supplements and 
relates to other cognitive mechanisms.  In terms of simulation and the 
philosophical discussion about it, this study is limited to this brief discussion, 
preferring to focus on the biocultural elements of a cultural critique. 
                                                 
8 The abbreviation CAVE overtly alludes to Plato’s ruminations on the nature of simulation. 
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2.6.1  Consciousness and cognition 
The unfolding and arising nature of consciousness is explained by Damasio as a 
series of biological events which are organised into ‘progressive’ levels starting 
at the cytological base of the ‘protoself’ which is a ‘stepping-stone’ in the 
construction of the ‘core self’, which is required for the further ensemble of the 
autobiographical self.  The ‘protoself’ is the level at which an “integrated 
collection of separate neural patterns that map, moment by moment” (Damasio 
2011:190) all the primordial feelings and generates an ‘observant chorus’ of 
interoceptive system that “generates not merely body images but also felt body 
images”. 
This insight into the processes which enable consciousness and cognition gives 
the cytological level a paramount value as a principal actor.  It brings about the 
utmost appreciation of life at its very basic level and is at odds with the typical, 
hierarchical way of evaluating living systems.  The autobiographical Self is a 
potential ground for the rise of a reflective Self which, according to Damasio, is 
processed out of the speculative ‘events’ and brings about the phenomenon of 
culture as one of its major consequences.  A parsimonious definition of the Self 
is that Self is not Self but a Self-process.  This view is in accordance with the 
latest understanding of consciousness that consciousness operates on processes 
rather than on states (Rowlands 2010).  The application of these views to the 
film S1mOne is revealing for its underpinning in bodiless simulation and it 
accounts for the accelerated disintegration of Taransky’s autobiographical self as 
he  repetitively fails to evaluate and reflect upon his doings and silences: his 
‘observant chorus’. 
2.6.2  Propagation of cognition 
Vygotsky (1896-1934) was one of the first researchers to conclude that learning 
happens within a social system and that distribution of knowledge is socially 
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enabled. Since his observations (1929, 1933, 1978, 1987) about how education is 
enabled through societal interaction, many contributions have been made to the 
field of distributed cognition with Piaget (1952, 1954), Minsky (1988), Hutchins 
(1995) and Clark (1997, 2003, 2010) as the leading figures that mark the 
progression of this discipline. 
The ways culture disseminates cognition by means of cultural objects when they 
are produced, viewed, interpreted and interacting with agents in society is a topic 
which has become prominent since the 1970s (Enfield & Levinson 2005; Latour 
2005; Dror & Harnad 2007; Kronenfeld 2008). 
2.6.3 Biological basis of narratives 
Trying to make sense of the environment and life through the mechanism of 
various narratives is a typical human cultural practice.  Damasio expands on this 
notion and explains how biologically felt body images generate proto- 
consciousness.  Hogan (2003:253-263) cautions against an uncritical application 
of the biological base for emotions, but supports the idea that it is our biology 
that enables the emergence of feelings and also speculates that similarly to the 
human brain, emotions are malleable and can be appealed to through various 
cultural means (2003:263). 
Damasio (2004) asserts that it is a culturally acquired ability to control emotions: 
“We can be wise to the fact that our brain still carries the machinery to react in 
the way it did in a very different context ages ago.  And we can learn to 
disregard such reactions and persuade others to do the same”.  The evolutionary 
nature of emotions is activated when the amygdala’s primitive drives and desires 
can be — as they frequently are — overridden by the prefrontal cortex, explains 
LeDoux (1986).  With such a basic biological view in mind, observations by 
many narrative theorists are that “stories proceed in segments” (Hogan 
2008:161). 
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The neuroscientific view is that areas of the human brain are compulsive story- 
tellers and that the segments of stories are continually generated by the 
“narrative-constructing function of the left cortex [which] cannot be switched 
off” (Linden 2007:229).  Even during sleep, the ongoing activity of story-making 
by humans promotes, according to Linden, the acquisition of religious thought 
and helps expand speculative thinking.  It is the speculative and evaluative 
‘behaviour’ of the possible outcomes of any particular action, whether fight or 
flight, that is at the core of the reflective Self. 
Narratives carry emotions and values, and although as Oatley (2004:xi) observes 
“in some ways we humans distrust emotions, we also believe they embody our 
most important values.  If you want to know what people value, listen to their 
stories”.  It is apparent from the narrative of the film S1mOne, that Niccol values 
the wisdom of the child, the Hans Christian Andersen’s ‘truth spotter and teller’ 
in the story of The Emperor’s new clothes.  It is also evident that Niccol reveals 
the cult of celebrity to be a result of unquestioning, non-critical passive 
behaviour and he provides an opportunity to transmit and spread these values 
through the means of a narrative, pointing up through satire and attention-getting 
devices where he is directing his barbs. 
That emotional expressions are part of our evolutionary past, had already been 
proposed by Darwin (Darwin 1872; Oatley 2004:x).  Hogan (2003) goes to some 
lengths to show the close connection between emotion and narrative.  This he 
does by examining universal facial expressions of some basic emotions which 
allow human beings to experience empathy.  By empathy he (Hogan 2003:81) 
means that “[e]mpathy involves, among other things, a conscious or unconscious 
inference to what someone else is feeling”.  Hogan (2003:82) develops his 
theory further and observes that, 
... we might say that our lexical entry for any given emotion term 
includes not only some link to the feeling of the emotion (typically via 
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memories ...).  It also includes some account of the kinds of situation 
that give rise to the emotion and some account of the kinds of 
expression and action that result from an emotion. 
Hogan (2003:83 ff.) goes on to distinguish four important hypotheses, “... when 
we judge someone to have a certain emotion, we do so by comparing his/her 
situation with prototypical situations and his/her response with prototypical 
responses”.  Then he describes how stories can be prototypical but “... one 
difference between prototypical narratives (for example, stories about lovers) 
and nonprototypical narratives (for example, stories about the operation of 
appliances) is that the former engage our feelings, or at least address and appeal 
to feelings”, or, put another way: “Prototypical narratives — including literary 
narratives — are generated largely from prototypes, prominently including the 
prototype eliciting conditions for emotions”.  Again stressing the relation 
between narrative and emotion Hogan (2003:90) distinguishes between 
“junctural emotions” as “there are emotions that have their most important 
function at specific points within the course of an encompassing narrative” and 
other emotions.9
   
The other emotions, happiness or sorrow refer to the outcome 
of the whole story and so he terms them “outcome emotions”.  His third 
hypothesis (Hogan 2003:94) is elaborate: 
Romantic union and social or political power (including material 
prosperity) are the two predominant prototypes for the eliciting 
conditions of happiness.  Thus, they are the prototypical outcomes 
from which our prototype narratives — including literary narratives — 
are generated. Put differently, romantic union and social or political 
power are the goals sought by protagonists in prototypical narratives.  
The corresponding prototypes for sorrow are the death of the beloved 
and the complete loss of social or political power, typically through 
                                                 
9 Hogan (2003:91) explains junctures: “junctures are not objective features of a causal sequence, 
but responsive features, features of an agent’s own realization, an author’s reflection, or a 
reader’s concern and consideration”. 
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social and political exclusion, either within society (through 
imprisonment) or outside of society (through exile). 
Understood in this way Niccol’s narrative ends in happiness — but through 
further deception.  
Finally Hogan’s (2003:98) last argument about the relation of emotions to 
narrative (literary for him) is, “Cross-culturally, there are two prominent 
structures of literary narrative, romantic and heroic tragicomedy, derived 
respectively from the personal and social prototypes for happiness”. The four 
‘hypotheses’ of Hogan seem to be universal human models for narrative. 
Narratives are some of the cultural means by which emotions are shared and for 
Hogan (2008:153), the ‘lyrical’ moments set against the segments of narratives 
are elaborations of feelings; they bring about the emotive responses in the public 
and govern the general cognitive principles of stories. Through the compression 
of emotions that lyric poetry, for instance, affords, it enables a particular proto- 
emotion, claims Hogan, and “the event in a lyric poem draws its meaning and 
affective force from its tacit relation to a prototype for an outcome emotion and 
its location within a narrative structure implied by that prototype” (2003:153). 
He also claims that the “relation of lyric poems to prototypical narratives and 
emotion prototypes is an absolute universal” and that the “prototypical lyric 
poems are tacitly located at junctural moments of heroic or romantic tragi- 
comedies and imply the emotion prototypes for those genres” (2003:153).  There 
is an analogy between this view of connections between the emotion prototypes 
and prototypical narratives that propel the behaviour of making narratives and 
the view held by Damasio about the direct relationship between the 
accumulation of felt images of the body and the rise of consciousness.  In both 
views, it is the emotions that are being accumulated, transmitted and 
communicated within seemingly dissimilar and separate media, the biological 
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and the cultural. 
Niccol creates a series of lyrical moments in his film, which he constructs out of 
mundane, everyday situations such as conversations between the ex-husband and 
wife, or the sudden insight Taransky’s daughter arrives at while researching the 
Pygmalion myth.  These are contrasted with the scenes from Taransky’s film that 
are full of pathos and highly idealised emotions. 
2.6.4  Using the biocultural approach 
The use of the biocultural approach to narratives and cultural objects can be 
exemplified through a description of some important contributions to the field. 
For example, Boyd (2009) in his On the origin of stories uses two different 
approaches to his biocultural analyses of two different texts, one of which is 
Homer’s Odyssey and the other Dr. Seuss’s Horton hears a who!  In the analysis 
of the Homeric text, Boyd emphasises the issue of “earning attention” from the 
evolutionary perspective on intelligence and on human cooperation.  In Horton 
hears a who! targeted areas are problems and solutions and secondly, levels of 
explanation which are organised around universal, local, individual and 
particular elements.  Zunshine (2006) applies mainly the Theory of Mind to 
selected texts in her Why we read fiction — Theory of Mind and the novel.  
Stafford (2007:1) accords primacy to the cognitive work of images ranging from 
the fifteenth century to the present — critically examining images against the 
“backdrop of the question being posed by our colleagues in neuroscience”.  The 
approaches to biocultural analysis are highly individual and specific to the 
discipline in the humanities within which any scholar works. 
Boyd, for instance in pointing to the biology behind storytelling and using texts 
to illustrate his points, shows how the biological traits of securing attention and 
solving problems are performed in literary texts as diverse as Homer’s and Dr 
Seuss’s.  He argues for the biological basis for individuality which issues in 
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cultural objects as a particular set of singular, identifiable, distinguishing 
characteristics which mark the individual as the creator.   
In the cognitive approach to cultural criticism the emphasis is on how the 
biological basis in the production of cultural objects is not a mechanical 
exploration of what science or technology can explain about human action and 
interaction concluding in deterministic outcomes.  It is richer than that.  For 
Boyd (2009:385), the cognitive approach “can refine and challenge our idea of 
human nature and thought”, broaden our responses to the individuality of the 
creators of the objects, contribute to the spread of cognition, enable collaboration 
as human brains do not tend “to do their cognitive work in isolation” (Dror & 
Harnad 2007:47) and open up chances for creativity.  
Cultural objects are signs of cognitive adaptation coming from what Boyd 
(2009:189) has termed, “limited perceptual input [which] yields rich conceptual 
output”; it is in this way that cumulative adaptation in culture happens.  
Tomasello (2010:3-5), who speaks from a cognitive linguistics perspective, 
emphasises the multiple interpretative possibilities and associations that can arise 
out of a single gesture — a limited input.  He argues that such limited input as a 
singular gesture can generate numerous options for interpretation which arise out 
of the specific conditions — as for instance the prior knowledge or the personal 
history of the recipient — within which such gesture is produced. 
A further issue in the use of the biocultural approach pertains to cultural 
variation. To retain cultural variation two concepts are important — transmission 
and persistence: a) from one brain to another brain, there must be a transmission 
of whatever information is valuable; b) there must be enough time (persistence in 
time) on whatever scale is necessary to make and use the tools so that whoever is 
learning from observation sees the model doing it. Boyd and Richerson 
(2005:288) argue that their work on culture and evolutionary biology 
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... is unified by the idea that culture is a system of inheritance: 
individuals vary in their skills, habits, beliefs, values, and attitudes, 
and these variations are transmitted to others through time by 
teaching, imitation, and other forms of social learning.  To understand 
cultural change, we must account for the microevolutionary processes 
that increase the numbers of some cultural variants and reduce the 
numbers of others. 
Boyd (2009:25) uses the term “biocultural” to underline the fact that biology is 
not in opposition to society and culture when he outlines his vision of cultural 
criticism.  If culture is behavioural adaptation to an environment, as Kronenfeld 
(2008:97) argues, in that it provides the “system which coordinates human 
society”, then the cultural objects, the outcome of certain cultural behaviours, 
provide us with a vocabulary of “goal instantiations”, “means toward ends”, a 
“toolkit” to understand “motives, attitudes”, and the “desires” of the 
manufacturers of the objects.  Culture also evolves as organisms do, but in a 
constricted, constructed environment (Boyd & Richerson 2005).  Culture and 
biology are intimately related — culture cannot arise where there is no biological 
base to enable it (Sperber 1996).  Scientists, focused on different aspects of this 
biological base for enabling culture, point out certain specific biological 
characteristics in humans that allow for culture and its transmission.  Boyd and 
Richerson (2005:4) explain it thus: 
Genes and culture coevolve.  Because culture creates durable changes 
in human behavior, human genes evolve in a culturally constructed 
environment. This environment, in turn, generates selection on genes. 
The evolution of language is an example.  We apparently have a 
complex innate system for hearing, speaking, and learning language. 
A theory of cultural criticism which takes account of biology is itself a species of 
adaptation to the new social climate in science and the humanities. 
The biocultural approach to analysing cultural objects is grounded in research 
which shows that culture and cognition are interdependent (Tomasello 1999, 
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2010; Clark 2010; Ramachandran 2011).  To understand the cognition involved 
in the appreciation and analysis of a cultural object, placing the object in a 
cultural construction such as semiotic theory or phenomenology (and so on) is 
not the only approach available now.  The value of a biocultural approach in the 
analysis of cultural objects is that it does not separate those who have produced 
the objects and are their recipients from the biological mechanisms that enable 
culture at an organism level nor at a cultural coevolution level (Tuomela 2007).  
Arbib (2006: Kindle loc 88) observes that by including the biological perspective 
in cultural analysis the aim is not to ignore the other dimensions of cultural 
objects and language but to enrich them by an understanding of how the use of 
language and imitation “may be situated with respect to other systems for action 
and perception”. 
2.7  CONCLUSION 
This selective review of the literature on the biocultural approach to criticism is 
founded on a key concept in biology, that of the cognising Self.  The old 
arguments between the Humanities and science are discussed to provide a 
context for the overwhelming evidence that findings from biology impact on 
every element of human cognition, hence narratives, art, any cultural production, 
so that it is unwise to ignore the findings of biology and neuroscience.  
Cognition is transmitted in a variety of ways by humans especially through 
mimicry and mimesis, but when mimesis is part of deception or someone is 
shown to be a norm violator it is not easily tolerated amongst humans, although 
mimicry is a key survival strategy among many other species on earth.  Narrative 
is shown as closely connected to biological underpinnings — namely, emotions, 
and satire as a narrative form belongs to the same picture, but usually has a 
moralising function. 
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CHAPTER 3:  COGNITION, SATIRE AND ITS OBJECT IN NICCOL'S 
FILM S1MONE 
The human skin is an artificial boundary: the world wanders into it, and 
the self wanders out of it, traffic is two-way and constant. 
Bernard Wolfe (Limbo, 1952) 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the notion of cognition and what is cognised 
specifically through Niccol’s S1mOne.  The biological approach to support the 
analysis of cultural objects is expanded in the discussion to support the next 
chapter. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections, the first being a discussion about 
cognition and its transmission through, among other things, cultural objects. 
Secondly, the specific cultural object of this study, the satire, S1mOne, is 
contextualized within a broad overview of satire in preparation for the close 
analysis of the film undertaken in Chapter 4.  The genre of satire is placed within 
the broader context of current American satire which has a particularly political 
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direction.  The last section is about the object of Niccol’s satire, Hollywood, 
which has metamorphosed from its earliest beginnings in the late nineteenth 
century to the multi-million, big business operation of today.  From a biocultural 
perspective satire, as a vehicle of cognition, reliant as it is on humour, represents 
an evolution of culture which is sophisticated in terms of the cognition called for, 
although its expression can run the gamut from grossly heavy-handed to the 
subtlest of touches. 
3.1.1  Cognition 
Cognition can be described as a series of mental processes of knowing or that 
which comes to be known.  Both these aspects of cognition happen through 
perception, awareness, reasoning, intuition and judgment.10   ‘Cognition’, then, 
designates either the ability to acquire knowledge or already acquired knowledge 
as well as the mental processes involved in cognition, including understanding 
and producing language, solving problems, making decisions and memory. This is 
represented in the illustration below (Figure 3.1). 
                                                 
10 The root of the word cognition comes from the ancient Greek verb “gnόsko” (γνώσκω) 
meaning ‘I learn’ and the noun “gnόsis” (γνώσις) meaning ‘knowledge’, so broadly speaking it 
signifies ‘to conceptualise’ or ‘to recognise’. 
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Figure 3.1      A simplified chart of cognition. 
 
A wide range of scholars in disciplines such as neurology, philosophy, 
psychology, anthropology, linguistics and computer science approach mental 
processes from different perspectives and offer insights from their diverse 
contexts.  According to Rowlands (2010:2-3), however, the main divide in the 
studies of cognition lies between focusing on cognition as mental states (Cartesian 
approach) or mental processes (non-Cartesian approach). 
3.1.1.1  Cognition and intelligence 
Cognition and intelligence are closely related. Herman (2006:358) highlights the 
usefulness of Rogoff’s definition of intelligence as “the socially supported ability 
to solve problems grounded in particular domains of activity”. The specific 
domain of activity discussed in this study is the engagement with a cultural object 
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from initial perception to metacognition. The use of intelligence as a socially 
supported ability to solve the problem of the cultural object, S1mOne in this case, 
however, is expensive in terms of energy use. 
One has to perceive the object, that is, organise, identify and interpret the 
incoming sensory information so as to represent and understand the environment 
one perceives. Fortunately one is scarcely aware of this activity. One then 
processes the information, first into recognisable and differentiated structures and 
then into a fine-grained understanding, a cognition of the narrative, its 
complexities, and perhaps the creator's goal in making the object. One then 
assesses meaning as to the importance, value, provenance and impact of the 
object.  Finally, because the film is satirical, one is amply assisted in grasping the 
point the creator makes by his extensive exploitation of signals or cues to us to 
engage in metacognition, understood as that ability to reflect on one's own 
cognitive processes (see 3.1.1.2). 
One of the methods used by researchers and scientists working on cognition and 
culture is a close examination of brain development, by means of studying 
material and cultural objects made over the last fifty thousand or more years. This 
enables them to arrive at conclusions about the evolution of the brain and the 
social mind as a result of the production of cultural objects and human interaction 
therewith (Donald 1991; Mithen 2000; Wilson 2002; Mithen 2005; Whiten, 
Hinde, Laland & Stringer 2011).  Viewed in this way, such cultural objects are 
therefore not only material evidence of cognitive processes but are also 
acknowledged by these scientists to be “propellers” for cognition. 
In terms of brain development, current studies in cognition claim that the modern 
human brain emerged between fifty to forty thousand years ago due to the rise of 
mimetic episodes as a strategy for survival, among other factors (Donald 1991; 
Mithen 2000; Smail 2008).  The development of mimesis, marked by the 
production of the first objects of art (Mithen 1996; Bailey 2005; Arbib 2006), is 
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thought to be one of the main triggers for the transfer of cultural learning and 
knowledge, thus enabling the growth of culture (Pinker 2002:60-63; 
Ramachandran 2011:117-152). 
3.1.1.2  Metacognition 
Another of the important concepts related to cognition is metacognition — 
reflection on cognitive processes which is indispensable to the enjoyment and 
understanding of cultural objects.  Güss and Wiley (2007) comment that, 
“metacognition, the observation of one’s own thinking, is a key cognitive ability 
that allows humans to influence and restructure their own thought processes”. 
Metacognition, the term which denotes “thinking about thinking”, was first used 
by Flavell (1976:232) who outlined the following description of metacognition as 
referring, 
... to one’s knowledge concerning one’s own cognitive processes or 
anything related to them, e.g., the learning-relevant properties of 
information or data.  For example, I am engaging in metacognition if I 
notice that I am having more trouble learning A than B; if it strikes me 
that I should double check C before accepting it as fact. 
This demand on metacognitive skills is what satire and other genres of literature, 
art and film (or other modalities of cultural production) make on the humans at 
whom the satire is aimed. 
3.1.1.3  Propagating cognition 
Distributed cognition11 is the framework for examining the processes of 
                                                 
11 Since the term “distributed cognition” is a somewhat specialised term (Hutchins 1995), the 
expression “propagating cognition” is generally preferred in this context to indicate the way in 
which ideas enter the social environment.   
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cooperation among humans, artefacts and environment. Calling the process of 
shared understanding “distributed cognition”, gives prominence to the social 
aspects of cognition (Resnick, Levine & Teasley 1988; Norman 1993; Hutchins 
1995; Latour 1999a; Giere & Moffatt 2003; Dror & Harnad 2008).  This 
framework of socially distributed cognition makes allowance for the possibility of 
a further advancement in human cognition through placing human experience 
within continuously growing interrelated systems of cultural, technical and 
scientific reference.  The term “distributed cognition”12 applies mostly to a set of 
coordinated activities with an anticipated outcome in mind; human interactions 
with cultural objects are less predictable however, and evoke rather potentialities 
than certainties of cognitive outcomes. The term ‘cognitive propagation of ideas’ 
might be useful here to address the open-endedness of interactions with cultural 
objects; it also suggests sometime uneven spread of cognition or potentially 
organic, unquantifiable reception of an art object.  Interactions with artefacts 
propagate cognition (Rogoff 1990; Wertsch 1991; Hutchins 1995) and human 
knowledge and cognition are propagated by memories of, knowledge of or facts 
about objects, tools or individuals.   
Propagating cognition, in the context of this thesis, is understood to effect changes 
and transformations in the individuals interacting with artefacts and environments.  
There are numerous vehicles for driving cognition and metacognition and 
propagating these in society; among them is narrative which can be described as a 
higher level of second-order beliefs (Enfield & Levinson 2006:195). The 
propagation of cognition promotes the evolution of culture and in turn culture 
affects the propagation of cognition.  
                                                 
12 The distributed cognition typically refers to a framework that involves coordination between 
individuals, artefacts and environments while that coordination does not necessarily involve a 
transformation of any of the participating elements.   
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Salomon (1997:xiii), working in the discipline of educational psychology, says of 
the concept of socially transmitted cognition, “People think in conjunction and 
partnership with others and with the help of culturally provided tools and 
implements”.  One of the more popular examples of distributed cognition is that 
provided by Hutchins who in the mid-1980s combined insights from the cognitive 
sciences with Vygotsky’s observations about collaborative learning processes in 
order to emphasise social aspects of cognition.  Hutchins’s example (1995) of 
distributed cognition between human and non-human systems is that of the 
interactions among an aeroplane’s crew members who work in conjunction with 
each other, the plane’s devices and the environment; thus, the interactions require 
social effort and assist in providing instances of distributed cognition. 
Another example of distributed cognition is the solving of complex arithmetical 
problems by two or more participants in which sections of the calculation are 
broken down into simpler components and stored in memory by the participants in 
order to collectively arrive at the final sum.  Art objects and films are also good 
examples of distributed cognition tools and are in certain aspects analogous to the 
two former examples above.  However, it cannot be claimed that all the 
‘interactions’ between artworks, their creators and their recipients are 
‘coordinated’ as these interactions often can have transformative rather than 
instructive exertion on all participating elements.  
The exchange of cognition reverberates not only between an artist/film 
maker/story-teller and his/her audiences but also between individuals in the 
audience who might share their interpretations of the work and thus add to it from 
the wide scope of their personal experiences or professional fields which could 
range from neuroscience or astrophysics to educational psychology or applied 
mechanics.  Additionally, accessibility of films and videos to the public via media 
like television, cinema, DVDs, iPads, Kindle, computer networks and the Internet 
makes them potent agents for transmission of cognition. According to Dror and 
Harnad (2008:1-3), those forms of cognitive technology enable “extending 
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[cognisants’] performance capacity beyond the limits of their own brains”. 
Concepts from the field of distributed cognition find applications in distance 
learning, especially in the field of Computer Supported Collaborative Learning 
(CSCL) and collaborative tagging on websites where popularity and similarity of 
searched material has been indicated to enable easier “navigability” through 
searches. The field of distributed cognition is expanding rapidly and is 
continuously enriched by examination of different agents and processes which 
play an inherent role. Gureckis and Goldstone (in Dror & Harnad 2008:111-114) 
emphasise the perspective of complex adaptive systems and their role in 
propagating cognition and the formation of group versus individual behaviour. 
The outcomes of interactions between the different agents are more predictable 
and calculable when examined as a part of a framework of distributed cognition 
than when are assessed as from the perspective of transmitting and sharing 
distribution.  Spreading of cognition is not easily assessed as it involves 
transformation of perceptions and/or values which are often non-quantifiable.  
Tomasello (1999a:5-7) focuses on the forms of social learning and evolutionary 
cognition as forces enabling “individual organisms to understand conspecifics as 
beings ‘like themselves’” and equipping them with the ability to imagine 
themselves “in the mental shoes” of other beings. 
A shared understanding of the cultural object can also be described as part of the 
activity of “propagating cognition” and the process can be understood as one of 
“shared thinking”.  Herman (2006:357) explains distributed cognition as “the 
process of shared thinking about [...] events and about one’s own and other 
minds”. Culture arises in the conditions of sociality and helps that same sociality 
to evolve.  The concept of cognition as both ‘shared’ and ‘distributed’ is a means 
of explaining how to understand learning (of the mimetic and non-mimetic kind), 
cultural traditions and customs and their transmission amongst a group of people 
(Rogoff 2003).  To think of cognition as propagated provides insight into the role 
which cultural products like literature, film or art objects play in dispersing 
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knowledge and intelligence. From a biological point of view, through a series of 
interactions with cultural objects, shared cognition contributes to the development 
of our human adaptability. 
3.1.1.4  Theory of Mind, Extended Mind and Coupled systems 
Theories about mind or mind reading are well established because humans must 
have some notion of others’ intentions, expected actions or reactions; this is a 
well-recognised idea in science (Premack &Woodruff 1978; Dennett 1987; 
Baron-Cohen 1991; Call & Tomasello 1998; Gallagher & Frith 2003; Horowitz 
2003).  More controversial are ideas like the extended mind and coupled systems. 
Geertz (1993:360) reminds us that in looking at mental states from the perspective 
of anthropological sciences it is obvious that “thought is consummately social: 
social in its origin, social in its functions, social in its forms, social in its 
applications”. Similar claims that mental states are not private but socially 
enabled and motivated are made from other disciplines like evolutionary 
linguistics and philosophy of mind.  One of the key concepts for the distribution 
and transmission of cognition is the Theory of Mind (ToM) which all humans 
have, that is, a ToM about what is in someone else's mind in the groups in which 
we share cognition.  Herman (2007:257) explains what ToM is in a clear 
summary, 
... [r]elevant in this context are fundamental, generic processes by 
which humans attribute mental states, properties, and dispositions both 
to themselves and to their social cohorts.  These processes are part of 
what psychologists refer to as the native ‘Theory of Mind’ in terms of 
which people make sense of their own behavior and that of the people 
they observe and interact with. Philosophers tend to refer to the same 
native inference — yielding resources as understanding and producing 
language ‘folk psychology.’  At issue is people’s everyday 
understanding of how thinking works, the rough-and-ready heuristics 
to which they resort in thinking about thinking itself. We use these 
heuristics to impute motives or goals to others, to evaluate the bases of 
our own conduct, and to make predictions about future reactions to 
events. 
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Frith and Frith (2001:151) report that the central factor of human socialisation is 
our cognitive ability to “attribute mental states such as desires, intentions, and    
beliefs to oneself and the others” and that this ability is a crucial aspect of human 
mentalising processes.  Frith and Frith (2001:151) also explain that 
... belief trumps reality in potentially ambiguous situations when 
someone wishes to predict another person’s behaviour. In everyday 
life, beliefs rather than reality determine what people do. Hence, the 
acid test of mentalizing is understanding a false belief. False beliefs 
play an important role in social communication, especially in the 
detection and use of deception, persuasion, and trading. 
An offshoot of having a ToM about other people's states of mind is the connection 
to objects which extend the range of our own minds.  Chalmers (in Clark 2011) 
explains that Clark’s hypothesis of the extended mind manifests itself when “parts 
of the environment are coupled to the brain” in such way that they become “parts 
of the mind”. 
A third idea has to do with the “cognitive life of things”, to use Sutton’s term (in 
Dror & Harnad 2008:47) for the array of objects and ideas that range from “the 
physical objects and epistemic tools used in processing orders in a café”, tagging 
systems, artists' and scientists' sketchbooks, “instruments and procedures involved 
in navigation” to gang tattoos or “black ties worn at funerals”. This category of 
things and ideas that provide an opportunity for propagating cognition seems to be 
intention driven because it serves to achieve goals that vary from logistic, 
commercial, scientific or artistic to expressions of emotions and can be collective, 
collaborative, private or individual. 
3.2  COGNITION, STORIES, NARRATIVE 
It is exceptional that we as humans process information as narrative.  Hermann 
(2003:x) distinguishes between two kinds of information, namely, “narrative [as] 
one of the two fundamental styles of thinking enabling human beings to make 
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their way in the world”, the other style being “paradigmatic” or 
“logical/classificatory thinking”.  In this examination of stories, narrative and 
cognition, the significance of narrative as a way of organising human experience 
both for the self and for others to facilitate mutual understanding is discussed in 
the introduction to the section on satire (3.3).  Boyd (2009:385) reminds us that 
To understand stories at all requires at least an implicit theory of 
human nature.  But most literary criticism has little more: either an 
intuitive theory of human nature as self-evident, or recently an explicit 
and untenable theory of it as entirely socially constructed. 
A similar statement can be made about recent film criticism. Andrews and 
Andrews (2012:59) criticise the constructivist approach which has dominated the 
humanities for so long, saying the biocultural one is a welcome addition to the 
humanities landscape, “offering a way out of a reductive species of culturalism 
that so frequently presents genres, texts, and authors as ‘social constructions’ 
only”.  An example of that approach is the limiting perspective enunciated by 
Atkinson and Delamont (2006:170) on narratives as “inescapably social 
phenomena ... they are produced and circulated in ‘social contexts’ ... they are 
based on socially shared conventions”.  Schiff (2006:22) provides a definition of 
narrative, in his case in the context of a narrative psychology: 
The word narrative has a broad and a narrow sense.  In its narrow 
rendition, narrative means the study of storytelling proper, including 
the analysis of specific stories, the study of plot lines, themes, forms 
of address, etc.  Although this narrow definition of narrative is 
valuable in interpreting lives, it is also limiting.  I take narrative in its 
broad connotation as the act of telling, narrating or showing subjective 
experience.  In such a way, narrative becomes the act of expression in 
which persons make known the meaning of experiences and the 
significance of their actions. 
This definition is an example of an intuitive theory of human nature and from this 
point of view the meaning of experiences and significance of actions arises from 
individual epistemologies.  From a biocultural perspective the act of expression 
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through narrative is no more true than from any other epistemological perspective. 
But our biological make-up, the maps and mental models which are both different 
and the same for all humans, will inevitably produce very different stories.  In 
addition, our personal narratives, real or fictional, are co-authored by other 
significant individuals.  There are innumerable other sources for our stories. The 
subplots in our stories which are unwanted and personally limiting (Drewery & 
Winslade 1997; Winslade & Monk 1999; Cheon & Murphy 2007), for instance, 
frequently arise from cultural or political stereotypes that “place people in 
particular positions or relationships with others and themselves and prompt them 
to describe the world from particular vantage points” (McKenzie & Monk 
1999:93). Such limiting subplots can exert so great a power that they can 
dominate people’s narratives psychologically and compel them to view their 
world through that lens only.  Cheon and Murphy (2007:7) say, “Narrative 
therapists suggest that because we are born into and are affected by dominant 
discourses, they are internalized within us as truths and influence personal 
narratives”.  
Thinking about storytelling, narrative and cognition from the particular standpoint 
of human nature as evolved, evolving, and co-evolving with culture, sheds further 
light on the entirely socially constructed view of human nature as so exceptional. 
As Boyd (2009:386) says about the biocultural perspective: 
A biocultural explanation builds from the ground up, from single-
celled organisms to humans.  It interprets human society partly in light 
of the many forms of sociality that have evolved, under sometimes 
similar pressures, throughout the animal world; human culture in light 
of culture in other animals; and human conventions in light of the 
conventionalizing of behavior in animal ritual. 
Boyd (2009) most convincingly describes the cognition element associated with 
narrative — from a biocultural perspective.  He (2009:145) points out that we 
need a ToM first in order to understand narrative: 
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We can trace three stages of the early individual development of fully 
human theory of mind: (1) First, infants up to about eighteen months 
have a single updating model of reality, of the world they can see now; 
(2) From about eighteen months to about four years, they can hold 
multiple models of reality in their minds, but do not understand the 
process fully. They can call up memories of the past, anticipate the 
future, have some notion of the wishes and intentions of others, 
understand and respond to pictures or stories, enjoy pretend play, and 
distinguish these other representations —  memories, wishes, 
anticipations, fancies, pictures, stories — from the world of the here 
and now. 
From studies of infants the idea of metarepresentation is clear.  Without 
metarepresentation the understanding of narratives is not possible.  While it is true 
that other great apes and even dolphins seem to have a ToM we cannot say as we 
can about humans that they are capable of metarepresentation, or that they 
understand the very processes of metarepresentation.  Although children cannot 
easily tap into their “beliefs as well as desires, goals, and intentions” (Boyd 
2009:145) we as adults can.  These beliefs, desires, goals and intentions underlie 
our metarepresentation facility. 
Narratives consist of sequences of events and without an understanding of those 
whether at the level of fairy tale in which the markers of those sequences are 
straightforward in the style of “and then”, “and then”, or at the level of romantic 
fiction “meanwhile” or the highly stylised dance choruses of ancient Greek 
tragedies, we as humans like to know event sequences.  In film at first the use of 
the conventions of stage plays gave the event sequencing a certain slowness 
(Branigan 1992). 
Event sequencing starts to be explicit in children as early as five years old.  That is 
a necessity for understanding narrative.  Boyd (2009:152) says, “event 
comprehension reflects the regularities of the world — things, kinds, minds — 
and is already well established in many kinds of minds quite without human 
culture and in human minds largely independent of any deliberate teaching”.  This 
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seems effortless as adults but the biological basis has to do with memory, both 
short term and long term.  To put events together in episodes is characteristic of 
narrative comprehension.  Some episodes especially in film seem to have no 
connection to preceding ones.  It is then that our working memory has to be set 
aside for the search into long term memory and finally “if that yields nothing, for 
general knowledge in semantic memory” (Boyd 2009:152). 
So it is with character assessment, another of the crucial parts of narratives.  It is 
because of our ToM and memory we can rapidly assess and remember character 
traits in a truly sophisticated way and if necessary reassess if the evidence 
presented is in some way dissident with our initial impressions.  Boyd (2009:153) 
explains some of the earliest work on memory which showed that, 
… our memories are not eidetically exact but partially reconstructed, 
reshaped by the mind at every stage: in initial perception, in encoding, 
during storage, and in retrieval. We remember only selectively, 
according to what we attend to and its recency, salience, and 
emotional impact. 
Energy costs in shaping even our micro biology so we survive successfully, 
extend to shaping memory as well.  This summary of cognition, biology and 
narrative is heavily reliant on Boyd (2009) as his is one of the clearest and most 
accessible explanations of the biology behind narrative. 
3.3  SATIRE: SEEKING A BIOCULTURAL DEFINITION 
The medium of Niccol’s work is satire and film and the object of his satire is 
Hollywood.  To review two millennia of satirical activity in theatre, literature, art 
and film in the West is obviously only possible from some specific viewpoint.  
The perspective adopted in this study is to examine the main rhetorical 
components of satire as strategies which serve the artist’s overall purpose. The 
strategies in question are those related to the biological facts of reference to those 
strategies which support the analysis of S1mOne in Chapter 4. It is worth 
94 
 
remembering that Quintero (2007:495) says, “The purpose of mockery is 
constantly shifting”. Niccol might be what Duval (2007:71) terms a “discrediting 
representative” (stock character from Renaissance satire), that is, he undermines 
his own profession by exposing the foibles, limitations of character and excesses 
of the other director, his counterpart, Taransky.   
A more detailed analysis of the biology of humour is submitted, as compared to 
Chapter 1, as well as a brief discussion of theories of humour as they relate to 
biology.  The second section covers a review of the Hollywood industry as it has 
developed over the last fifty years since the “classical” period of the 1960s to its 
current large scale operation as a global business enterprise. 
Satire is a form of discourse belonging to drama, literature, and art.  It has three 
main functions as part of the human capacity for humour, as Simpson (2003:3) 
suggests: 
[t]he aggressive function always ridicules or makes fun of a victim, 
allowing the non-victim a feeling of superiority.  The social function 
can serve to reinforce intra-and inter-group bonds, strengthening the 
cohesiveness of interpersonal relations. The intellectual function, 
which is based on absurdities, word play and nonsense, provides 
pleasure in ‘the temporary freedom from strict rules and rationality’. 
However, satire remains difficult to define. It is unsatisfactory to define it 
according to its functions. Still less satisfactory is to look at its ancient roots and 
believe that the greater the antiquity of the definition, the more authoritative it is 
(Condren, 2012).  As Rabb (2007:570) says about viewing the history of satire in 
antiquity despite its great and continuing popularity 
[i]n our current culture, satire continues to flourish in widely 
disseminated formats and media.  But how many admirers of ‘The 
Onion’ or ‘The Daily Show’ have read Horace, Persius, Varro, or 
Juvenal?  Something else besides classical erudition provides the 
‘hook’ that holds readers of satire together in mutual desire for its 
peculiar pleasures. 
95 
 
That hook is probably the same indignation that satirists have always felt about 
violators of predominant values or norms, confabulation, arrogance, blind 
stupidity or any vice mentionable.  There is a certain agreement on what is 
recognised as satire.  As McClennen (2011:5-6) says, “At the heart of satire is the 
exaggerated, parodic acceptance of the status quo, done in a way that serves to 
ridicule common practices and beliefs in order to provoke the audience to rethink 
its behavior and ideas”. 
3.3.1  Satire and sociality 
Hollywood is a specialised outcome of American society, a social group all of its 
own, characterised previously or prior to the 1980s as a series of “chiefdoms”. 
With changing global economic conditions and advances in technology between 
the 1960s and the 1980s the fabric of the industry changed (Bordwell, Taiger & 
Thompson, 1998; Bordwell 2006).  It belongs now in the league of very large 
national industries with all their parameters, pressures and financial drivers. 
The “socially coordinated effort” (Herman (2006:356) towards making sense of 
the inner workings of the machinery of the Hollywood industry lends itself to the 
satirical mode because of its exhibition of ludicrous conventions such as the 
worship of celebrities, prurient interest of the media in the lives of such 
“goddesses”, financiers’ manipulative demands on film makers and raw 
consumerism and commodification.  In being confronted with the consuming 
machine of Hollywood Niccol can agree with Juvenal's (c.60-c.140 CE) cynical 
remark, “Difficile est saturam non scribere” (Satire, 1:30).13 
Satire can be said to be the cultural tool utilised in disseminating the 
understanding of a clear-sighted individual regarding what he/she views as 
                                                 
13  “It is difficult not to write satire.” 
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behaviour which, in a cultural sense, leads to the “spread of maladaptive cultural 
variants” (Boyd & Richerson 2005:10).  Satire as a species of humour belongs to 
an extensive tradition whereon innumerable theorists have theorised from 
Aristophanes' (448-380 BCE) Old Comedy play, Lysistrata (411 BCE) to 
Stanislaw Lem’s Cyberiad (1975) or Woody Allen's 1995 Mighty Aphrodite 
(Draitser 1994; Sperber & Wilson 1995; Sperber & Wilson 2000; Simpson 2003).  
Much of what has been written focuses on the rhetoric of literary satire but that is 
not the focus in this study.  Rather, the emphasis is on the biology which 
underpins our cultural objects and the objective is to place humour, satirical or 
not, in the context of human sociality.  As Gervais and Wilson (2005:399) report, 
“Social contexts facilitate laughter ... , and laughter is thirty-times more likely to 
occur in a social context than when alone ...  It has even been argued that laughter 
requires another person to stimulate it ...”. 
Two ideas about humour as satire need to be clarified here. One relates to the 
cultural context and as Kenrick, Nieweboer and Buunk (2010:258) explain, 
“[w]hat is true is that all humans recognise each other’s angry expressions but 
when it comes to humour ... all human groups have humour and moral outrage, 
but which verbal statements elicit laughter or horror depends partly on an 
understanding of local cultural norms”. The other significant idea about humour is 
in relation to laughter in the evolution of humans. 
In the context of human relations the value of humour is obvious in reducing 
negative affect and preventing some aggressive behaviour, amongst much similar 
adaptive behaviour.  Gervais and Wilson (2005: 396) also remark that he 
considers “laughter to have been a preadaptation that was gradually elaborated 
and co-opted through both biological and cultural evolution”.   
3.3.2  Satire — a brief overview of important sources 
The literature on satire is vast and rather than reviewing here a period of three 
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thousand odd years, suffice it to say that the primary texts used in the following 
chapter are originals or translations.  The secondary sources for the techniques and 
sources of satire are Freudenburg’s (2005) The Cambridge companion to Roman 
satire, Keane’s (2006) Figuring genre in Roman satire and Quintero’s (2007) A 
companion to satire.  Ancient satire is also represented by Rosen (2007) in 
Making mockery: the poetics of ancient satire.  The eighteenth century was the 
satirical age par excellence and the following works were consulted: Weinbrot’s 
(2007) Eighteenth-century satire: text and context from Dryden to Peter Pindar, 
Wild’s (2008) Christopher Smart and satire, and Forbes’s (2010) The satiric 
decade: satire and the rise of Republican political culture in France, 1830-1840. 
Modern satire is addressed through Abche’s (1999) Political satire, Schlegel’s 
(2006) Satire and the threat of speech, Freedman’s (2008) The offensive art: 
political satire and its censorship around the world from Beerbohm to Borat, 
Day’s (2011) Satire and dissent interventions in contemporary political debate, 
Gournelos and Green’s (2011) A decade of dark humour: how comedy, irony and 
satire shaped post 9/11 America and McClellan’s (2011) America according to 
Colbert: satire as public pedagogy.  In approaching film and TV sources 
consulted were Horton’s (1993) Inside Soviet film satire, Gardner’s (2009) The 
Marx brothers as social critics: satire and comic nihilism in their films and Gray, 
Jones and Thompson’s (2009) Satire: TV politics in the post network era. General 
works on satire which proved useful were Simpson’s (2003) On the discourse of 
satire: towards a stylistic model of satirical humour. 
3.3.3  Satire’s cryptic origins 
Whether satire’s origin is a Roman invention from “satura”, “a mixed plate [of 
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beans]”14, or from the Greek satyr plays does not make it any easier to define 
(Keane 2007:31-32; Quintero 2007:7). One would like to think there is a 
connection to ancient forms as found in the irreverent chorus of satyrs in Old Attic 
drama who comment in a mocking way on the action of the protagonists in the 
comedy which was offered to Attic audiences during the course of their viewing 
of the great tragedies of tragedians such as Aeschylus (525/524-456/455 BCE), 
Sophocles (496/5-406/5 BCE) and Euripides (480-406 BCE).  Quintero (2007:9) 
continues to say that satire exists 
... as if it were equity interminably disputed in chancery, comes down 
to us as an enduring creative product of a jumbled and sometimes 
specious genealogy — rhetorically assertive, concretely topical, and 
palpable as an art form but with its title and pedigree as a genre 
perpetually in question. 
Its instruments are many and diverse, but for satire to have any relevance for its 
spectators or readers it needs to have something to mock, subvert, or criticise.  
This in part accounts for the enormous variability of satire as it has appeared since 
the Old Comedies of Aristophanes (448-380 BCE) through to Orson Welles’s 
Citizen Kane (1941). Condren (2012:380) favours the association of satire with 
humour for the practical outcomes it provides: 
It is nearer the truth to say that our later strong associations of satire 
with humor encourage extending the range of the satiric back to 
embrace the Greek rhetorical and comedic notion that laughter was 
ridicule of folly and wrongdoing.  Aristotle’s important reflections on 
laughter and ridicule, from The Rhetoric and Poetics were assimilated 
to satire only through later translation.  Thus in ridicule and tropes 
adjacent to it, we have something that helps hold together the varying 
                                                 
14 Keane suggests that this early expression comes from mixing a variety of genres: and says that 
“the genre’s name (satura, “stuffed”) warns that its own nature cannot be summarised in a simple 
formula. Its purported founder Lucilius […], used many different rhetorical tones, and even 
varied his metrical scheme” (2007:32). 
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rationalities for a general conception of satire, not just in ‘literature’ 
but across rhetoric, drama and poetics. 
Aristotle’s idea that laughter “was ridicule of folly and wrongdoing” is currently 
enriched by Gervais and Wilson’s claims that laughter has two distinct sides, the 
playful type which primates all share, and the type which is a learned behaviour.  
Gervais and Wilson (2005:399) say, 
[d]espite the evident biological foundation of laughter and humor, 
there is little doubt that laughter-evoking contexts and how laughter is 
interpreted are fundamentally influenced by cultural norms and 
learning.  Goodson ... has called this ‘learning (cultural) overlay’ or 
the codetermination of human actions by biology and culture.... 
One of the norms in Western culture is to recognise certain kinds of ridicule, such 
as the use of incongruity, exaggeration, bathos, lampoon, comic reversals, litotes, 
witticisms, irony, invective, unmasking, grotesquerie, as satirical and capable of 
eliciting laughter.  Further, Pavlovskis-Petit (2007:511) says, “Being privy to 
knowledge not available to all is pivotal to all types of irony and satire”.  Finally, 
it is rather difficult to distinguish between persuasive and punitive satire and that 
debate continues apace. 
3.3.4  Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth century satire in Europe 
Classical satire survived into the sixteenth century in Europe and classical satirists 
continued to give inspiration and to contribute to that form of writing into the 
eighteenth century.  In literature in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries it was taken for granted that there were two kinds of satire modelled on 
classical literature.  Pavlovskis-Petit (2007:514-525) explains that there, 
… are two main types of classical satire: the Horatian and the 
Juvenalian. ... all satire may be seen as inherently ironic, but the 
involved and complex ironies of Horace and others who adopt his 
mode (Erasmus is an example of a Horatian satirist ...) furnish much 
greater enjoyment to anyone with a penchant for being teased than do 
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Juvenal and his like (such as Samuel Johnson, to name but one).  
There is no room for suspecting that the latter type of satirist is hiding 
behind the Horatian mask of an easy-going, fallible, even friendly, 
fellow talking to us with ironic humility even while concealing the 
sharpness of his observation and inveigling us into a belief that all that 
is going on is a friendly conversation.  A Juvenalian voice is that of an 
unimpeachable judge.  Even though the reader is still taken into the 
satirist’s confidence, open and angry indignation rather than crafty 
indirection is what we are made privy to. 
Amongst famous satirists is Francois Rabelais (1483?-1553) with his dense 
Gargantua and Pantagruel.  He employs a dazzling array of devices, registers 
from the most learned to the jargon of the street, and targets the church, lawyers, 
avarice and almost all vices.  Erasmus’s Praise of Folly (1511) comes from The 
Netherlands.  This is to name only two of the most outstanding writers of satire. 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries more satires were written in 
English than in any other century (Quintero, 2007:9). Johnson, Pope, Dryden and 
Swift are some of the most well-known.  The difference over the last two hundred 
years between the kind of audiences at whom satire is aimed might be a fruitful 
avenue to explore.  Certainly a diminution in learned audiences is the norm and, 
with mass media available, satire is best characterised currently by cartoons such 
as South Park (1997). But England and France in the 1600s and 1700s had to offer 
creative and indignant playwrights and authors and audiences sufficiently 
sophisticated to understand the satire launched against the prevailing modes in 
their society.  Molière’s (1622-1673) comedies are satirical in a biting way; 
ridicule and exaggeration are his key weapons.  La Fontaine’s subtle satires about 
animals, his Fables (published between 1668 and 1694), remains important for his 
sly wit and clear eye for human foibles.  Beaumarchais’s Barber of Seville (1775) 
has his protagonist, Figaro, utter some of the most stinging, satirical remarks 
about the class system of the time. 
How the detailed socio-economics, population of readers or any other factors 
influenced such a proliferation of satirical discourse is not within this study’s 
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purview although it is precisely those factors which make a satire topical for an 
audience who shares what Northrop Frye (1957:224) has described as “national 
hatreds, snobbery, prejudice and personal pique”. 
3.3.5  Satire in contemporary media 
Without the learned audience who read books or visit the theatre and upon whom 
earlier satirists relied, satire now presents a newer, less learned face.  With the 
development of the mass media and TV and all the technology which is at the 
fingertips of consumers currently, political satire has developed successfully in 
America. McClennen (2011:2) refers to satire as “public pedagogy” in her study 
of the American satirist, Colbert, whose scathing satire against the Bush 
administration after 9/11 brought satire back to centre stage of the public’s 
attention. He has been recognised for his work and awarded innumerable honours.  
His pedagogy is public and critical but as McClennen (2011:4) says, 
Colbert’s force as a public intellectual, though, is not limited to the 
public scope of his visibility.  One thing that makes his work 
especially powerful is the way that he combines entertainment with 
social critique.  This is what happens when he takes his show to Iraq 
and he blends silly bits of himself undergoing basic training or getting 
his head shaved with more significant commentary on the war and the 
crises facing the troops. 
In the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries satirists had as much force for small 
audiences for whom they played or wrote as Colbert or Borat have for their, 
thanks to the mass media, massively extended audiences.  Dario Fo (b.1926), the 
satirical playwright and Nobel laureate, observes that there is a difference between 
satire and teasing (sfottò). Where satire has a decisively subversive character that 
makes judgments and targets the oppressive systems, teasing has an element of 
humanising the “forces” or individuals at whom it is directed (Fo 2009:129).   
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3.3.6  Satire in relation to irony and laughter 
According to Elliott (1960), a satire exposes follies, abuses, vices and 
shortcomings by ridiculing them in order to shame individuals, certain groups of 
people and society, with the intent of improvement.  The mechanisms often relied 
on in satirical works to challenge stereotypical perceptions are exaggeration, anti-
climax, about-face reversals, unmasking, punning, parody, bathos, juxtaposition 
and hyperbole.  In another age irony could play a subtle part in satirising, 
especially in literature, but now the brush has to be broader to encompass the 
newer public for whom the mass media cater.   
Satire can be equally successfully used for both subversion and reinforcement of 
stereotypes.  So, much satire which was not direct ridicule, lampoon, castigation 
of moral attitudes or pointed exaggeration relied on irony.  Pavlovskis-Petit 
(2007:424) asserts that 
[s]atire is still with us, and still relatively easy to define, but irony 
continues to lay claims to territories far away from the satiric, and this 
tendency may delimit satire.  It is possible that the urbanity of ironic 
satire has largely disappeared with the spread of democracy and 
universally available schooling.  One would be ill advised to fault 
either of these modern phenomena, but with the shrinking of the 
highly educated literary elite proportionately to the size of the public 
addressed by satire, in order to have its desired impact satire cannot 
afford to be bewilderingly subtle; irony can, for it does not bear a 
burden of political and social responsibility, which has always been 
satire’s.  Hence the increasing use in the past two centuries of pictorial 
caricature to make a political point; and since the invention of film, 
that medium too has been utilized with splendid effect to make the sort 
of comment on human nature, society, and the responsibility of human 
interactions that used to be confined within the domain of literature. 
Neither irony nor satire need necessarily elicit laughter although when it is of the 
lampooning kind of satire that Monty Python (1969-1983) offers there is often 
laughter.  But an important finding about laughter is described by Gervais and 
Wilson (2005:402): 
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Laughter production is still tied to some degree of emotional arousal 
... but laughter’s function stems not from the communication of 
emotional states as information but instead from the accentuation or 
induction of positive affect in others.  This occurs either directly by 
laughter’s acoustic properties or indirectly through conditioned 
experience.... This conception of laughter finds support in studies 
showing that heard ‘voiced’ (or song-like) laughter elicits positive 
affect in others (in contrast to ‘unvoiced’ or grunt-like laughter; ...  
and from a fMRI study that found the amygdala, a key emotion and 
stimulus relevance area in the brain, activated by the perception of 
laughter ... .  In addition to inducing positive affect in others … 
laughter is contagious ... heard laughter is a sufficient stimulus to 
elicit laughter.  With this property, laughter falls within a larger 
category of primitive emotional contagion ... or the phenomena by 
which the actions and emotions of interlocutors are coupled.  The 
more general underlying tendency of interaction partners to adopt the 
same postures, gestures, and mannerisms has recently been dubbed 
the ‘chameleon effect’.... 
If the chameleon effect is applicable to our responses to the actions of any of the 
characters in Niccol’s satire, his goal is to ensure that subsequent reflection on and 
cognisance of what those actions might mean has a salutary effect on his 
spectators. The propagation of ideas should not be underestimated when the film 
industry approaches topics of universal interest, as was evident in the 
phenomenon of the effect of Rainer’s and Zackman’s Bucket List (2007) on the 
consciousness of millions of film spectators.15 
3.4  HOLLYWOOD AS THE OBJECT OF NICCOL’S SATIRE  
Mocking the industry in which he himself directs films by making a mockery of 
Taransky, the protagonist of his Simone, is a witty and self—reflexive joke full of 
ironies which Niccol will exploit to the end when, in the credits, his synthespian 
thanks all the real film stars preceding her existence for their contributions to her 
                                                 
15 The film opened on January 11, 2008, grossed $19,392,416 and ranked #1 at the box office. 
(http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?page=weekend&id=bucketlist.htm) 
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beauty and success.  But there is a darker critique of the Hollywood industry 
which Niccol makes about the pressures on directors to work within budgets, to 
ensure that investors get a return on their investment, as well as all the 
complications of a massive business—orientated industry. 
Bordwell (2006: 194 ff.) provides readers in his The way Hollywood tells it with 
an invaluable description of the changes in the industry from 1960 (the cut-off 
date for so-called ‘Classical’ film making) to 2006.  From its beginnings after 
World War II as a new means of mass entertainment (drive-ins developed from 
screening for troops), there were changes for the industry to assimilate.  The 
1960s reflect the impact of television on the niche market the industry formerly 
occupied.  So bad did it become for the industry that Bordwell (2006:192) reports 
that “screenwriters and actors go on strike for residuals from the sale of films to 
television.  The strikes are settled in April and June”. 
Another indicator of the changed climate was the fact that 20th Century Fox sold 
its land for the building of a shopping complex.  By the 1970s problems with 
government begin to ease because “In March [1970] the studios come to an anti- 
discriminatory, equal employment agreement with the Justice Department” 
(Bordwell, 2006:195).  Names of old studios changed as mergers and buy-outs 
occurred in the industry.  Television and the film industry battled for ownership of 
films as TV studios released uncut films on their screens.  Government stepped in 
again and again.  By 1976 there were definite changes in the relationship between 
the industry and government, as Bordwell (2006:212) reports, “CARA becomes 
the Classification and Ratings Administration and no longer examines scripts 
before production”. Furthermore, “MPAA establishes the Office of Film Security 
to combat piracy”. 
Along with all the inner turmoil of the industry’s politics, increasing technical 
innovation in the range of cameras, lenses and other technological developments 
made the industry more and more innovative.  Box office returns reached 
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unheard-of figures, reflecting among other things the new marketing practices of 
the industry and a gradual rapprochement between TV and the film industry. 
With the launch of the World Wide Web in 1989 the industry had a new set of 
challenges to deal with.  By 1994 the Turner Classics movie channel had been 
launched and in 1996 the Telecommunications Act was signed which deregulated 
the industry.  Having adapted to the release of videos, DVDs further changed the 
nature of the industry.  DVDs went on sale in 1997; by 1998 they could be rented 
and the resultant impact on the industry compelled its participants to change 
marketing strategies.  By 2001 the industry had Internet marketing and created a 
parallel universe around the film, A.I.  In addition, the strategy of “day and date”, 
to indicate when films will be released world-wide is used to prevent video piracy. 
The development which made celebrities of movie stars is not only an inevitable 
result of gradual changes in the marketing strategies of the industry but probably 
also reflects social changes, public access to the media, unparalleled in previous 
decades, and the increasing cult of the individual which the mass media fuels. 
With the astonishing developments in technology from the 1990s in motion, stage 
props, simulation, theatre stage design, from blue and green screens to 
computerised effects and special effects, the difficulty of detecting the real from 
the unreal is all the more a feature of the narratives on TV and in film.  Films that 
comment on this spectacle of pseudo-realities are Wag the dog (dir. Barry 
Levinson 1997), and The Truman Show, for instance.  In the following chapter 
Niccol is shown to exploit the technology of Hollywood for the satirical purposes 
he has in mind. 
3.5  CONCLUSION 
Scholarship on cognition has advanced remarkably over the last forty years and 
the insights offered from neuroscience affect every area of our understanding 
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about cognition and metacognition.  Narrative as one of our universally enjoyed 
arts has reaped the benefits as well. 
Pavlovskis-Petit (2007) has summed up the changes in the use of satire from its 
elitist to its popular versions over the last two centuries during which time it has 
become more and more pictorial and less literary.  This is an accurate way of 
contextualising Niccol’s satire.  But over its long history there have been many 
other instances of general illiteracy.  One has only to remember the Aristophanic 
satires or the Commedia dell’Arte, or the Feast of the Baculus amongst medieval 
youth to know that the elicitation of humour has been a feature of sociality as long 
as written down history. 
The brief summary of the history of the film industry does not stress enough the 
enormous burdens placed on directors in the industry who are accountable for 
their budgets. It is this pressure which is disclosed as the “inciting incident” in 
Niccol’s satire, S1mOne.  With such a long history of trial and error in film 
production, especially within budgetary constraints of one sort or another, it is a 
sign of how well humans help their culture to evolve that Hollywood’s “arc” for 
arranging narratives from beginning to end in such a way that our cognitive traits 
are most often engaged, remains a success.  S1mOne shows all the evidence of the 
expertise required to exploit that arc. 
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CHAPTER 4:  ANALYSIS OF S1mOne — A BIOCULTURAL 
APPROACH 
Cinema and literature: shadow plays, simulacra that resist all 
wisdom… except that of understanding how they work. 
Gilles Thérien (Le cinema québécois, 
1979:114) 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into four sections of which the first three contain the 
analysis of how Niccol communicates through the medium of film, and 
specifically through S1mOne.  In the first section the analysis focuses on Niccol’s 
appeal to the general public by simply telling a “good story” while the second and 
third sections address more complex and less immediate mechanisms of narrative 
such as external referencing and satire.  In these last sections the main research 
question of this thesis is addressed. The question of how the mechanisms through 
which knowledge can be disseminated is tentatively answered.  The analysis of 
the film is done with an eye to demonstrate how appealing storytelling, a wealth 
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of external references and satirical elements can be put to good use to 
communicate a particular viewpoint.  The last section contains discussions about 
the biological underpinnings of the evolution of culture as they pertain to the film. 
The analysis of the film S1mOne in this thesis points at a set of devices commonly 
used by narrators to achieve cognition.  Some of these mechanisms are even 
embedded in language itself (Boyd 2009:175-6): 
Language reflects the shifts our minds use to make sense of events and 
their sequence once we have theory of mind and a capacity for 
metarepresentation. And it can impart to others that sense, and those 
changing perspectives of time, place, and person, with minimal 
confusion.  
Assuming that cultural objects and texts propagate cognition, the analysis 
undertaken in this chapter aims to reveal the cognitive basis Niccol relies on in 
S1mOne to achieve his effects and spread his understanding of what is laughable 
in his narrative.  This is done by analysing how the plot (and subplots) of the film 
have been made engaging for the viewers, how the film reaches outside itself and 
operates with rich referencing techniques, and how the subversive quality of satire 
has been used in the film to bring about insights for the viewers. 
Our understanding of culture ranges from literature, music, arts and related 
intellectual activities to knowledge acquired through education and exposure to 
arts; it can also designate the shared beliefs, practices and traditions within 
particular groups of people.  I have argued that from the biocultural perspective, 
this understanding of culture is enlarged by the insight that it evolves through 
propagation and that it depends not only on learning but relies on understanding 
the learning process and on accepting that behaviours can also be learned. There 
are many ways in which humans learn (rote learning, repetition, mimicry, 
imitation or by following an example).  Narratives are more complex forms of 
learning that provide an opportunity to propagate cognition. 
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What the audience of Niccol’s film is required to do from a biocultural perspective, 
is to process a large, easily grasped, error-free amount of information to rapidly 
construe that it is a film in front of them.  As film spectators they are accustomed to 
seeing the title of the film, usually at the beginning.  In addition, given the way the 
industry works with its advertising and reviewing techniques to reach as large a 
viewing public as possible, some spectators at least will have read something about 
the film or heard about it in the media so they may have prior knowledge about 
some aspects of such film.  Spectators of a film such as S1mOne expect a narrative 
to be expanded, developed and reach a satisfactory conclusion within 90 minutes or 
so.  The viewers will also be familiar with various stereotypes exploited in film.  
Simone herself is one, as is Taransky. As discussed above, narrative is a familiar 
and basic cultural transmission vehicle in human social groups.  
The spectators can anticipate a fictional narrative which will enable their 
identification with some of the characters in the narrative. This is because human 
neural/cognitive mechanisms of informational content networks underlie the 
activation of the self and are shared between the observer and an observed 
conspecific.16
   
The reason for this is that the actions of others are matched with the 
spectators’ motor systems and their mirror systems (Muthukumaraswamy & 
Johnson 2007:44). 
The spectators expect a film or a narrative to have a certain pattern which is 
recognisable, in this case the “Hollywood arc”, that is, an initiating event, a 
development of causes and effects arising from some problem, a denouement and 
an epilogue; furthermore the central protagonist will show some interior 
development — or undergo some change of worldview — which is communicated 
to the audience (see 3.2).  Spectators expect the film to mirror some of those 
                                                 
16 Conspecific means belonging to the same species. 
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changes. Narratives are recognisable from the myriad of films, plays, books or 
operas spectators might have seen.  Imagination and the multimodal way our 
cognition works, grounded in experience, enables spectators to grasp story lines 
(Boyd 2009:156-157). 
Film is a human cultural construction. As such and because S1mOne is a narrative 
the audience will categorise and process the information of the narrative into 
rhythmic-hierarchic structures (Givón 2005).  The neural/cognitive mechanisms 
of informational content networks underlie the activation of the self and are shared 
between the observer and an observed conspecific in films, while the pattern 
recognition that mobilises the categorising activity is exploited by application of 
filmic and storytelling devices such as deployment of conflicts and resolutions and 
specifically, in Niccol’s case, the Hollywood arc, story lines, internal referencing 
of other films and referencing other cultural objects like paintings and myth. 
There is ample evidence of evolution of culture and it is the main force that 
affects behaviour, as Boyd and Richerson (2005:4) observe, “on a scale unknown 
to any other species” by the acquisition of beliefs, skills and values through 
processes like teaching and learning. The development of human knowledge and 
technology is a result of cumulative processes of culture and could not have been 
developed by a single individual.  While it understandably depends on a degree 
of credulity and faith by others in the group as to the trustworthiness of such 
transmitted values and beliefs, they are usually absorbed early and questioned 
later. These are good adaptive techniques. 
In the evolution of culture “maladaptive” ideas, “ideas that would never evolve 
in a noncultural organism” (Nesse 2010:134) are often also transmitted in a 
culture. Those are the sorts of ideas which are in Niccol’s case the main targets 
of satire. The reason for choosing the film S1mOne for analysis through the 
biocultural perspective is that it is an example of a cultural object which 
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simultaneously is a result of cultural evolution and which ‘participates’ in it by 
commenting ironically on it, so pointing to a number of ‘maladaptive’ ideas in 
American culture.  
The analysis of the film in terms of its technical strategies, visual language and 
rhetorical devices of satire, shows its narrative structures as exploiting cognitive 
processes, and its transmission of cultural insights places the film within the 
processes that operate and sustain the evolution of culture.  In addition, the 
element of play, which in the case of the film in question is satire brings about 
flexible behaviour which “cannot be completely specified genetically” but “can 
be modified by learning” (Boyd, 2012:9).  Play has a fundamental role in the 
evolution of culture (Konner 2010). 
Verbal narratives such as storytelling with its variants like drama, comedy or 
satire, certainly offer the ‘safe conditions’ for participating at a remove in a wide 
range of behavioural possibilities (Ramachandran 2011).  As Boyd observes, not 
only do these become the platform for extending behavioural options, but in 
themselves become motivational forces and “become fun” (Boyd, 2012:9). 
Darwin’s belief in the universality of laughter and that humans share it with the 
apes is supported by Gervais and Wilson’s claim that laughter was well 
established in the biobehavioural repertoire of the early hominids (2005:396) 
(see 3.3.1).  It is the development of laughter provoked by a play on 
expectations, exaggerations, metaphors that underlies the expansion of humour 
and its evolution into subsequent ranges like satire, parody, grotesquerie and 
comedy.  The spectators of film experience amusement and expect it from an 
intriguing sounding film like S1mOne.  The safe conditions of the narrative, 
however, belie the satirical puncta which Niccol will launch at the spectators. 
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4.2  THE TRANSMISSION OF COGNITION ON THE NARRATIVE 
LEVEL 
The making of an engaging story relies on a variety of ingredients that are reliant 
on our human cognitive make-up (see 3.2).  This section contains the discussion 
of some such ingredients Niccol uses to communicate his insights about the 
world of filmmaking. From a biocultural perspective, processes of categorisation 
and pattern recognition are some of the bases of human engagement with the 
world and enable construction and comprehension of narratives.  These 
capacities for recognising patterns and assigning values to them also enable the 
formation of more complex interpretations and analyses of the incoming 
information about the agendas of other beings and are the province of a ToM. 
As far as scientific research is concerned, it seems that humans are the only 
group of primates that exercise and indeed have a genuine appetite for theorising 
about the mental states of other beings.  According to biocultural theorists, 
narratives in which these mechanisms are put to use are more likely to resonate 
with our biology and are more likely to be repeatedly recalled, retold, and 
propagated further. The development of a narrative, its annunciation, the way the 
attention of the viewers is earned and how the problems addressed in the plots 
are solved, all contribute to successful storytelling. 
4.2.1  Categorising incoming information 
It is the capacity to categorise incoming information speedily that ensures the 
successful survival of many organisms, a very valuable ability for communication 
and cognition alike (Givón 2005).  This biologically based ability to categorise 
information is vital for human cognition and fosters sociality.  It is an ability 
which forms a base for understanding how to comprehensively organise 
information.  Then it enables sharing it and communicating it outwards in forms 
appealing to humans. Givón (2005:47-48) explains that biologically grounded 
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information-processing relies on passing on of data which is “repetitive, frequent 
and highly predictable; and/or of great adaptive urgency or relevance”. 
In Niccol’s film the narrative is constructed for easy understanding by its 
spectators. The narrative is linear in its chronology of events. The Hollywood arc 
is a further macro structuring device. The complexities weighing down on the 
protagonist are inferred from ToM and are not the key structural issues of the 
film.  By categorising Taransky’s activities (primarily aimed at pleasing different 
people in his life) in various episodes by linking them through the use of similar 
shots, Niccol establishes the main events of the plot.  Taransky has both a private 
and a public self — another macro categorising for the narrative. 
The public activities Taransky performs to maintain his creative status in the film 
industry such as the deceptive information fed to the press are balanced by the 
deceptions he concocts for the “benefit” of his family relationships.  These 
different but intimately connected aspects of the narrative are placed into 
associative groupings.  Niccol allows the viewers to recognise that they should 
be linked through filming devices.  Some of the devices are similarity of scene 
locations, repetitions of shots, variations of the repetitive locations or 
composition of the scenes or the use of marked changes in music to denote the 
scenes from the glimpses of Taransky’s own enframed film.  
Niccol’s approach to editing can be understood as creating rhythmic-hierarchic 
pattern structures. This is done using shots taken in similar locations and scene 
repetitions. An example which exemplifies this technical ruse to match biology 
is the scene that marks Taransky’s interactions with the press about Simone.  
Shots that give a chance to spectators for processing the story of Taransky are 
repeated (in similar patterns) throughout the film.  The repetitiousness of some 
shots helps to locate recurring patterns in the narratives of the film. For 
example, the shots of Taransky’s interviews with the press form not only a part 
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of storytelling of the events in the film — they also serve to bring together the 
high points of Simone’s career as a film star. 
The background against which Taransky conducts the press interviews is the 
Hollywood landscape with its prominent studio buildings in the foreground.  It is 
through these shots that the account of Simone’s career by proxy — meaning 
Taransky — is conveyed.  As the story in the film develops, Simone’s rise, her 
success, her reclusiveness and finally her tragic, accidental demise are all 
accounted for by Taransky and are repetitively shown through medium shots 
taken with the same ultra-wide angle camera in the same location (Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1  The press conference given by Taransky echoes a visual and conceptual 
structure of a religious assembly. 
Film narratives are constructed from a welter of information which is processed 
through the categorisation and pattern recognition functions of the mind.  
However the conflicting type of information processing which needs to be done 
is about “fine contextual discrimination of small but relevant minorities” (Givón 
2005:48). 
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Taransky’s press conference echoes the visual and conceptual structure of a 
religious assembly (Figure 4.1).  For viewers to understand the contextual 
discrimination and small relevant minor pieces of the information being narrated 
by Niccol, he uses close juxtapositions of shots exposing the incongruous nature 
of Taransky’s behaviour.  The press conference Taransky conducts among the 
fictional background of theatrical sets on the behalf of non-existent Simone as 
above is immediately followed by scenes in which the true status of Taransky is 
satirically hinted at by showing him as visually diminished, haunted and running 
away (Figure 4.2b). This shows the incongruity in Taransky’s status very strongly. 
The elevated preacher-like position Taransky assumes as a self-appointed ‘high- 
priest’ spokesman for Simone (Figure 4.2a), is satirised in the shot featured in 
Figure 4.2b. The high contrast between these ‘neighbouring’ (adjacent) shots 
enables the viewers to make subtle shifts in processing the information that 
alternate between being general and specific.  One of the cultural mechanisms of 
satire — bathos — used in these scenes unmasks Taransky. 
Just prior to his frantic run into the world of fiction in the frames that feature the 
gigantic image of Simone on a billboard, he was a self- appointed high status 
figure. Simone’s enormous person on the billboard will indeed engulf and 
diminish him as the story progresses (Figure 4.3a and 4.3b). Taransky’s panicky 
run against the background of an enormous and dominating image is shot with a 
panning camera and it alludes to theatre forms both as stage set and as a staging 
of a story on both levels: the framing — Niccol’s film — and enframed —
Taransky’s story — narratives.  Naturally to drive home the contrast between the 
significance of Simone she is represented as huge (Figure 4.11a and 4.11b) and 
Taransky’s scampering tiny figure precisely shows his loss of status. 
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Left: Figure 4.2a The elevated preacher like position Taransky assumes as a self-appointed      
‘high- priest’ spokesman for Simone.  
Right: Figure 4.2b The visually diminished figure of Taransky making a sudden retreat after the 
fierce grilling from information-hungry paparazzi. 
Foregrounding in a visual way of how lowly Taransky will become in character 
as a confabulator and even a murderer are given as premonitions of the rest of 
the narrative to come.  The satire of the scenes relies on anti-climax. The allusion 
would not be lost on the viewers who know how popular stories are about fallen 
holy men of high status.  This is a stereotype exploited at least since Lucian of 
Samosato’s (second century CE) Alexander the false prophet up till episodes in 
The Simpsons. The central composition in the frame (Figure 4.2a) with Taransky 
as the main focal point echoes the elevated position of some ‘high priest’.  The 
visual clues to this are the emphasis of the upraised hands and the “stole” formed 
by the vertical, symmetrically arranged, lines of microphones. The religious 
allusions in the film about Hollywood worship of celebrities and simulations 
seem appropriate and in harmony with its content. 
Categorising of different kinds of information in the film is not only required for 
‘putting’ the narrative of the film together.  It is also spread throughout different 
levels of meaning of the narrative where the visual allusions need to be 
processed first by viewers as a quick means of understanding.  Then fine-grained 
associations begin to operate as viewers decode ideas such as priesthood, 
worship, belief, the symbols and metaphors of which are subtly spread through 
the visuals. 
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4.2.2  Fixing attention 
Viewers’ attention can easily be diffused and that is why the technical devices of 
storytelling through the medium of film are ordered in such a way that not only 
allows accessible processing information but holds the viewers’attention. One of 
the strategies of initiating attention is to confront viewers with shots which raise 
expectations of further explanations. Such shots may be unfamiliar images of 
familiar objects, images of objects or environments which seem to be 
unconnected to the narrative or atypical camera angles.  In written and oral 
narrative it will be shocking moments like Sinbad the Sailor flying on an eagle in 
the Arabic stories, or the deus ex machina in ancient dramas. 
There are various strategies for fixing the attention of consumers of cultural 
objects. In artmaking, the non-pedestrian, stimulating, extraordinary approaches 
to concepts and media are the tactics, which artists use to ensure that their art 
objects are noticed and considered as vehicles for meaning making.  In 
narratives, the novel or extraordinary circumstances or events play a significant 
role in securing viewers’ or readers’ attention.  Ordinary characters made to 
behave in non-stereotypical ways, commonplace situations by extraordinary 
individuals, or entertaining and unpredictable solutions to address humdrum 
problems are all conducive of attention and are useful cultural strategies.  The 
particular way used to earn viewers’ or readers’ attention arises from the content 
of a narrative (Boyd 2009). 
Niccol exploits the spectators’ tendency to have their attention mobilised when 
confronted with enigmatic, curiosity-arousing images by following such shots 
with others that feed the viewers’ need for explanation and reward the spectators 
with a series of ‘aha’ moments.  In this way he establishes and maintains the 
conscious attention of his audience.  Boyd (2009) calls this effort on the part of 
the storyteller earning the attention.  The close-up shot of colourful jellybeans is 
at first enigmatic in terms of a film about celebrities but when followed by the 
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explanatory shots of a film director who sorts out the colours of sweets to please 
his leading role actress, Nicole Anders, the scene becomes satirically 
illuminating (Figures 4.3a, 4.3b, 4.3c, and 4.3d). 
 
Left: Figure 4.3a The opening close-up shots which come to focus to reveal jellybeans are    
initially out of focus and enigmatic.  
Right: Figure 4.3b           The image is brought to focus and becomes recognisable. 
 
 
Left: Figure 4.3c Sorting out of jellybeans — the ‘mysterious’ purpose of this activity 
attended with such reverence is revealed three minutes later during the 
conversation Taransky has with his wife — the explanation is provided.  
Right: Figure 4.3d An altar-like setup for the sorting of the jellybeans. 
In science-fiction films technology is often used to fix viewers’ attention to 
speculate about the possibilities of the future evolution of culture.  Technology 
(how Taransky creates Simone) in Niccol’s film and typically in most science 
fiction literature and I would like to suggest, films, is treated as a behaviour that can 
result in contrasting outcomes; on the one hand the use of technology can bring 
about deceptions and on the other it holds out the possibility of unveiling illusions; 
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it can be used to control and hold power over the nature and elements while on the 
other hand it can trigger irreparable damage to the environment or social fabric.17  
The way technology is introduced in the film under discussion is, however, 
unrealistic. Kurzweil (2002) stresses that the portrayed sudden emergence of 
technologies more advanced than anything anyone ever dreamed of can happen 
only in fairy tales.  Obviously the process of developing new technologies requires 
different groups of specialists cooperating towards a common goal.  The move 
away from the understanding of how culture evolves pushes the film into the 
fairyland of improbabilities which can be used as an initial step to draw attention. 
4.2.3  Exercising the Theory of Mind 
Transmission of cognition and metacognition (Whiten 1991; Leslie 1994; Baron- 
Cohen 1995) has been extensively researched from the perspective of ToM in 
relation to its acquisition by children.  Without a ToM, children and people 
generally are unable to “differentiate between their own beliefs about the world 
and someone else’s” (Dunbar 2000:239).  In other words they cannot decide 
whether the other person's belief is patently false or not. 
The device of taking the audience into the author’s confidence and allowing them 
to have considerably more knowledge than the characters in a story has been 
relied on by many storytellers — Shakespeare’s Twelfth night (1601-2), The 
tempest (1610-11) or A midsummer night’s dream (1590-6) are good examples. 
The audience has prior information about the particulars of the plots concocted 
and played out by the characters.  Such a strategy is very successful and is used in 
                                                 
17 For instance, The Terminator (1984), directed by James Cameron [also Terminator 2: 
Judgment Day (1991), Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines (2003), and Terminator Salvation 
(2009); Surrogates (2009), directed by Jonathan Mostow; Gamer (2009) written and directed by 
Mark Neveldine and Brian Taylor; Minority Report (2002), directed by Steven Spielberg.  
120 
 
popular contemporary comedies like Tootsie (dir. Sidney Pollack, 1982) or Good 
advice (dir. Steve Rash, 2001) as it allows the audience to exercise the ToM in a 
specific way.  Gazzaniga’s (2008) claim that humans excel at thinking socially 
supports observations in social studies in which participants are engaged in 
reading each other’s behaviour and trying to determine each other’s agendas.  
“The most common obstacle in both life and story is figuring out what other 
people really mean” (Cron 2012, Kindle loc 1072) and attributing and finding out 
the goals and actions of the protagonists in narratives and films is a human 
practice of sociality. 
Reading the intentions of others or as Gazzaniga (2008:179) puts it (understanding 
the possible outcomes of a specific action) that “not only do you understand 
someone is grabbing a candy bar, you understand she is going to eat it or put it in 
her purse or throw it out or, if you’re lucky, hand it to you” is an example of ToM.  
This cognitive functioning of humans is necessarily relied on in any successful 
storytelling and letting the audiences or readers know ahead the intricate details of 
the protagonist’s view of the world, his interpretation of a given situation, his 
agendas, and his actions are key to rendering a narrative understandable not only 
graspable but appealing to the biologically based propensity for reading other 
minds. 
Mind reading is relied on in a multitude of narratives, but the film S1mOne is 
particularly interesting as it occurs on two levels.  Niccol primarily depends on 
this aptitude for telling his story about the desperate film maker to his viewers. On 
the second — the inner story — level he puts the main character, Taransky, 
through a series of ordeals that reveal problems in reading the intentions of others.  
On the first level viewers are given the insight into Taransky’s status seeking.  At 
this level his ambitions, intentions, concerns and motives are rendered in such a 
way as to enable mind reading by the viewers of S1mOne.  The inner story, the 
embedded narrative, targets the very activity of mind reading itself and shows 
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how Taransky effectively — or sometimes not so effectively — tries to anticipate 
public and private behaviour while adjusting his agenda to fulfil his career 
ambitions.  Through reading or viewing narratives about mind reading, humans 
exercise their own mind reading abilities and are afforded insights about this 
activity. 
4.2.4  Repetitious inner patterns 
To help the viewers to categorise information, repetitions are used to establish the 
inner pattern of the film.  Repetitions of close-up shots like that of a computer 
drive mark significant moments in the film.  The first close-up shot is used by 
Niccol to mark the first launch of the “Simulation One” programme after 
Taransky receives the computer disk while he is still unsure about his attitude to 
the idea of using a synthespian to finish his film (Figure 4.4a).  Later when 
Taransky is determined to cover up the synthetic nature of his actress and he 
‘launches’ her three-dimensional version through holographic technology (Figure 
4.16f) it is marked with another close-up shot of a computer drive (Figure 4.4b).  
The third repetition of this close-up shot happens when Taransky’s daughter 
rescues him from prison by re-instituting (re-booting) the programme. These three 
instances of commencements of Simone are different in nature as the motivations 
underlying them arise from different goals. 
The first instance of launching the programme is to satisfy Taransky’s curiosity 
about the possibilities it offers, the second instance is marked by Taransky’s 
determination to keep up with the charade he has invented for the existence of 
Simone.  The third occurrence marks Taransky’s daughter’s intervention to save 
her father.  All these developments in the narrative which show different 
intentions in using the simulation programme are marked in a visual way by the 
use of the same close-up image of the computer drive.  Significantly, on the 
cultural level, these close-up shots satirically allude to a variety of ideas humans 
hold about the relationship between creator and creatum that range from Adam’s 
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rib to the concept of the ghost in the machine.  The creator’s apparatus for making 
the things he has created is veiled in secrecy in myth, but today it is shown to be 
nothing more than a machine. 
 
 
Top: Figure 4.4a and 4.4b The repetition of close-up shots which thematically and structurally link 
the different stages of launching the synthespian into the public scene.  
Bottom: Figure 4.c  Taransky’s daughter retrieves the computer programme ‘containing’ 
Simone. 
The shots and the way they are edited in the film tightly correspond to its 
narratives and sub-narratives and announce their patterns of events in film 
generally. Givón (2005) suggests that repetitions are of great value for passing 
on data and in his film Niccol wittingly applies this strategy to organise the plots 
into comprehensible information. 
4.2.5  Unmasking of deceptions — the concluding scenes 
In exchange for the amusement and entertainment offered by Niccol’s film the 
123 
 
spectators expect the story to be punctuated by surprising rewards for their 
patience. In biocultural terms they need to know their ToM has worked. Some of 
these delightful surprises are the unmasking of deceptions.  The nature of the 
computer-assisted filming techniques like the use of green screen processes which 
were visually hinted at in the shots of billboards (Figure 4.11a, 4.11b, 4.13a, 4.13b 
and 4.13c) is revealed at the conclusion of the film (Figure 4.5a and 4.5b).  In 
those concluding shots Simone with her “life partner”, Taransky, and their baby 
gives the television interview.  And she announces her intentions to participate in 
assisting socio-political changes! 
The technicalities behind creating the shot in Figure 4.5a are supposedly 
“unmasked” (in Figure 4.5b) through the use of the green screen. The theme of 
filmic and simulated deceptions that Niccol addresses in his film expressed 
through the behaviour of his main character is emphasised even further when 
Niccol exposes himself to be as cunning in doing this as any other film maker.  
This is done through the irony of the double take on the visual game: what seems 
to be, is not; as the shots of the TV interview were not constructed — the shot 
(Figure 4.5b) suggests and supposedly explains.  The layered patterns between 
deceptions and candour about simulation as visual and conceptual trickery in 
filmmaking point to evolutionary complexities of visual storytelling. 
 
 
Left: Figure 4.5a  The shot from the televised interview alludes to the theme Madonna and Child.  
Right: Figure 4.5b The green screen technique that was supposedly used in filming the interview is 
revealed. 
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4.3  THE TRANSMISSION OF COGNITION THROUGH EXTERNAL 
REFERENCES 
External referencing serves to take a film out of its internal existence as it refers 
to the outside of itself and positions itself in relation to other films and cultural 
objects. On the one hand such technique points to the film as simply a film (‘I 
am just a film’, a cultural object referencing itself as a cultural object like the 
Magritte 1928-29 painting The Treachery of Images /La Trahison Des Images — 
popularly known as “This is not a pipe”); on the other hand such referencing 
takes a film outside of its internal existence.  This is done by drawing attention to 
other films or cultural objects and allows these films (and cultural objects) to be 
seen as cultural patterns that are biologically enabled by pattern recognition. 
Clark’s claim that coupling of “parts of environment” with the brain gives rise to 
the idea of “extended mind” is relevant to numerous examples of narrative and 
visual texts.  This is evident in the film S1mOne where the external referencing 
extends the film beyond itself and its own reality to allude to, interfere with and 
interlink itself with the outside environment which in the first place provided the 
technical resources and the necessary knowledge to produce this and other films. 
4.3.1  External referencing for the insiders 
Niccol goes as far as illustrating the instance of deciphering such external 
referencing in the plot of his film.  The location of the television interview with 
Simone — composed by Taransky with a background landscape picture he took 
from the Internet — is recognised by one of the paparazzi (Figure 4.6).  This 
‘detective’ work of figuring out the filmic references to the outside world is a 
humorously constructed symbol for the activity of spotting the external 
references in art objects.  It is an allusion to the activity that underpins a cultural 
analysis of cultural objects and texts.  In terms of Boyd and Richerson’s ideas 
(2005) such activity shows the evolution of culture and the spread of cognition in 
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which the visual and narrative strategies are traced and demonstrate the passing 
down of “cultural variants” which can then be developed further or undergo a 
process of adaptation or demise. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 “I know this place!” — a shot that exemplifies the activity of literal and 
figurative pointing. 
4.3.2  Allusions to grander themes 
Linking the allusions to other stories, making associations between different 
kinds of rituals, connecting seemingly distant ideas by spotting similar elements 
of their underlying pattern is what humans do as naturally as tracking animals for 
survival.  Mastering the local patterns for tracking prey or teasing out the “causal 
patterns linking particular chemicals to particular cancers” (Boyd 2012:10) or 
tracking different appearances of similar stories or motifs is the survival strategy 
that humans actively pursue. “A theory of culture must account for the processes 
in the everyday lives of individuals that cause such changes”, say Boyd and 
Richerson (2005:4).  Niccol’s film is such an account as it is not only the result 
of cultural changes through the development of film technologies and narrative 
strategies, but it also provides a version of those accounts that target filmmaking 
as a social process. 
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The ultra-wide angle camera shots of Taransky’s press release emphasise the 
sharp vanishing point of the studio lines evoking the Renaissance device for 
creating the illusion of space and depth — perspective drawings.  Buckland 
observes that the continuity of the editing is aimed at imitating the space of a 
Renaissance painting (1998:14) and while this approach is evident in Niccol’s 
editing of his shots, the imitative value of such editing is highlighted by Niccol 
through his use of Renaissance visual strategies that are employed in the formal 
composition of certain scenes.  Niccol formally stages a central composition, 
framed by the one-point perspective of the studio buildings, in which Taransky 
gives a press release on behalf of his synthetic actress to the gathered paparazzi 
(Fig 4.1). It is the formal pattern of central composition that echoes and 
resurrects the stylistic devices denoting a religious order of the world that was 
used by Bellini (Fig 4.6a) in his altar piece Madonna and Child Enthroned with 
Saints, San Zaccaria in Venice (1505), or Piero della Francesca’s 1474 work 
Montefeltro Altarpiece (Fig 4.6b). 
The enlarged scale device, used in many Trecento and Quattrocento depictions 
of the Madonna like that by Giotto in his 1310 Ognissanti Madonna in Uffizi, 
Florence, alerts the spectators of the film to the status and importance of the 
portrayed personae, and is humorously adopted by Niccol in the scene where 
Taransky runs in front of the gigantic image of his ‘synthespian’ Simone.  In that 
scene she has become like a religious deity, omnipresent.  Such strategies mock 
the presence of divinities, of either the spiritual, religious or entertaining nature 
who feel they have an all-powerful reign over the human world. The satirical 
commentary here is that of a parody, where the placing on the pedestal of 
seemingly ‘beyond the shadow of a doubt’ ideas and the unquestioned worship 
reverberates through human history and is pointed to as a behaviour of a non-
reflective kind.  The human capacities for accumulation of culture are asserted in 
the film while the blind human attachment to unquestioned cultural traditions is 
revealed as the pattern of potentially maladaptive behaviour enabled through 
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gullibility and a propensity for idealisation.  
 
Left: Figure 4.1 Taransky and the press.  
Middle: Figure 4.6a  Bellini, Madonna and Child Enthroned with Saints of San Zaccaria in 
Venice, 1505.  
Right: Figure 4.6b Piero della Francesca, Montefeltro Altarpiece — Pinacoteca di Brera in 
Milan, 1474. 
 
4.3.2.1  Allusions to making illusions 
In the medieval Christian tradition, observes Warner (2006:123), illusion, 
enigma and conjuring tricks were believed to be the devil’s means for creating 
deception as he conned humans and “summons images … playing on desires and 
weaknesses”.  The visual trickery of a simplest kind, the shadow projection 
conjured by Taransky in the hotel scene, is aimed at exactly this objective — to 
fulfil the desires of the paparazzi who are ready to use any underhanded means 
to get a closer look at Simone.  The shots of the shadow projections of the 
Simone’s supposed silhouette on the outside window’s curtains (Figure 4.7a) are 
intermixed with the shots which inform the spectators of the film about the 
incredible simple, low-tech trickery used for the deception (Figure 4.7b). 
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Left: Figure 4.7a            Shadow projection — the outside view.   
Right: Figure 4.7b          Shadow projection — the inside view. 
These shots intermingled with the shots of the happy crowd of paparazzi 
gathered outside the hotel windows oscillate between the truth of what really 
happens, deception (what is perceived by the paparazzi as having happened) and 
desires that deceptions can anticipate (what people want to see).  This comically 
staged triad of behaviours raises questions about cultural means to create and 
control perceptions and satirises the ease with which public appetites can be 
managed. 
The technique of shadow projection is old and the shot (Figure 4.7a) can be 
traced not only to other films (Figure 4.7c) but alludes, intentionally or not, to 
the traditions of the art of shadow ranging from Indonesian shadow theatre 
(Figure 4.7d), to 18th-century experiments with shadows (Figure 4.7e) or Lotte 
Reiniger’s 1925 “shadow film”, The adventures of Prince Achmed (Fig. 4.7f), to 
the early filmmaking of Meliès.  It reaches back to Plato’s cave of shadows 
(Figure 4.7g).  The development of ideas of creating illusions as the visual 
support for storytelling is enabled by the principles of evolution of culture and as 
Boyd and Richerson explain (2005) the propagation of shared processes and 
ideas becomes the ground for further modification, adaptation of newly founded 
cultural behaviours, which in this case are the activities of making illusions and 
their continuous refinement. 
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Left: Figure 4.7c A still from the film Home Alone (1990).   
Right: Figure 4.7d Indonesian shadow theatre – visual storytelling for the purpose of passing on 
morals, myths and knowledge 
. 
Left: Figure 4.7e Joseph Benoit Suvee, Invention of Art of Drawing, 1793, oil on canvas. 
Middle: Figure 4.7f  A still from Lotte Reiniger’s 1925 “shadow film” The adventures of Prince 
Achmed.  
Right: Figure 4.7g Jan Saenredam, Plato's Allegory of the Cave, 1604, engraving. 
4.3.2.2  Visual allusions 
In the film S1mOne, Niccol alludes to the whole range of making visual illusions 
from shadow puppetry to three-dimensional holographic imagery (Figure 4.8a) 
and it is composed of many visual and conceptual (witting or unwitting) hints to 
other cultural products. Verne’s (1828-1905) Nautilus equipped with a beam of 
light in Twenty thousand leagues under the sea (1869), Lang’s 1927 Metropolis 
with its magical-scientific conception of the robotic Maria as the new working 
class of Maschinenmensch (Figure 4.8b), or teleportation devices in Star Trek 
(Figure 4.8c) or motion capture processes (Figure 4.8e) can be mentioned as 
visual references in scenes of public performance by Simone.  While, however — 
in a nutshell — Verne tells a story about the control of nature or Lang’s film 
addresses the age-old human dream to create and control machines, Niccol’s fable 
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deals with creating stories (films in the case of Taransky) and their control by 
creator after their conception.  Huyssen (1987:68) argues that in Metropolis 
“doubling, mirroring and projecting not only constitute the technological make-up 
of this film, but they lie at the very core of psychic and visual processes that 
underlie its narrative”.  He (1987:77) explores the male gaze, the threat of female 
sexuality and examines the metaphorical representations of the female as a 
“Minotaur and as technology-out-of-control” in the film itself and historically. 
The sexual angst that underpins Metropolis and its interpretation gives way to the 
numerous anxieties of a film maker in S1mOne, for whom technology does not 
hold the dark gender undercurrents but is a means to tell stories through film. The 
anxieties Taransky experiences are the outcome of complex social behaviours for 
self-preservation and survival such as status seeking, finding a mate, self- 
expression and aptitude for making deceptions and falling prey to deception. 
Producing the hoax — the synthespian, Simone — and inventing increasingly 
intricate ways to conceal it becomes a form of play, an artwork itself. 
The holographic representation of Simone wrapped in a beam of light not only 
resonates with the image of the robotic Mary (Maria, or the Virgin Mary?) in 
Metropolis but also can be interpreted as alluding to more ancient, pre-Freudian 
attitudes to the feminine (Figure 4.8f).  It took centuries for the disagreeable 
attitudes towards women to be modified: from St Jerome's fierce denunciation of 
them in the early years of the Christian Fathers to the 12
th 
century ‘revolution’ in 
attitudes towards women. Warner (2013) expands on the advent of the Marian cult 
and the birth of chivalry.  In biocultural terms a new twist to mate selection to be 
chivalrous and courteous as knights were supposed to be.  As early as the biblical 
Ezekiel attitudes to women (in his case prostitutes) show how culture and not only 
biology determines mate selection.  Picasso’s deconstructions of women in some 
of his works look forward to postmodern or feminist frameworks and show the 
evolution of changed ideas about the masculine and the feminine.  The new 
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biological revolution, the cognitive turn, encompasses all these historically varied 
views of and attitudes towards women and situates them in the perspective of the 
evolution of culture which is underpinned not only by human biology but also is 
influenced by our knowledge and understanding (or lack thereof) of that biology. 
 
Left: Figure 4.8a A still from Simone: Taransky produces 3D holographic representation of his 
synthespian for a worldwide concert performance.  
Right: Figure 4.8b A still from Lang’s Metropolis where the robotic replica of Maria is charged 
to life — Rotwang, the inventor-magician creates Maschinenmensch. 
 
Right: Figure 4.8c Alphonse Marie de Neuville, Nautilus (1869), illustration from Jules Verne’s 
Twenty thousand leagues under the sea.  
Left: Figure 4.8d A still from the Star Trek series (1987), The next generation — teleportation.  
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Left: Figure 4.8e Example of motion capture processes.  
Right: Figure 4.8f  Alesso Baldovinetti, Annunciation (1447) Tempera on wood, 167 x 137 cm 
Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence. 
4.3.3  Patterns and mythologies 
S1mOne is constructed of a series of limiting and enabling subplots which 
engage with each other. One of the limiting subplots is the breach of contract by 
Taransky’s actress; this subplot is resolved by an enabling subplot, that of a 
computer programmer who makes it possible to take filmmaking to digital mode. 
In order to draw his viewers’ attention to the patterns in the narrative, Niccol 
uses a system of mythological markers for his subplots. The capricious actress, 
Nicole Anders, can be identified with the Greek Aphrodite while the computer 
programmer, who insists on equipping Taransky with his technological gift and 
who has lost one eye because of the computer screen exposure, can be 
interpreted as an allusion to Cyclops. They were the one-eyed members of a 
primordial race of giants who handed out new technological tools to the ‘new’ 
Greek pantheon of gods after Rhea and Kronos were overthrown: thunderbolt for 
Zeus, trident for Poseidon and the helmet of invisibility for Hades. 
It is clear that Niccol attempts to draw his viewers towards the cognitive exercise 
of conceptually interrogating his film by using a series of mythological signs. 
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Niccol used the device of mythological markers in his The Truman Show (1998) 
in which the omnipotence and omnipresence of television were well marked with 
analogies from Christian mythology.  In S1mOne, when he shows Taransky’s 
daughter researching the myth of Pygmalion and Galatea on the Internet it is a 
very overt kind of pointer to Greek mythology and Ovid’s Metamorphoses.  It is 
also, I suggest, a blatant ruse on Niccol’s part — he seems to suggest the 
audience can also question and research ideas — he has not simply made them 
up.  In this way he makes fun of himself as the authority on the problems he 
presents in his film. By doing this, he also mocks authoritative, unquestioned, 
unresearched ideas as stifling elements that work against the evolution of culture.  
The value of probing and examining ideas is illustrated in the film through the 
sole clear insight in the film about the real situation Taransky finds himself in.  
That insight comes from his daughter who questions, investigates and researches. 
The relationships between contemporary and mythological signs in the film, 
which are in some cases more or less overt, bring humorous nuances into play 
and necessitate interpretation on the part of the viewers.  It is in these moments 
when the roles and stereotypes are not clear cut, when Taransky is 
simultaneously a contemporary, ambitious film maker as well as the mythical 
Pygmalion or Zeus with his spectacular digital thunderbolt charming his 
worshippers, that the viewers are enticed to review and analyse their own casting 
of stereotypes.  The placement of mythological markers in the narrative itself 
serves numerous purposes.  The narrative opens up further opportunity of play 
with patterns.  Some of the clues as to the mythical origins of some older 
patterns Niccol uses in the film are overtly addressed with visuals (Figure 4.9). 
134 
 
 
Figure 4.9         A still fromS1mOne — the internet page from the research Taransky’s 
daughter, Lainey Christian, conducts at the same time as her father, like 
Pygmalion who according to Ovid “carved a statue out of snow-white 
ivory,” constructed a digital actress. 
4.3.4  Playing with open-ended patterns 
The absurd activity of sorting out the colours and flavours of jellybeans does not 
only serve as the satirical commencement of the film, it trivialises Taransky's 
status as a film director.  The activity of sorting is often treated in stories as an 
important cognitive task — after all this is a task enabled by pattern recognition, 
categorising information that humans use to understand events, stories, to 
process all kinds of data.  Famously, Cinderella in her story sorts out grain from 
ash to symbolise cognitive work done to separate valuable ideas from the 
worthless ones: sorting is meant to be meaningful for the evolution of an 
individual and for the evolution of culture.   
In many other narratives too, for example, novels, detective novels or films about 
the recovery of memories like Memento (dir. Christopher Nolan, 2000) or Total 
Recall (dir. Len Wiseman, 2012) or Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (dir. 
Michel Gondry, 2004), Nabokov’s work Speak, memory (1951) the activity of 
sorting out the available data in order to arrive at some truth about the presented 
situations is paramount.  It involves the participatory attention of the readers or 
viewers who — with their curiosity aroused — follow the puzzling plots to their 
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denouements.  Niccol, however, in his satirical portrayal of the human 
relationships within the Hollywood filmmaking industry, trivialises this activity 
of ‘figuring out’ the essence of things and subverts it to show how meaningless, 
tiresome and futile it can be — in the context of Hollywood. 
There are multiple allusions in the few opening establishing shots that confront 
the spectators and fix their attention as Niccol brings together an assortment of 
“cultural variants”.  The allusion to a kind of an altar and a preparation for the 
Holy Communion marks the mordant satire by which Niccol references the 
elevated “spiritual” or “godlike” status some film directors claim for themselves. 
Through the use of multiple allusions Niccol feeds what Boyd (2012:10) 
expresses as, the “human appetite for open-ended pattern”. 
Pattern recognition, the inbuilt ability to process information through template 
and prototype matching and relying on feature analysis and recognition of 
components, lies at the heart of storytelling.  The storyteller can be sure his 
spectators or listeners will make sense of the patterns that stories are composed 
of — conflicts and resolutions, announcements and denouncements, 
development of story lines, external referencing to other films, or referencing 
other cultural objects like paintings, myths and stories. 
4.3.5  Empathy and cognition 
Playing with open-ended patterns originates in the behaviour of play, which 
according to Panksepp (2012) is a way of exploring emotions and forms the 
basis for developing empathy and cooperative social behaviour in humans and 
other animals.  Social interaction and communication enabled by play and 
enabling playful behaviour also depend on categorisation and pattern recognition 
which in turn are underpinned by facial recognition, as Meltzoff’s (1995) studies 
on newborns confirm.  According to Graham and LaBar (2012:553), the human 
face plays a vital role in socialisation as it “conveys a rich source of non-verbal 
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information used during social communication [and while] research has revealed 
how specific facial channels such as emotional expression are processed, little is 
known about the prioritization and integration of multiple cues in the face during 
dyadic exchanges”. 
The strategy of how to deal with multiple cues, in films, is usually solved by 
sequencing them over a number of shots so as to allow the viewers to “process” 
the facial communication over a segment of time.  The dyadic exchanges are 
mostly dealt with by coupling or stringing them into a series of evoking and 
evoked gazes (Figure 4.10a – 4.10b).  
 
Figures 4.10a and 4.10b The soft emotional gaze of Simone evokes the emotional response in 
the viewers of her acting. 
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The empathy enabled by mirror neurons (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004; Gazzaniga 
2005; Ramachandran 2011) is deepened by the use of “the long lens […] for 
close-ups [as] its shallow depth of field automatically softened and glamorized 
faces” (Bordwell 2006:127).  The blurring of the background and the surrounding 
of the face filmed with those techniques results in blotting out all the irrelevant 
information to communicate human emotion to which humans respond so well. 
Bordwell explains that the use of new lenses yielded some “stylistic by-products” 
extending and enriching the technical and visual base of filmmaking (2006:127) 
which follows the pattern of the development of “cultural variants” that participate 
in the evolution of culture. 
4.3.6  Shots to remind spectators of the deception 
Another kind of visual patterning that underpins the film is the use of still images 
which serve as a signal, a reminder to the spectators of Niccol’s film that they are 
viewing a staged and arranged simulation of reality.  That alienation technique 
harks back famously to Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956). The typical practice in 
Hollywood filmmaking is to mask all the evidence of staging of filmed events 
with technical processes like green or blue screens and to remove or erase all the 
traces that could remind viewers about the technical side of filmmaking. 
In S1mOne these traces are recalled to expose the constructed nature of 
filmmaking.  The markers between different parts of the film used by Niccol are 
the illusion devices, props, like billboards or stage backgrounds which when used 
as establishing shots are almost immediately revealed as not a filmed reality but as 
filmed or photographed images of reality.  The revelation of these images is done 
through different ways of editing and camera techniques and serves as a move 
away from the formulaic monotony of these shots. 
In the sub-narrative in which Taransky holds a press conference and runs away 
from the pursuing media, a juncture is created by the shot of the monumental 
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image of Simone lying on her side, already referred to, and seconds later when 
Taransky is shown running in front of this image, the panning camera work is 
used to confront the viewers with the true nature of that establishing shot – it is a 
picture on the gigantic billboard (Figure 4.11a and 4.11b). 
 
Figure 4.11a and 4.11b           Running into fiction – the image of Simone as a dominant stage set. 
In the scene where a conversation takes place between Taransky and the computer 
programmer, Hank Aleno (an anagram of alone — as Taransky increasingly 
becomes), the narrow backstreets of the film production studios are revealed.  A 
film prop, the billboard with the iconic image of a single eye, has been transported 
from one studio to another and its glimpse has been caught through the gap 
between the buildings giving the impression of a piece of a film sliding through 
the aperture of a viewing apparatus (Figure 4.12a and 4.12b).  This is almost a 
reverse technique in terms of movement to the one used when Taransky is shown 
running into a gigantic and static image of Simone; the image of an eye slides 
through lacunae between film studios. 
The image of an eye that does not really see can be used to denote the old adage 
that beauty is in the eye of the beholder and satirise the film industry which 
operates on external images and favours externally beautiful people who, like 
Nicole Anders, the initial actress in Taransky’s films, have no view of inner 
values such as adaptability, sociality and cooperation — the base of the 
evolution of culture.  The eye recalls the Cyclops (Polyphemos) in Homer's 
Odyssey (Od. 9) from whom Odysseus and his men escape by using a ruse — 
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they exit with the sheep (themselves safely tied underneath) from Cyclops’s cave 
after Odysseus has blinded the monster.  The trick to escape the monster of the 
public will be a cunning one that Taransky will use. He, like Odysseus, will 
eventually have a safe homecoming.  But Taransky's world is not the epic one of 
Homer and Niccol takes trouble to satirise its meanness, narrowness, and lack of 
adventure.   
In the film, the ‘billboard’ eye, although denoting the omnipresence of the film 
making eye and alluding to the relationships between the observer and the observed 
it still does not see. As in Cezanne’s ruminations (see 2.2.1) about the true nature of 
seeing depending on the mind’s interpretation, Niccol wittily reminds his viewers 
about using discernment.  The subversions of stereotypical signs used by Niccol 
like “looking but not seeing” are extended and reinforced by other insurrections: 
pointing at things but not “getting” them, showing the way but instantly losing the 
path, or creating a simulacrum and losing one’s own identity to it. 
 
Figure 4.12a – 4.12b The billboard with the image of an eye is being transported across the end 
of a passage between the studio buildings. 
Another instance where the billboard setting is used to propagate subversions 
and ambiguities is the scene of the celebrity function in which the surroundings 
at first seem to be a vast spacious beach environment, but moments later while 
Taransky socialises with his filmic colleagues, the fact of its being a billboard is 
revealed. There is a solid wall serving as a support for the monumental image of 
the beach (Figures 4.13a, 4.13b and 4.13c).  This revelation is not done through a 
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typical zooming out shot showing the image of the beach in its surroundings but 
through its awkward spatial relationship to the parking lot.  The spatial illusory 
confusion constructed in these shots suggests the necessity of learning how 
physically and mentally to orientate oneself and navigate in such deceptive 
landscapes. Some fairy tales hint at such illusory environments (usually made of 
a multitude of mirrors) that are created by malign forces to confuse and trap 
benevolent protagonists. Satirically Niccol points to Taransky's inability to see 
and further outwards to his spectators whom he has tricked.  
These illusionistic techniques not only mark the narrative junctures but 
conceptually support the content of the film about illusions in which a simulation 
is received by the whole world and believed to be a flesh and blood actress.  The 
scene in the parking lot is similarly trivialised by Niccol just as the press 
conference given by Taransky was, though it is created in this instance by the 
verbal and not visual bathos as a waiter at this apparently important function for 
the chosen elite of film industry informs Taransky that a free carwash has been 
dispensed! This huge favour is granted simply because Taransky now belongs to 
the elite of VIPs.  
Figure 4.13a          The visual distortions of the environment.  
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Right: Figure 4.13b           “We gave you a complementary carwash”.  
Left: Figure 4.13c              The illusionistic environment where nothing is what it seems to be. 
4.3.7  Gestures and cognitive engagement 
The example in "I know this place!" (Figure 4.6) reflects Tomasello’s (2010) 
conclusions about the use of gestures as the devices that underpin human 
cognitive engagement with their environment and with each other.  Tomasello 
(2010:7) proposes that “human cooperative communication — whether using 
‘natural’ gestures or ‘arbitrary’ conventions — is one instance […] of uniquely 
human cooperative activity relying on shared intentionality”. 
Pointing, as Tomasello (2010:3) says, is a “primordial form of human 
communication” that evolved into a complex and advanced form used 
extensively in culture.  It operates on processing inner knowledge and can be 
directed to analyse the outside circumstances.  A cultural object is both the 
pointer and the pointed at.  The film illustrates this capacity humans have to 
point at events, issues, ideas or values and to engage with them in a testing 
manner.  “Spotting the discrepancies” is what the paparazzo does after his 
pointing to the visuals he has some knowledge about (Figures 4.14a-4.14d). 
This subplot is congruent with the insights provided by Boyd and Richerson 
(2005) about the nature of human culture and it illustrates that the evolution of 
culture is not only driven by dissemination of information but by testing and 
questioning of the passed on information so that it can be reliably acknowledged 
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as valuable and advantageous.  It is unfortunate that the conclusion drawn by the 
paparazzo is not that Simone might not exist but that Taransky keeps her 
imprisoned; that becomes a satirical comment Niccol makes about the human 
capacity to singlehandedly process information in novel ways by people 
unaccustomed to critical thinking. 
 
 
Figures 4.14a – 4.14d Spotting the differences.  
L e f t :  Figure 4.14a Still from the televised interview with Simone.  
Right: Figure 4.14b     Comparison of the views of the location.  
Bottom left: Figure 4.14c The actual ‘current’ location which since the time the internet photo 
was taken (and used by Taransky) has changed – a building in the 
background has been erected.  
Bottom right: Figure 4.14d The paparazzo ‘faces’ the discrepancies between the physical and  
photographic evidence. 
When the snooping character in the film, the paparazzo, points at the place where 
Simone supposedly conducts her televised interview, viewers expect that the 
truth about Taransky’s plot will be finally revealed. Instead, Niccol subverts 
these expectations by making the paparazzo draw conclusions that are in contrast 
with the “inner” knowledge the audience of the film possesses — a typical move 
in dramatic farce. The paparazzo claims “Simone is kept a prisoner by 
Taransky!” The moment of possible insight or enlightenment in the film, 
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supported by a clear pointing gesture, is turned upside down and the shocking 
farce hits the audience: the blind are leading the blind. 
The deliberate communicative and revealing function of a pointing gesture is set 
off in the film against the limitations of the “gesturing agent” (the paparazzo).  
Although the paparazzo correctly spots the tree that leads him to the real location 
of Simone’s TV interview, it does not lead him to the real reason for Simone’s 
reclusiveness.  The emblematic value of gestures “which have a direct verbal 
translation, like head-nods, beckoning, and pointing” (Burrow 2004:57), is 
destabilised in the film as voluntas significandi. So the meaning of the pointing 
gesture to the circumstances which could assist in unravelling confabulations 
collapses.  Although the paparazzo points correctly to the tree in the location 
Simone had supposedly conducted her interview, his conclusion about Simone-
Taransky relationship made upon his discovery is amusingly defective. The 
pointing gesture acquires its own satirical signification in the film as it is turned 
upside down and ‘points’ to the futility of searching for truth when under the 
reign of preconceived ideas.  The pointing gestures in cultural objects 
traditionally serve to draw the attention of viewers to something or someone of 
importance but not overtly and sometimes hidden from the immediate view. 
There is a multitude of various examples throughout the history of cultural 
objects and texts where special attention was given to gestures. One such famous 
example is that of Michelangelo Buonarroti Simoni’s (1475-1564) The creation 
of Adam (1511) (Figure 4.15a) and whichever art-historical interpretation of the 
work is closer or further from the artist’s intentions (whether demonstrating 
God’s “power of life”, the “awakening” of Adam, the symbolic depiction of 
creation, the transmission of the “divine spark” or illustrating a spiritual 
hierarchy), the main issue for biocultural analysis is the significance of the 
pointing gesture in cognitive terms as the human species excels at 
communicating through signs. 
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Left: Figure 4.15a The creation of Adam on the Sistine Chapel ceiling in the Church of S. 
Pietro in Vincoli in Rome.  
Right: Figure 4.15b Hercules at the crossroads, Annibale Carracci (1596), oil on canvas, 
collection: Naples, Museo e Gallerie Nazionali di Capodimonte. 
The use device of gestural signification in cultural objects has had a long 
practice in representational (Figures 4.15b, 4.15c, 4.15d, 4.15e, 4.15f) and 
conceptual art-making (Figures 4.15g, 4.15h) where it has been exploited for its 
metaphorical, ethical and conceptual value. The gesture, however, arises out of 
primate responses to external and internal stimuli. 
Left: Figure 4.15c  Hercules at the crossroads, Pompeo Batoni (1748), oil on canvas, 
collection: Liechtenstein Museum.  
Middle: Figure 4.15d The Continence of Scipio, Niccolo dell'Abbate (1555), oil on canvas, 
location: Louvre Museum.  
Right: Figure 4.15e Christ Pantocrator, mosaic (1174-82) in an Albanian Catholic Church from 
Cefalù Cathedral, Sicily. 
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Left: Figure 4.15f  Neo-Assyrian cylinder seal c.85BC, location: British Museum.  
Middle: Figure 4.15g Warren Neidich, Conversation map (I worked on my film today. Are you 
dating someone now?) (2002), digital composite image of conversations 
conducted in sign language with lights attached to participants hands.  
Left: Figure 4.15h Warren Neidich, Conversation map (I am in love with him, Kevin Spacey) 
(2002). 
4.4  PROPAGATING COGNITION THROUGH SATIRE 
Satire is one of the finest cognitive vehicles we have for subversion of 
stereotypical attitudes. The punch that satire is made to deliver in S1mOne is 
both visual and gestural — it forces a human response as it confronts with the 
portrayals of upside-down behaviour, deception, arrogance, lack of empathy, 
ignorance, and self-deception. 
4.4.1  Repetitious shots to mock 
The scenes in the hotel, in which Taransky acts out the bodily presence of 
Simone are of short duration and are placed rapidly after each other using close-
ups of body evidence shots of blonde hair or female lingerie or a used bar of 
soap.  They are intermixed with bird’s eye view shots of Taransky frantically 
rolling in and working at disturbing the sheets of the hotel king size bed and 
medium shots of him arranging a bath for Simone’s non-existent body (Figures 
4.16a, 4.16b and 4.16c). 
The pace of these shots matches the frantic character of his actions.  These shots 
are matched to similar shots of the paparazzo, who while investigating the hotel 
suite for Simone’s remnants, starts in a fetishistic way to caress the objects 
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which were supposedly touched or used by her.  The pace of the shots, however, 
slows down to fit in with the slower, examining and admiring mood of the 
paparazzo who seeks to ‘soak’ himself in the ‘bodily’ aura of the synthespian. 
The same shots of the hotel bed viewed from above with (this time with not 
Taransky but the celebrity-hungry paparazzo in it) are longer and comically 
supported by the mood enhancing music typically used in love-making scenes in 
many American films (Figures 4.16d and 4.16e).  Anti-climax, direct parody and 
lampoon are directed at the paparazzi in general by Niccol. 
Figures 4.16a, 4.16b and 4.16c Taransky stages the presence of body-less actress in the hotel 
suite. 
 
147 
 
 
Figures 4.16d and 4.16e The paparazzo reconstructs the presence of Simone and worships all 
objects supposedly touched by her. 
 
 
Figures 4.16f, 4.16g, 4.16h & 4.16i Hotel scenes — the shots satirically reveal before and after situations. 
 
Staging of the hotel deception scenes is deployed in a satirical way when the main 
recipient of the ‘stage’, the paparazzo ‘takes Taransky’s bait’ and delights in it. 
His pleasure in being absorbed in the environment created by Taransky might not 
be surprising as it is the professional trademark of film directors to be able to put 
together and construct the mise-en-scène for their films.  There is an analogy 
between Taransky staging scenes for the paparazzo and Niccol’s constructing the 
reality of filmic endeavours for the viewers — the first construction is aimed at 
deception, however, while the second targets spreading of cognition and 
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humorously reminds the viewers that the nature of filmmaking relies on illusions. 
4.4.2  Mocking gestures 
When Taransky, held on the charge of murdering Simone, clasps the bars of his 
prison cell, the viewers are reminded of the other examples of gripping the 
confining rods and this gesture communicates frustration and desire to break 
free, to overcome the imprisonment (Figures 4.17a and 4.17b). This dramatic 
gesture has the significance of the embodied consciousness and humans rely on 
such gestures as they are primal responses to experienced events.  Niccol brings 
about an ironic twist to the scenes of imprisonment by exposing how Taransky 
has been hoist by his own petard.  The viewers witness the ironic subversion of 
status acquisition: Taransky, who after all, is the creator of the most influential 
celebrity in the world, is powerless in the face of people’s (the paparazzi, the 
police detectives, his own lawyer’s) “thinking” habits which target the obvious 
solutions to problems. 
 
Figure 4.17a          Taransky’s imprisonment. 
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Figure 4.17b            The creator of the most influential celebrity in the world is powerless. 
The prison scene is loaded with subversions. The conversation between 
Taransky and his lawyer reveals that the false orientation of truth to publicity 
dominates popular thinking. The lawyer prompts Taransky to admit to the 
murder by saying “Victor, come on, it’s in the papers!” — a satirical reference to 
our reliance on the mass media for conveying half-truths.  The status acquisition 
is shown to be arbitrary when the film director, the maker of S1mOne, is 
portrayed as incapacitated by people who are incapable of grasping the essence 
of things. 
Satire as a form of cognition is perhaps the most complex — as it is 
counterintuitive — lesson in moral values.  The simple biblical claim that “the 
meek shall inherit the Earth” receives a satirical treatment in the film: the status 
driven society removes itself from reality by being preoccupied with status 
seeking. Satire serves well in the film as it is used to facilitate rapid understanding 
and learning, and it confronts the flawed assumptions by disarming aggression 
against challenging the dubious opinions through provoking laughter. 
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4.4.3  Subversions of subversions 
Subversions of stereotypical or expected behaviour are the cognitive 
mechanisms Niccol uses to spread his experiences in the world of film making.  
The subversions are of satirical kind as they undermine the predictable outcomes 
that the audience of the film expects. The gesturing paparazzo (Figure 4.6), who 
seems to be on the verge of discovering the truth behind Simone’s existence, 
arrives at a completely unexpected and ludicrous to the viewers’ circumlocutious 
conclusion: that Taransky keeps his actress imprisoned.  The plot Taransky 
employs to discredit Simone in a series of TV interviews and to make her the 
media’s persona non grata backfires as the audience in the film judges her 
politically incorrect and ecologically unfriendly views as refreshingly honest.  
The film “I am pig” (Figures 4.18a, 4.18b, 4.18c and 4.18e) Taransky makes on 
behalf of Simone aims to debase her; however, again it is most reverently 
received by the audience within the film S1mOne and the attempted subversion 
of Simone’s status is subverted itself. 
 
 
Figures 4.18a, 4.18b, 4.18c and 4.18d              “Stills” from Simone’s film “I am Pig”. 
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Figure 4.18e The attempted subversion of Simone’s status backfires and Taransky 
dispiritedly faces the film poster for Simone’s cinematic effort. 
4.4.4  The parting satirical shots 
The final satirical shot is that in the credits of the film Niccol acknowledges in a 
light-hearted way the support of actresses who supplied their facial features to 
compose Simone (Figure 4.19a).  This is done by means of a conceptual joke but 
the further layer of this satire rests on the understanding that, indeed, there is a lot 
to be grateful for to the previous generations who enabled what is possible today. 
 
Figure 4.19a “Simone wishes to thank the following for their contribution to the making of 
Simone” — alliances are not only of the social kind, they most importantly 
are formed with ideas and significations. 
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Figures 4.19b, 4.19c and 4.19d Stills from S1mOne. In the epilogue scenes Taransky is shown 
to continue creating illusions. 
The epilogue scenes depict Taransky as continuing to inhabit “an imaginative 
realm called Neverland” (Gottschall 2012:iv); this behaviour of adapting reality to 
fictions reverberates with the motto of the Shakespeare’s playhouse, The Globe 
(1599-1613), “Totus mundus agit histrionem, which can be translated as ‘All the 
world’s a stage’ (As you like it, 2,7, 1037)” (Oathly 2011:11). 
4.5  THE BIOLOGICAL TRAITS FOR SURVIVAL 
This section begins the analysis of the film and expands by concentrating on various 
traits that organisms, human or not, use to survive.  Some of them have led to the 
evolution of culture, some have not.  Biologically based behaviour that enables 
problem solving, formation of alliances and construction of narratives or promote 
status seeking is discussed here as particular events in the film S1mOne. This is done 
to show that such biological behaviour underpins the narrative of the film. 
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4.5.1  Status seeking 
The irony of Taransky’s behaviour is that while he tries to establish his place in 
society, which works at the beginning of his ‘simulated enterprise’, his actions 
eventually result in increasing the distance between himself and others, the exact 
opposite of sociality.  The core of human cultural evolution is the sharing and 
exchange of gathered information and knowledge, as Boyd and Richerson (2004) 
explain, and the lack of sharing and interrupting the flow of information that 
Niccol points to through his main character, Taransky, brings about alienation. 
Niccol’s portrayal of the effort Taransky makes to establish a position of status as 
a renowned film director displays insights into human sociality and the nature of 
the evolution of culture, the basis of which is the transmission of information. 
The observation made by Boyd and Richerson (2004:4) is that “people living in 
human populations are heirs to a pool of socially transmitted information that 
affects how they make a living, how they communicate, and what they think is 
right and wrong”.  Taransky is shown in the film as a person who not only does 
not participate in transmitting information but actively aborts the information 
flow.  This is done in service of Taransky’s status seeking — and the necessity of 
maintaining secrecy to uphold positions of power is a small illustration in the film 
of the bigger, historical trends and events like withholding schooling and access to 
knowledge from underprivileged social classes or “races”. 
4.5.2  Exchanges fair or unfair 
The exchange of favours plays a vital part in social selection and in shaping 
“human capacities for culture” and although it has not been fully established how 
exactly the “altruistic rewarding for cooperation in larger groups” contributes to 
the evolution of culture (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003:790), in the film the 
incongruity of value of the “reward” for Taransky's contribution to filmmaking 
strikes one as comical.  A carwash as “compensation” and acknowledgment of his 
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film directing talent seem incommensurate.  The distribution of “favours” as a 
rewarding system does relate to the “fitness” level of an individual — but, to 
paraphrase Fehr and Fischbacher’s concerns (2003), who gets a car and who gets 
a carwash and how those decisions affect the evolution of culture, but to some 
other value or belief. 
As “humans are … exquisitely sensitive to social rejection” (Maner, DeWall, 
Baumeister, & Schaller 2007) it is probably understandable that Taransky takes up 
a variety of approaches to counteract the ostracising measures.  His drive to re- 
establish himself as a desirable social partner fits with the behavioural patterns 
described by Nesse (2010:143) that include the work toward improving one’s 
fitness, “displays of value and generosity” (Figure 4.20a) all of which are 
prominently portrayed in the film through the distribution of gifts to his daughter 
(like the vintage car Simone “drives” in Taransky’s film) or the renewed attraction 
his ex-wife feels for Taransky because of his alliance with such a socially 
powerful “actress”.  So Taransky experiences an elevation of his social fitness 
because of his alliance with Simone; desirability for him as a social partner 
increases because he becomes a proxy in the relationship with Simone. 
“Mutual exchange is ubiquitous in human interactions” (Nesse 2010:139) and kin 
relationships are especially long lasting for the formation of alliances — it is 
Taransky’s daughter who through her clear deductive thinking rescues her father 
and restores her family (Figures 4.20b and 4.20c).  
 
Right: Figure 4.20a            Social fitness asserted by “gift bearing”.  
Left: Figure 4.20b              Lainey rescues her father by restoring Simone to existence. 
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Figure 4.20c         Taransky’s family restoration. 
4.5.3  Forming alliances 
Formation of alliances is crucial in the evolution of culture and according to 
Nesse (2010:143) it could be the “tipping point” which made the “advances to 
sociality possible” when the number and “quality of relationships” and bonds 
began to “strongly influence fitness”.  The fitness of humans for forming 
alliances and creating ‘power hubs’, like choosing a mate or nowadays 
assembling a list of Facebook friends is based more on social qualifiers than 
genetic traits.  Taransky is shown by Niccol to make an initially advantageous 
alliance with a famous actress whose betrayal at the very moment of concluding 
the film she has worked on with Taransky results in the spread of social rejection 
of Taransky and his resulting ostracism from the film making world.  Her 
defection is caused by her suspicion that Taransky is a social nobody in the film 
industry.  The exclusion of Taransky spreads to his ex-wife too, who after the 
analysis of the “figures” of profits — which plummeted as the result of the 
leading actress' anti-Taransky campaign — withdraws her support of him and his 
film making.  Should he not have had the opportunity to create his synthetic 
alliance — one can speculate —it is probable that his social fitness would totally 
have collapsed and his films been relegated to oblivion.  
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The synthetic alliance (Figures 4.21a, 4.21b, 4.21c, 4.21d and 4.21e) he 
constructs with the digital actress is what forms the main narrative of the film 
and propels the events of the story.  As Djikic et al. (2009:28) observe, although 
the results of human interactions with cultural objects are not easily evaluated or 
assessed and these encounters cannot really be measured in terms of changes, 
they affect the “human psyche" and they are a worthy pursuit to explore. 
Boyd (2009) stresses that interactions with cultural objects and texts extend and 
develop pattern recognition skills but the outcomes of such interactions can be 
varied and while they can serve to enlarge the grasp of the world, they can also 
produce psychological identification and entanglements with the cultural objects. 
Niccol pursues the possibility of such varied outcome in his film by showing the 
main character on the one hand experiencing brain plasticity and expanding his 
abilities for empathy while, on the other hand simultaneously constructs the 
more fatalistic possible outcomes of a human-artifice alliance. 
Niccol offers his speculation about how the psychology of the human – 
exemplified by Taransky — who does not reflect on his interactions with the 
simulation he has created becomes affected by it.  The initial stage of Taransky’s 
alliance with a simulation elevates him in his family circles, the film industry 
and the public eye.  His “fitness” level increases; he gets a free carwash; his ex-
wife wants him back; his daughter is proud of him; film awards are bestowed on 
him; he “earns” attention and his status escalates.  But as the synthespian gets 
progressively greater social recognition from this alliance than Taransky does 
and, as the balance of this alliance is tipped in her favour, the initial purpose of 
the relationship to assist Taransky in his status seeking becomes nullified.  Nesse 
(2010:137) observes that “aspects of culture now select for prosociality and 
capacities for complex social cognition”. 
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Figure 4.21a Selection of the facial features and visual appearance of the synthespian — 
the newly established alliance’s facial features must appeal to both 
Taransky’s and the social visual preferences. 
 
 
Figures 4.21b and 4.21c Taransky searches through the visual bank of facial features of the 
renowned film stars who had already “proved” their social fitness and 
desirability for forming alliances with these features. 
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Figures 4.21d-4.21e “Putting it together” — Taransky makes a comparative analysis of selected 
facial features that results in a composite portrait of an ultimate star. 
The ties or alliances with simulations of different kinds abound through the 
history of storytelling.  Be it the emotional bond of Pygmalion with his Galatea, 
Dr Faust’s lust for his Gretchen — like the eternal feminine Helen, Master 
Geppetto’s care for his carved wooden son Pinocchio, the collaborations between 
Swanhilde and Coppélia, Hadaly constructed by Edison for Ewald in The future 
Eve, or the frightful transactions resulting in the attachments of Dorian Gray to 
his portrait by Basil Hallward in Oscar Wilde’s novel — that is paramount.  
These human-simulacrum bonds were mostly founded on emotional responses to 
human form of the other, but some of the ties also expose the status seeking 
strategies like Victor Frankenstein’s ambition to create life or Dr Coppelius’s 
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drive to imbue his automata with human life. 
The strategy for survival and status seeking by Taransky is an underlying motive 
for the formation of his alliance with Simone.  This strategy for survival through 
alliances with a creatum in the contemporary world portrayed in the film is 
shown to be long lasting and resembling the older Pygmalion mould.  Unlike the 
coarse abandonment of the creature by Victor Frankenstein, in S1mOne, a more 
responsible solution to the relationship between a creator and the created has 
been sought and achieved through the bond of marriage. 
Since Baudrillard’s insights about simulation (which were grounded in the 
technological production of the world) many more recent perceptions have been 
offered on the nature of simulation and imitation. These come, among others, 
from the fields of developmental psychology and cognitive sciences (Meltzoff 
1995; Decety 2002; Ramachandran 2011). Decety observes that although 
developmental psychologists have long been concerned with imitation, the field 
has burgeoned with the findings that newborns imitate facial gestures, suggesting 
an innate system for coupling perception and production of human action 
(Decety 2002, Meltzoff & Moore 1977). 
In numerous experiments that aim at finding out how these imitative actions 
work, says Decety (2002:9) there is the “convergence from both brain and 
behavioural sciences that the same representations are used for both reading the 
actions of the other as well as producing them [my italics]”.  In other words there 
is a consensus among the scientists ranging from neuroscience and cognitive 
science disciplines about the shared origin centre for our actions and deciphering 
the actions of others. 
In the film the exchange of the actions and the imitative reactions between the 
film director Taransky and his synthespian becomes increasingly fused. 
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Eventually it reaches the point when Taransky’s actions are the result of the 
reactions of the public to the synthespian’s presence on the silver screen.  This 
problem of who controls whom is not only addressed in the narrative itself but 
Niccol also uses a series of visual devices in which he plays with the reversed 
sequences of simulated actions: for instance he first shows the simulated reaction 
that is followed by the initial action.  The previous action is shown after the 
followed simulation (Figures 4.22a and 4.22b).  In this way Niccol satirically 
emphasises the confusion of who is simulating whom and launches this paradox 
on the viewers of the film S1mOne, the simulation. 
 
 
Figures 4.22a and 4.22b The mirror actions by the synthespian are shown in the film to anticipate the 
inductive actions by Taransky as his cognitive entanglement with Simone 
progresses. 
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4.5.4  Narratives as constructs of identity 
The alliance with the synthespian demands that Taransky invents not only a visual 
‘vessel’ for her but provides her with identity.  Narrative was traditionally thought 
of as an empirical, descriptive vessel for factual or fictional knowledge, storytelling 
and other forms of cultural containers of knowledge.  However a different 
understanding of the role narratives play in the evolution of individuals and culture 
has emerged.  One of the main contemporary neuroscientific claims about the 
purpose of narratives is that they serve as constructs of the Self and that their nature 
is contained in the exchange of fiction produced and fiction received (Saks 1985, 
Dennett 1988).  In this view, the explanation of the Self provided by Bruner 
(1994:11) who claims that “self is a perpetually rewritten story … in the end, we 
become the autobiographical narratives by which we ‘tell about’ our lives”, throws 
further light onto the identity crisis Taransky experiences in Niccol’s film. 
The two identity narratives portrayed in the film, the one of Taransky and the 
other that was invented by Taransky for his synthespian, become gradually 
enmeshed, fused, and entangled with each other.  This representation of enmeshed 
narratives is not unrealistic and is often observed when a person devises different 
accounts of the same story for different situations or different people, sooner or 
later resulting in confusion as to what was invented for whom. 
When Niccol portrays Taransky fusing his own and Simone’s narratives, he points 
to the potential cognitive confusion of narratives.  This confusion becomes 
comprehensible when the biological basis for social interaction is taken into 
account.  Frith (2001:153) observes that in the functional subdivisions of the 
anterior cingulate cortex, areas specialising in monitoring one’s own mental states 
and areas for attributing mental states to others (also called mind-reading) are 
closely packed and overlapping.  The areas that perform mind-reading actions, in 
the case of Taransky, are overwritten by the areas through which Taransky is able 
to observe himself (Figure 22c). 
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Figure 22c The graph illustrates the close ‘geographical’ proximity within the brain of regions 
responsible for “monitoring own mental states” and for “attributing mental states 
to others” activities. “Location of peak activations in medial frontal regions 
during task in which subjects think about their own or other people’s mental states 
or have to interpret actions of freely moving agents” (source: Frith & Frith 
2001:153). 
Niccol reinforces the issue of metacognitive confusion in the individual Taransky 
by portraying the mass “malfunction” of a metacognitive system, the public in 
S1mOne.  The public, disengaged from critical thinking about celebrities and 
blindly determined to worship them, loses the ability to interpret the external 
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world, which requires more than just discernment between true and false beliefs 
(Chandler & Lalonde 1996). Niccol's portrayal of the metacognitive fiasco that 
happens in these two domains, the private life of Taransky and the larger life of 
Taransky’s audience, is a reversal of Sperber’s distribution of representations 
(Kronenfeld, Bennardo, de Munck & Fisher 2011:420). 
Sperber identifies group and public representations as longer-lasting, more widely 
spread and more cultural than those of an individual whose internal 
representations are based on feeling and private experiences.  However, in 
fictional situations such as film or literature, it is these individual experiences and 
representations that strike the most personal chord with the viewers and readers, 
so enabling the longer-lasting and wider propagation of cognition. 
4.5.5  Simulated reality, brain plasticity and identity 
Simulation from the neuroscientific point of view can be used to affect brain maps 
of body schemata and assist in learning a variety of motor skills. Blakeslee 
2007:120-127), however, reports that it is not only human perception or skill 
acquisition but also human behaviour that can be affected in virtual reality 
situations and that while such simulated situations can be used as an aid to motor 
recovery in people who have suffered physical trauma, it can also change 
behavioural patterns in human-avatar situations.  Her (2007:125) example is the 
research conducted by Bailenson who “explores the intersections between virtual 
reality, body schema, homuncular flexibility, and social psychology”.  Blakeslee 
(2007:117) explains: 
Thus neuroplasticity might play a larger role than is generally 
appreciated in creating the ‘species-typical’ organization of at least 
some brain maps. Evolution may craft anatomical improvements in 
body parts, and then the brain gerrymanders its body maps to 
capitalize on those improvements. Many unique features of the human 
mind and brain may be due to hidden, emergent processes like this 
one. 
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Baileson’s research (in Blakeslee 2007:120) reveals that people change their 
behaviour accordingly to the type of avatar through which they act out their 
agendas. For example, a usually timid person can start behaving more assertively 
in virtual situations where his avatar is taller and ‘better’ built then the other 
avatars he interacts with.  In S1mOne when Taransky acts through his synthespian, 
Niccol shows him to experience a psychological ‘meltdown’ and an intense 
entanglement with Simone.  There is, however, another aspect of the changes 
Taransky undergoes — while he acts through and on behalf of his female 
synthespian — his avatar of sorts — he gains a deeper appreciation of the 
feminine. This leads him to seek to restore his relationship with his ex-wife and to 
work on the bond he has with his daughter.  It is through these experiences and 
changes that the phenomenon of plasticity of human behaviour can be recognised 
and Damasio’s definition of the self as the self-process depicted. 
4.6  PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
Simulation can play a role in both creating problems and solving them.  In the 
film S1mOne both these possibilities are well exploited.  Problem solving is one 
of the most potent strategies in the natural world for advancement of a species 
who are viewed within cognitive sciences as integrated systems of specific 
solutions in which behaviours, developmental patterns and organs are the major 
role players (Camazine, Deneubourg, Franks, Sneyd, Theraulaz, & Bonabeau 
2001).  Boyd (2009:324) observes that culture follows biological patterns of 
problem solving and that it does so by “making available to the whole group 
behavioural solutions more responsive to novel circumstances than genetic 
evolution can offer”. 
The narrative of the film exposes a series of behavioural solutions and decision-
making which are varied as to their anticipated effectiveness.  One can speculate 
that Taransky’s choice of using a synthetic actress in place of a live one might 
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have had far different and more desired outcomes in terms of survival strategy had 
he disclosed to the public the digital origin of his synthespian as technological to 
supplement our biological resources.  Instead the audience witnesses a series of 
self-absorbed, self-focused decisions made by Taransky. 
The solution addressing the motley of enmeshments offered by Taransky’s 
daughter at the conclusion of the film is of a cooperative kind, valued in many 
biological situations — symbiosis, collective behaviours or the self-organisation 
of insects.  According to Camazine et al. (2001:370), such self-organisation in 
biology is “a property of certain dynamical mechanisms whereby structures, 
patterns and decisions appear at the global (colony) level of a system, based on 
interactions among its lower-level components (agents, individuals)” and that 
those processes are carried out on the basis of purely local information, without 
reference to the global level. 
If that observation about biological structures of problem solving can be used to 
elucidate Taransky’s daughter’s behaviour in her dilemma, then it can be said that 
her solution simultaneously operates at both local and global levels.  Locality of 
the solution involves the reconciliation of Taransky’s family and includes not only 
their immediate wellbeing but the forecast of the desired future.  The global level 
of problem solving is illustrated in the film through the Internet research 
Taransky’s daughter does to find out how mythology handled similar problems 
and the specific resolution of the Pygmalion myth. 
The value of collective, cooperative solutions — which often lead to the formation 
of valuable social alliances — as a fundamental element of human sociality and 
the evolution of culture has been not only well explored in many social and 
cognitive studies but has often been used in films and narratives for addressing a 
problem at hand.  Neo, for instance, the hero in the Wachowski brothers’ film The 
Matrix (1999), comprehends the nature of the simulated world he occupies when 
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he joins a group of freedom fighters.  Together through close cooperation this 
eventually leads toward a triumph over the preying, life extracting virtual reality. 
The replicants in Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) take advantage of 
cooperation and experience sociality when they team up for survival against the 
powers that destroy them.  The hero of Harry Potter books, or Luke Skywalker of 
the Star Wars series, are both well supported by a reliable network of friends who 
collectively help each other to solve mounting, escalating challenges and fight the 
evil forces together. 
Cooperation toward a common goal occurs on all levels of biological life and in all 
spheres of culture.  Bassler (2008), for instance, who specialises in studying 
chemical communication and cooperation between bacteria, believes that the 
primordial cooperation observed in bioluminescent bacteria set the scene for the 
emergence of cells and cell specialisation leading to complex organisms.  Bassler 
also argues that human democratic concepts of legislature and quorum are the 
analogous mechanisms employed by bacteria for decision making that propagate 
their collective survival.  Cultural cooperation of humans, claims the evolutionary 
palaeontologist Roberts (2009, 2011), has played a major role in human longevity 
that is well past its reproductive capacities and that grandparenthood is nature’s and 
culture’s result of cooperation between generations toward ensuring child rearing. 
4.6.1  Cooperative and competitive problem solving 
The narrative of the film, however, addresses the collective, cooperative way of 
problem solving only at its conclusion and before reaching its conclusions it can 
be conceptualised as a concatenation of interlocking crises (problems) in which 
one crisis leads through its attempted solution to the next one.  This is in 
agreement with observations made in the field of biological systems and amplified 
by Boyd (2009:324) who says that, “[a]ny solution can create new problems” and 
in the film the viewers can observe exactly this biologically founded truth. 
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The initiating crisis in the plot happens when the actress employed to play the 
main role in Taransky's new film, Eternity for Ever, breaks the contract with him. 
Unable to contract anyone else to finish the film, Taransky's project is in danger of 
total collapse.  The fortunate solution to this problem is provided by a former 
acquaintance of Taransky, the computer software developer who created a 
computer programme enabling simulation in real life which the film director uses 
to concoct a synthetic actress for his film.  
The very next crisis arises directly from this solution as Taransky, despite the 
favoured reception by the audience of his new work, decides to omit the fact that 
his leading actress is in fact a digital fusion of facial features of real famous 
actresses and that the “acting” is in fact done through motion capture where a 
computer programme reads actions of the programme operator and re-enacts, 
copies them into a digital “persona” (in this case an actress for Taransky’s film). 
Niccol gathers and creates more and more problems in his narrative by allowing 
his main fictional character to continue concocting an escalating series of 
deceptions.  Each solution does not only create new problems but also instigates 
the evolution of the synthespian and affects Taransky.  The initially two- 
dimensional synthespian is later reworked by Taransky into a three-dimensional 
hologram that occupies and shares real time and space with the deceived public. 
He does this out of desperation to avoid unmasking and to continue his agenda to 
prevent the detection of his fabulations. 
Niccol reveals that the choice of nondisclosure by the director Taransky about the 
real nature of his actress leads to aborting the flow and sharing of knowledge. 
When cultural objects are solely made for the purpose of status seeking by their 
creators, they are not fulfilling their function as vehicles for transmission and 
sharing cognition. However, they still might transmit and spread the knowledge 
about status seeking patterns and as Harris (2006:239) explains “the status system 
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searches for self-knowledge in the social cues provided by others.  It then uses 
this information to plot as long-term strategy that will involve direct competition 
only in those areas of endeavour in which the individual has a hope of succeeding 
and, if possible, avoid competition in other arenas”. 
Ironically, in the film, it is not self-knowledge that is sought by Taransky, but 
finding the means to survive and succeed in the capricious Hollywood 
environment of film making and to elevate himself above the others is the focus of 
all his creative and improvisational actions.  After the making of the synthespian 
Simone and testing the motion capture capacities of the computer programme, 
Taransky experiences a powerful moment of amazement — he starts to speculate 
about the nature of reality and the manufactured reality but by keeping these 
ponderings to himself, he fails to explore the relationship between the real and 
virtual in the way that broadens human knowledge.  He is immersed in his own 
confabulations and becomes gradually devoted to maintaining and safeguarding 
the illusion that Simone is human.  By portraying Taransky’s unwillingness to 
disseminate knowledge, Niccol presents his audience with an opportunity to 
engage with questions about some aspects of the nature of cognition, such as 
propagation, transmission, sharing and spreading information or secrecy and 
exclusivity. 
The Truman Show also addresses virtual reality and the cognitive consequences 
that follow a lack of awareness of simulated events.  The awareness situation in 
The Truman Show is reversed.  While in S1mOne nobody but Taransky himself is 
aware of the truth behind his digital actress, Truman, the hero of The Truman 
Show is the only one who is unaware of his total immersion in simulated life. 
There are cognitive consequences of awareness and non-awareness of being in 
simulated situations. 
In both these films, fabrications of simulation are portrayed to serve the societal 
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need to be entertained.  In both instances, the secretive mechanisms of simulation 
are shown to be disadvantageous to the propagation of cognition.  In the case of 
S1mOne, the spread of cognition about the means of fabricating reality is aborted 
the moment Taransky decides to keep his knowledge about such confabulations to 
himself.  In the case of the film The Truman Show, the propagation of cognition 
among the viewers of the television programme happens only when his hero, 
Truman, does his own cognitive work toward modifying his own understanding 
according to his new insights about his situation. 
In S1mOne, on the first level, the public starts an active, intense and 
indiscriminate, almost absolute worship of the synthetic actress by putting her on 
an absurdly high pedestal. On the second level, Taransky’s personal relationship 
with his family, his ex-wife and his daughter, is driven into an escalating series of 
lies and cover-ups for the non-existence of Simone.  The even more grave results 
of these lies and cover-ups are situated in Taransky’s own psyche, manifested on 
the third level, when he becomes increasingly unable to distinguish the boundaries 
between himself and his now alter ego; in other words he loses the ability to 
observe his own thinking and his meta-cognitive skills deteriorate.  
On the meta-level of the film, it is Niccol, the director, who attempts to address 
his problem with excessive celebrity worship in America by making a film which 
points to this very issue.  He uses the medium of film to spread his particular 
insight about the society’s naivety and blind idolatry of actors and actresses.  
After all, Niccol tells his viewers, actors and actresses are but vehicles of 
simulations, skilled simulators, and performers of other people’s ideas.  Creating 
narratives, films and art objects is one of the biocultural strategies of problem 
solving and drawing attention as to how real problems can be dealt with through 
the fictional world. 
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4.6.2  Problem solving through confabulation 
Sperber (2000:3) says that “cognitive systems are characterized by their ability to 
construct and process mental representations” and that the human ability to 
construct “mental representations of mental representations”, in other words 
metarepresentations provide a base for forming “second-order intentional 
systems”, with aptitude for having “beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires”. 
Sperber explains that in terms of Dennett’s study on intentional systems the 
“[s]econd-order intentional systems are, for instance, capable of deliberate 
deception.  In a population of second-order intentional systems, a third-order 
intentional system would be at a real advantage, if only because it would be able 
to see through deception.  Similarly, in a population of third-order intentional 
systems, a fourth-order intentional system would a greater advantage still, having 
greater abilities to deceive others and avoid being deceived itself, and so on” 
(Sperber 2000:3). 
In the film S1mOne, Niccol portrays the rapid development of higher-order 
intentional systems in his hero Taransky.  Each time Taransky has to appease the 
increasing curiosity of the public about his synthespian, he devises more and more 
creative ways to meet those growing demands by being a step ahead.  His methods 
consist of, among others, a clever hiring of the body double for the digital actress as 
well as the invention of a very eccentric character for her to explain away her utter 
seclusion.  
The deception culminates with Taransky’s deployment of holographic technology for 
the “live” on stage performance by Simone.  The initial technology Taransky had 
been handed down by the inventive computer programmer has been supplemented by 
a variety of other deceptive resources aimed to keep Taransky in control.  The third 
and fourth-orders of intentional systems take on a rapid development in the film 
towards Taransky’s goal of deception, while his mirror neuron system appears to live 
through an increasingly confused relationship with his creation. 
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4.7  CONCLUSIONS 
Makers of cultural objects depend on exploitation and manipulation of the 
biological characteristics which secure the attention of the viewers of the objects. 
Pattern recognition is relied on by cultural object creators both to secure attention 
in viewers and to satisfy their desire for patterns.  The makers of the cultural 
objects face a range of problems — mimetic, perceptual, cultural, political, 
epistemic problems of identity and problems of representation.  Through the 
solutions offered in the making of the cultural objects the evolution of culture is 
further enabled. 
The photographic style of Niccol's S1mOne is crisp and he uses uncluttered, 
minimalistic frames.  This quality of Niccol’s approach to filmmaking sometimes 
even a sterile style of frame composition is visible in his other films like Gattaca 
(1997), or In time (2011).  The different “tints” Niccol uses in Simone, like the 
overall green in the scenes where Victor Taransky and Hank Aleno hold 
conversation or the blue tinting of the VIP function, allude to the film practice of 
blue and green screen techniques for creating seamless illusions. The method 
applied in this study is that of linking the characteristics of the individual cultural 
object to the biological base that enables the creator of the object to exploit the 
possibilities of both the object and the biology of the viewer to achieve the spread 
of cognition.  
Second order intentionality, the ability of human beings to "recognise that another 
individual has a belief that they know to be false" (Dunbar, 2000:239) is at the 
core of Simone.  Niccol exploits this ability of humans.  He develops a narrative 
about multiple deceptions at multiple levels.  The satire which Niccol uses to 
underline the fact that viewers of films can be happy to be duped into false beliefs, 
is a cognitive deictic tool which facilitates insights. 
Simone is a film about a synthespian when, Kurzweil ironically observes, no 
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synthespian technology was used to make the film.  That irony can be extended to 
a number of films about robots, replicants and artificial intelligence in which 
people, living actors simulate the man-made creatures. 
Niccol, throughout the film, consistently subverts many signs of cognitive 
activities like pointing, simulating, categorising and sorting out.  This is done in 
the context of Hollywood film production where these activities “lose” their value 
as cognitive gestures. 
Culture is defined by many terms depending on the intentions of those who define 
it.  It is sometimes used as a weapon in the defence of cultural identities that 
define the Self within these cultural structures. From the biocultural point of view, 
however, the Self is a process and so is culture.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter concludes this study. The study was an investigation of Niccol’s 
satirical film S1mOne from a biocultural critical point of view. The structure of 
this chapter is such that it is a reflection on the entire study.  It offers general 
conclusions about the significance and value of a biocultural approach for a 
critique of cultural objects.  More conclusions, specific to the way a biocultural 
approach has helped to amplify the critique of a film (although that object of the 
critique, the film S1mOne could have been any satirical film) are offered.  Some 
conclusions about satire as a tool for spreading of cognition are offered, in the 
context of the significance of humour for human understanding of moral values. 
Simulation as one of the themes in the study is discussed to draw general 
biocultural conclusions. 
How cognition is propagated through cultural objects was part of the investigation 
of this study.  A wide reading programme in unfamiliar scientific literature after 
Boyd’s On the origin of stories (2009) as an introduction to the possibilities 
opened up by the biocultural approach was the first step towards this study.  
Grau's (2003) Virtual art — from illusion to immersion was a beacon as was 
Stafford’s (2007) Echo objects — the cognitive work of images. 
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The film discussed in this study is a narrative and narrative has been the subject of 
research in terms of a biocultural approach (Boyd 2009).  One of the reasons for 
taking up the biocultural standpoint in this study is that, although much has been 
said about the “cognitive turn” in film studies, there has been no serious look at 
the film S1mOne.  As  a satire in the oeuvre of the New Zealand/American Niccol 
it deserves attention for its elegant use of the Hollywood “arc” of narrative and 
because film satire in America is dominated by political satire rather than social 
satire.   
In the context of American culture, satire of every kind deserves attention, 
whether it is Colbert’s political and critical pedagogy, Moore’s endless deflation 
of the chicanery practised by government in relation to war, the cult of the 
individual at the expense of sociality in South Park or Niccol’s ironic deflation of 
entertainment’s foolish celebrities, all of it calls into question the globalising and 
dominating values of the country which are expanding to every place on the 
earth's surface. A biocultural approach is a valuable way to investigate the close 
connection between culture and biology — a topic which is currently being 
scrutinised in disciplines other than film studies.  The use of the biocultural 
approach to narratives is a way of accommodating what amounts to revolutionary 
scientific findings and technology over the last four decades. 
Narratives have always been used to disseminate knowledge to the society in 
which they arise and are spread.  Some scholars, like Oatley (2002), claim that 
there is a particular value in fictional stories, to encourage empathy, which is 
sometimes referred to as the emotional knowledge or information about inner 
workings of emotions in ourselves and others.  He understands that the power of 
fictional stories, as opposed to non-fiction, lies exactly in the empathic responses 
humans produce while listening to, watching or reading stories about others’ 
experiences and the human trait of being available for strong identification with 
the characters of such fictions.  Oatley (2002:39) explains in a nutshell his ideas 
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about empathy: 
I think the reason fiction but not non-fiction has the effect of 
improving empathy is because fiction is primarily about selves 
interacting with other selves […]. We can think about it in terms of 
psychology of expertise. If I read fiction, this kind of social thinking is 
what I get better at.  If I read genetics or astronomy, I [become] more 
expert at genetics or astronomy. 
In this view of the value of fiction, a simulation becomes the desired re—
enactment of emotional states and processes which are transferable through media 
such as stories, films and other cultural objects from human to human or human 
groups to human groups.  It is this quality of emotional knowledge transfer, 
according to Hirsten (2005) and Nicholson (2013) that can be both enabling and 
incapacitating for humans.  Nicholson (2013 loc 673) observes that it is disturbing 
to reflect on and acknowledge the power of the human propensity (the 
fundamental need for stories that can be believed in and adopted as the map for 
human interaction) to make ourselves vulnerable and open to stories.  Of course in 
this way we allow abuse by “cohorts of myth-makers and truth-pedlars who have 
consciously enlisted storytelling as a tool of influence” (Nicholson 2013:loc 673). 
But narratives and stories, like metaphors have their roots in our very biology, 
our embodied minds (Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Boyd & Richerson 2005).  
Narrative is one of the key ways in which humans construe their worlds and 
experiences so as to make sense in what might otherwise be a daunting and 
terrifying environment as many studies of brain damaged individuals have 
shown (Ramachandran 1998; Stroud 2008). 
Most narratives rely on language.  When exactly language arose is still a hotly 
debated topic but as mysterious would be the question about when narratives 
were first told.  Certainly at least 10,000 years ago narratives were being written 
down in Sumeria, China, and Egypt (Mithen 2003).  But with the revolutionary 
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advent of technologies to see into and outside the brain simultaneously (such as 
Positron Emission Tomography, PET scans, and the development of the fMRI) it 
has become possible for scientists to deduce many answers to previously 
impenetrable problems of narratives relating to cognition and emotion.  
Although narrative as a form of cultural object is the direct outcome of our 
human cognitive structures, the content of such objects is intuitively felt as open 
for interpretative actions. But, interpretation, pattern recognition, information 
processing, securing attention and problem solving, all the traits needed for 
interpretation, are part of human cognitive processes also. 
For a narrative to transmit knowledge there are two necessary grounds for 
cognition — first there must be a transmission from one mind to another 
consciously alert mind and secondly, there has to be a persistence in time during 
which something is modelled and something is mimicked or learned (Givón 
2005). Many variations are enabled in this way and this strengthens the ongoing 
evolution of culture.  Renaissance painters such as da Vinci trained their 
apprentices in this old way based on an intuition of how learning came about 
(Vasari 2008). 
Boyd and Richerson’s research over three decades (2005) provides a framework 
of constituents for the evolution of culture, and includes the model of “Darwinian 
evolutionary processes” based on “cultural variants” — these are results of and 
causes for changes of ideas and values. Innovative narrative artists are part of the 
cultural variant species which all cultures need in order to remain vigorous. The 
examination of the film in terms of points that Boyd and Richerson provide in 
their analysis of how culture evolves, was a valuable test for my approach to the 
biocultural critique and has confirmed its usefulness for me. 
With information as illuminating as that which is now available to humanities 
scholars, not only to scientists, it would be a pity not to pursue Boyd’s (2009) 
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path into a biocultural investigation of cultural objects.   
The old debates between the humanities and sciences can be revisited and many 
new ideas and insights become available to the intellectual world from the 
fruitful mix of the two approaches.  Topics from neuroscience and anthropology 
such as the ToM amplify our understanding of literature (Zunshine 2006), or, as 
Stafford’s (2007) work in fine arts shows — neuroscientific findings applied to 
those works can explain them in novel ways.  We are drawn back to the 
realisation that the author or creator of a cultural object is an autonomous, 
innovative, adaptive and perceptive being, who does not deserve to be dismissed 
as in many Postmodernist critiques because that leads to sterile conclusions.  The 
recent development of technologies that enable viewing of activities that range 
from the workings of the human brain to satellite movements has an effect not 
only on the expansion of knowledge but naturally contributes to the increase of 
the spectrum of visual productions like holograms or 3D movies, virtual 
environments and other simulation technologies.  In addition the way of writing 
about the sciences has evolved to become more accessible to everyone.  The 
mode of writing also reflects the change of attitudes to knowledge and 
information: previously inaccessible findings have been moved to a platform of 
sharing, spreading and popularising rather than protecting.  The work that 
neuroscientists like Damasio (2003, 2006, 2010), Ramachandran (1998, 2011), 
Tomasello (1999, 2003, 2010) or Kandel (2008, 2012) do to contribute their 
knowledge to other disciplines is an effort towards “bridging the two cultures” 
— the sciences and humanities. These new attitudes to knowledge open more 
“gates” to spread ideas throughout “different” knowledge platforms and enable 
what is often called in humanities “the cognitive turn”. This free flow of 
information is the evidence of the evolution of culture at work — through the 
intense exchanges of knowledge within different disciplines by means of the 
accessible way of writing about those ideas.  Through understanding and 
popularising how culture changes and evolves, people everywhere are enabled to 
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notice and ask more vigorously about stifling or harmful ideas in politics, 
religion, and all areas of culture.  Not questioning ideas and cultural practices 
feeds into human credulity and cumulatively can lead to great oppression and 
lack of freedom.  I do not suggest that the biocultural critique prevents this 
happening, but the analysis of S1mOne through that lens has enabled me to 
reflect on ongoing flow and transmission of ideas and their value/or not to 
humans. 
An important question about potentially maladaptive behaviours is why they 
continue to thrive regardless of costs.  In the biological domain maladaptation 
and maladaptive behaviour is dealt with swiftly as it does not carry gains and 
costs too much in energy or survival terms to be continued.  In cultural terms, the 
immediate suspects for spreading potentially maladaptive behaviour are the 
formations of kinships and the adherence to the customs, traditions, beliefs and 
ideas of dominating figures.  Imitation of their ways of being in the world and 
not questioning those ways transmits both, the adaptive and crucial for survival 
behaviour, as well as potentially maladaptive behaviour (Mithen 2003).   
It is the degree of credulity that enables the transmission of culture in the first 
place and imitative behaviour spreads behavioural patterns which, when adopted 
immediately, ensure the survival of particular cultures and their participants; and 
they sustain them. That the very enabler of cultural transmission is at the very 
same time the main culprit of the survival of maladaptive behaviour is ironic.  In 
cultural terms, however, the costs of maladaptive behaviour, unlike in biology, 
are outweighed by costs of acquiring information for survival individually.  The 
transmission of culture encompasses the whole range of well suited and less 
suited behaviours including those accumulated over time as a variety of tools for 
testing and analysing the transmitted information and the methods for the 
exposure of potentially maladaptive, stifling, behaviours.  
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Niccol as a film maker uses his craft as a vehicle to spread his ideas about 
society.  In the script for The Truman Show he discloses the central deception 
about how we are imprisoned in our thinking with the allegory of a man who is 
entirely imprisoned in virtual reality.  In Gattaca, a film about a future society 
that is governed by the genetic engineering, Niccol drives home the fact that 
technology can limit development, freedom, humanness amongst humans and 
points to an incorrect governing relationship between signified and signifier.  In 
The Lord of War, Niccol points at the maladaptive practice of the undercover 
condoning of illegal arms trading by leading world governments.  In his latest 
film In time (2011) he ridicules a social system based on unequal access to 
resources.  All these films comment on maladaptive human behaviours. In 
S1mOne the excessive status given to individuals is targeted.  Mocking of the 
potentially maladaptive behaviour is the signature of this auteur. 
Through Niccol’s satire about movie production and technology in S1mOne he 
suggests the possibility of cognitive and emotional entanglements with 
simulations. The issue of mental entanglement, however, might have less to do 
with technology and more with the lack of equilibrium between the creative and 
the inhibiting forces (Hirstein 2005) that play a role in the human ability to 
confabulate and relate through stories.  Taransky, preoccupied with ‘damage 
control’ of situations which might expose the true nature of his synthetic actress, 
does not spend any time on reflecting and interpreting his own actions.  Given 
the human propensity, foible, for confabulations it is not unexpected in the film, 
that when its main character, after designing labyrinthine duplicities, loses 
himself within them, he tries to repair his mounting problems by further 
exercising his skill at creating more and more deceptions. One lie leads to the 
next… 
What Niccol points to satirically by showing the excesses to which Taransky 
goes only to find himself overwhelmed by his creation is a general, unstated but 
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lively fear which the public has of virtual realities taking over the real world as 
we know and experience it (Surrogates, Gamer, or Blade Runner).  The Truman 
Show was Niccol’s opposite stab at the same problem — the confusion which 
results from making what is unreal hyperreal).  Whereas Irishmen feared the 
beggars in Swift's streets as they were so numerous as to overwhelm genteel 
folk, nowadays some people worry about our children’s engagement with 
technology in case they cannot distinguish the real from the unreal.  What is 
clear though is that Niccol uses narrative and simulation to good effect in the 
film.  He pokes fun at himself in making Taransky a fool and someone who 
discredits his own profession as a filmmaker and director (Duval 2007). 
Hollywood is revealed in S1mOne to be the venal, mega business industry it is. 
One might argue that the culture of successful filmmaking has been driven by 
that intuitive grasp of cognitive processes and the ‘tricks’ of filmmaking are 
passed on and their spread results in the expansion of the techniques.  This is the 
example of the transmission of culture Tomasello (2010) talks about. 
Transmission of the culture of filmmaking happens at many levels: transmission 
of culture to the film industry, to the spectator, transmissions of skills to all the 
directors who are watching and analysing the films by others film makers.  And 
this is what a cultural tool does — it propagates itself.  Transfer of the intuitive 
repository of understanding of how film makers can exploit the biological base 
for storytelling proceeds apace. 
Satire is Niccol’s way of reminding his peers he understands how venal the film 
industry is. Satire is one of the examples of methods used to expose maladaptive 
behaviours and it is a valuable vehicle to rapidly and widely spread ridicule of 
disturbed and disturbing actions and beliefs — maladaptive ones.  It is the 
human form, face and its expressions that humans respond so strongly to that 
ensures imitation, the success in the evolution of culture and its different forms 
181 
 
that proliferate in visual forms of communication.  The satire Niccol aims at his 
viewers, when examined from a biocultural perspective, becomes less amusing 
as the realisation dawns on a reflective viewer that idolatrous attitudes to 
celebrities have roots in the human wiring for pattern recognition, the use of 
which is exercised almost immediately after birth by babies in relation to human 
faces.  Metacognition, when functioning in line with satirical communication, is 
deemed to activate learning, provided that spectators reflect on what the satire 
targets. Questions about our humanity and its nature have always been central in 
the reflections about the world and ourselves.  The ‘cognitive turn’ and the 
biological insights into human culture, like Darwinian ideas, result in a way of 
reflecting on humanness differently.  The old debates about the divisions 
between nature and nurture can be directed toward fresher grounds where the 
connectedness and dependency of culture on biology are unfolded. 
Our human emotional range, such as sadness, anger, happiness and joy as well as 
all the nuanced emotional states, is exploited by satirists — some cultural objects 
are not only for reflection on human cognition but have entertainment value, a 
unique feature of the species.  Boyd (2009) and Nicholson (2013) observe that 
there is a need for a deeper examination on the part of cognitive sciences of the 
distinctively human phenomenon of the sense of humour.  Although Darwin 
believed that laughter is universal and humans share it with the apes, yet 
cognitive processes involved in sharing a joke as a metaphorical shortcut that 
takes us right into the core of the matter, are still fairly mysterious.  Kandel 
(2008:387) supports the idea that it is the exaggeration which underpins 
caricatures and satire that conveys emotions and influences “the brain’s 
perceptual and empathic processes”.  
Both Damasio (2010) and Johnson (2008) attempt to explain the role of emotions 
in human cognition.  The way that genes and culture have evolved over millions 
of years to appear in the forms they have at present, among humans, seems to go 
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back to the deepest biological/cytological needs of all organisms on earth for 
survival — the need for homeostasis (Damasio 2010).  Laughter and humour 
perhaps help restore that homeostasis emotionally.  (Sadly the bulk of funding 
for cognitive research is allocated to exploring cognitive systems like pattern 
recognition which can be used for enlarging our technologies, and not laughter.) 
Culture transmission becomes more potent and widespread than ever because of 
many factors.  Popularisation of scientific knowledge that is made accessible to 
the public not only about the neuroscientific and cognitive basis for culture but 
also about the way the culture is processed and changed by the principles of 
evolution.  The accumulation and development of technical resources for making 
simulations and narratives that transmit the range of scientific and emotional 
knowledge depend themselves on the biological ability humans have for passing 
on and transmitting information.   
Art-making is an active actor which participates in the evolution of culture and is 
especially “profitable” for accessing and the spreading of both technological and 
the emotional knowledge.  The emotional knowledge for the spread of 
behavioural options, if seen from the point of view offered by Damasio (2010) or 
Kandel (2008), proves to be of evolutionary value for culture — as it is the 
emotional biological base that enables behavioural patterns that seek the release 
from pain and fear and the search for joy, trust and wellbeing. 
There is no single unifying biocultural framework which can be used to critique 
a cultural object.  The establishing of new methodologies in view of new 
information is one of the very characteristics of the processes that underlie the 
evolution of culture.  The desirability of “cultural selections” which allows good 
adaptations to survive and cognitive work to be done is part of new ways of 
interpreting the world.  Controlling ideas and methodologies by academics, 
politicians, or religious leaders stifle cultural evolution.  It is surely more 
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valuable to spread new ideas into the larger social and cultural landscapes so that 
more people have the freedom to interpret their environment and experiences.  
Some general conclusions about biocultural analysis are that it can prompt the 
maker of such an analysis to broaden her or his scope of knowledge originating 
from the humanities and enter the rich field of the sciences.  As the biocultural 
approach is not rigid or prescriptive it affords freedom of choice in designing 
one’s own layout for such analysis.   
Further, it points at the larger picture of human sociality within the analysis of 
culture and supplements the contextualization of the postmodern cultural 
criticism.  A biocultural approach enables us to encompass views of nature — 
where biological “inventions”, like an eye or pain receptors, are spread across 
species and that deepens our compassionate interaction with the environment.  
The approach allows for dynamic engagement of the humanities with the world 
of science in which new discoveries about human cognition may be 
communicated speedily because of the nature of close cooperative strategies in 
the sciences.  Of course, a biocultural approach is open to certain dangers of a 
superficial imposition of biological terms and jargon and so to useless 
conclusions in cultural analysis. One of the chief conclusions emerging from the 
employment of a biocultural approach to analysis of cultural objects concerns 
attitudes to art as societal, political or “pure” self-expression.  Art throughout the 
ages has been considered to be an expression or a reflection of social climate, 
social powers or an individual on understanding the world or environment, 
depending on the prevailing critical attitude.  A biocultural approach to culture 
allows for the emergence of yet another kind of expression — art as a direct 
expression of human biology. 
A biocultural approach to the analysis of culture has been employed in this study 
in order to arrive at insights concerning the use of such an approach.  This 
includes the benefits and advantages as well as potential problems the biocultural 
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approach can pose for art critics.  As the biocultural approach is relatively new 
and for some humanist scholars entering the field of hard sciences, like cognitive 
science or neuroscience, it is not enticing.  The other potential problem (typically 
dealt with by humanists in relation to science) can be that a biocultural approach 
can be accused of determinism — however, it is contrary to the knowledge 
provided by neuroscience about the malleability of the human brain which 
refutes the deterministic attitudes in humans. 
There is a great value in this approach for education in general but especially for 
the teaching of visual arts and multimedia as it exposes the foundations of visual 
communication as both culturally and biologically enabled.  The understanding 
of the principles of visual arts like that of composition or sequencing and 
structuring of ideas in multimedia films and animations is the backbone of that 
artmaking. When such understanding is underpinned by the realisation that all 
these principles are not only a culturally shaped set of devices we use to 
communicate with each other but that they are biologically enabled in the first 
place by imitation, pattern recognition, wiring for storytelling, language and 
metaphors, a different appreciation of the ‘tools of the trade’ is achieved.  
Filmmaking, storytelling or art often thought of as the efforts of individuals 
allow themselves to be seen as also part of a bigger, collective effort humans 
have made for spreading culture and insights about human behaviour of all 
kinds.  The effective methods of ‘teaching’ art and multimedia by example and 
imitation, as it is usually done in any case, are confirmed as biologically and 
culturally grounded.  However teachers like me, by entering the field of 
biocultural critiques of cultural objects, are given an additional didactic tool for 
reflecting on their own teaching. 
A biocultural analysis of cultural texts and objects relies on a combination of 
actions which simultaneously deal with cultural and biological phenomena 
which enable and facilitate human understanding of the particular object under 
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such analysis.  How makers of cultural objects exploit our biological selves to 
emphasise where they want attention to be focused in an object means a good 
understanding of that biology is enabling for visual arts practitioners.  In 
defining relationships between biological and cultural agents in a cultural object 
in terms of its form and content, actions such as pattern recognition, repetition, 
pointing, categorising and interpretation play a large role.  The form of cultural 
objects is a direct outcome of the human cognitive make-up.  The content of 
cultural objects is typically thought of as open for interpretative actions — but 
these actions in turn also rely on cognitive processes like anticipation, mind-
reading, pattern recognition and emotional resonance and elevation. 
A key element in this study has been simulation which is based on shared mental 
models and audiences who carry the mental models and respond to these models 
in varying degrees.  Simulation and storytelling depend on the human capacity 
for empathy which is often described by cognitive science researchers as the 
power to identify oneself with a person or an object and, through this particular 
ability, humans are enabled to create stable inter-personal and inter-group 
relationships in which negotiations, transfer of knowledge and cooperation can 
be achieved. According to Gazzaniga (2005), Ramachandran (2011) and 
Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004, 2008), empathy has most probably been enabled 
by mirror neurons and is the key to the ‘mind-reading’ phenomenon that serves 
the recognition of emotions and intentions of others (ToM).  One of Niccol's 
strategies is to have the spectators empathise with Taransky remembering their 
own blunders.  So Niccol draws his audience in. 
Niccol exploits our empathy with simulations to satirical advantage.  Although 
he does conclude the film, S1mOne, with a confirmation of the potency of 
simulation, he immediately cautions that it is belief in fiction/unreality and 
simulations that brings about cognitive confusion.  Niccol’s construction of 
being caught in the grip of these powerful opposite outcomes of storytelling is 
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compelling and satirical, even more so as it is the protagonist himself who is the 
originator of the simulated actress and stories about her.  It is the believable 
account of the cognitive ‘meltdown’, however, of what Taransky experiences on 
a psychological level by fusing his Self with the invented Self of Simone that 
signals the vulnerability of human perceptions in deceptive situations. 
The conclusions about the hyperreal qualities of simulation by Baudrillard 
(1996) and Eco (1986) are confirmed in Niccol’s film — the essential properties 
of simulations to supplement or supplant reality can be described as being 
debated in the film.  From the cultural perspective many intuitions and inklings 
about the value of simulation and imitation are formed.  However, the 
explanations of how human cognition depends on simulation and imitation in all 
aspects of human communication are accounted for by scientists in the field.  
Gallese (2003:521) proposes: 
... that simulation, that is, how we model reality, is the only epistemic 
strategy available to organisms such as ourselves deriving their 
knowledge of the world by check means of interactions with the 
world.  What we call the representation of reality is not a copy of what 
is objectively given, but an interactive model of what cannot be known 
in itself.  Of course, this also holds for the social interpersonal reality 
in which we spend all our lives. 
Technology is filled with human content, and technological advances are shaped 
for and around human capacities for transmission of information and knowledge, 
reading of other minds, perception, and sharing of empathy.  If there is no value 
for humans in the transmission of information, the emergence and the 
development of the Internet, Facebook accounts filled with human events and 
opinions or the satellite communication would not have succeeded.  However, 
technology is often perceived as something that is separate from humanity and 
something to be wary of. 
Niccol through Taransky’s voice shares the opinion with his viewers that the 
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human ability to produce fakes outgrows the capacity to unravel duplicities and 
deceptions, as discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  The duplicities and 
deceptions are part of potentially maladaptive behaviour for short term gains — 
like extensive and unjustified access to resources or attaining excessive status — 
and form the part of the biological package which enables the transmission of 
culture.  The degree of credulity and gullibility that is necessary to accept and 
spread ideas can also be used for dissemination of false ideas and confabulations.  
That the content of technology is human and that technology arises from 
adaptive behavioural patterns to transmit information about all aspects of human 
life is already hinted at in the Greek root of the word ‘techne’ which means ‘the 
way of making things’, and it is the human way of making things which are 
vehicles of and for the sharing of knowledge. 
Attitudes to simulation vary depending on the cultural, scientific and 
philosophical bias of those writing about it, but current research has established 
its biological basis especially through recent findings about the operation of 
mirror neurons (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta & Lenzi 2003; Keysers & 
Gazzola 2007; Ramachandran 2011). I have argued through the analysis of 
S1mOne that simulation in cultural objects can act as a means of cognition. 
Finally, the argument of this study is that cultural objects, including human 
simulacra such as sculptures, artistic representations of human beings, and 
invented simulacra serve to spread cognition in several ways.  These ways can be 
summarised hierarchically as, first, what the maker of the simulacrum intends his 
audience to understand — this is embedded in a particular time, place and culture.  
Secondly, stepping back and reflecting on the way in which cognition is 
transmitted through the maker and his simulacrum, it is worth noting that humans 
can interact with the simulacrum and do so.  The third point is that although the 
simulacrum is known and recognised as an illusion, it can still set off a train of 
consequences which affect the real world of those who have interacted with it.  
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Deceptions, dreams, visions, hallucinations, illusions, the world of virtual reality, 
statues, sculptures, artworks, all kinds of objects relying on mimesis can give 
rise to the problem of reliably distinguishing between the simulacrum and what it 
imitates.  I have argued that makers of cultural objects depend on exploitation 
and manipulation of the biological characteristics which secure the attention of 
the viewers of the objects.  The creators of cultural objects rely on pattern 
recognition to secure the attention of their audience and to satisfy the audience's 
bioculturally grounded desire for patterns. As Boyd (2009:86) puts it: “The high 
concentrations of pattern that art delivers repeatedly engage and activate 
individual brains and over time alter their wiring to modify key human 
perceptual, cognitive, and expressive systems, especially in terms of sight, 
hearing, movement, and social cognition.” 
The makers of cultural objects face a range of problems — mimetic, perceptual, 
cultural, political, epistemic problems of identity and of representation, not to 
mention the economic necessity of making a living.  Through the solutions to 
these various problems offered by makers of cultural objects the evolution of 
culture continues.  The method applied in this study is that of linking the 
characteristics of the individual cultural object to the biological base that enables 
the creator of the object to exploit the possibilities of both the object and the 
biology of the viewer to achieve the transmission of cognition. 
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